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THE DEMONIC IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA

Hazel Johannessen

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Contents

Abbreviations

ABBREVIATIONS FOR WORKS BY EUSEBIUS

CH	*Contra Hieroclem*
CI	*Commentarii in Isaiam*
CM	*Contra Marcellum*
CPs	*Commentarii in Psalmos*
DE	*Demonstratio Evangelica*
De eccl. theol.	*De ecclesiastica theologia*
Ecl. Proph.	*Eclogae Propheticae*
Fr. Luc.	*Fragmenta in Lucam*
GEI	*Generalis elementaria introductio*
HE	*Historia ecclesiastica*
LC	*De laudibus Constantini*
Mart. Pal. [LR]	*De martyribus Palaestinae* [Long Recension]
Mart. Pal. [SR]	*De martyribus Palaestinae* [Short Recension]
Onom.	*Onomasticon*
PE	*Praeparatio Evangelica*
SC	*De sepulchro Christi*
Theoph.	*Theophania*
VC	*Vita Constantini*

OTHER ABBREVIATIONS

AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
ANRW	*Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972–).
BICS	*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*
C&E	T. D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
CPG	*Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, ed. M. Geerard, Corpus Christianorum (Turnhout: Brepols, 1974–2003).

CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
GCS	Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte
GRBS	*Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JECS	*Journal of Early Christian Studies*
JEH	*Journal of Ecclesiastical History*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
JRS	*Journal of Roman Studies*
JTS	*Journal of Theological Studies*
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LSJ	*A Greek-English Lexicon*, compiled by H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, revised by H. S. Jones, with the assistance of R. McKenzie, 9th edn with a revised supplement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
NPNF	Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers Series, ed. P. Schaff and H. Wace
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
PG	*Patrologiae cursus completus . . . Series Graeca*, ed. J. P. Migne, 161 vols (Paris: Seu Petit-Montrouge, 1857–66).
PGL	*A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, ed. G. W. H. Lampe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
REL	*Revue des études latines*
TAPA	*Transactions of the American Philological Association*
TU	Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
ZNW	*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche*

Note on Translations

Translations from Greek and Latin are my own, unless otherwise indicated. For many of Eusebius' works, translations already exist in a number of modern European languages and I have consulted several of these at various points. Any translations consulted are listed in the Bibliography. For those of Eusebius' works which survive only in a Syriac translation, such as the *Theophania* and long recension of the *De martyribus Palaestinae*, I have been entirely dependent on the translations of S. Lee, and H. J. Lawlor and J. E. L. Oulton, both of which are listed in the Bibliography. For biblical texts I have, for the most part, adopted the NRSV translation, except in those cases where the Septuagint text quoted by Eusebius calls for a slightly different translation. Modern language translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

Note on Citations

There is some variation in the citation style for Eusebius' works. For the sake of clarity, I outline here the style I have adopted, which differs between his works. Where possible, works are cited according to book, chapter, and section number, as appropriate. Where this is not possible, they are cited according to page and line number in the relevant edition. Those works which have not been edited into a modern critical edition are cited according to their volume, column, and line number in Migne's *Patrologia Graeca*.

Chronological Table

This table summarizes the conclusions reached in Chapter 1 concerning the dates of Eusebius' works.

290s	*Canones Evangelicae*
before 303	*Chronicon* begun
307–10	*Apologia pro Origene*, co-authored with Pamphilus
before 313	1st edition of the *Chronicon*
*c.*310	*Generalis elementaria introductio (Eclogae Propheticae)*
*c.*311	Long recension of the *De martyribus Palaestinae*
*c.*312	*Contra Hieroclem*
*c.*313	1st edition of the *Historia ecclesiatica* (books 1–8)
*c.*313–20	*Praeparatio* and *Demonstratio Evangelica* written
315	*Oration on the Church at Tyre* (*HE*10.4)
*c.*315–20	*Quaestiones Evangelicae*
after 324	*Onomasticon*
after 325	*Commentarii in Isaiam*, *De solemnitate Paschali*, and *Theophania*
after 326	*Commentary on the Psalms*
335	*De sepulchro Christi* delivered
336	*De laudibus Constantini* delivered
336–8	*De ecclesiastica theologia* and *Contra Marcellum*
337–9	*Vita Constantini*

Introduction

To many scholars of late antiquity, Eusebius of Caesarea (d. 339) will seem a familiar figure. His *Historia ecclesiastica* (*HE*) is one of the most important sources for the history of the early Christian church[1]—likewise his *Vita Constantini* (*VC*) and *De laudibus Constantini* (*LC*) are invaluable for those studying the reign of Constantine.[2] The *Praeparatio Evangelica* (*PE*) contains extensive quotations, preserving lengthy fragments of earlier works that would otherwise have been lost.[3] Alongside these texts, Eusebius also left several works of biblical scholarship and exegesis, as well as of theological polemic—all written in a period of dramatic political and religious upheaval.[4] In consequence, it is hardly surprising that he has long attracted the attention of scholars, or that work on Eusebius continues to flourish today.[5] The reader might therefore be forgiven for wondering what this present study can add to an already considerable body of scholarship.

[1] T. Heyne, 'The Devious Eusebius? An Evaluation of the *Ecclesiastical History* and its Critics', *Studia Patristica* 46 (2010), 325.

[2] A. Cameron, 'Eusebius of Caesarea', in S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, eds., *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 575.

[3] A. P. Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 13.

[4] On Eusebius' works and their context, see Chapter 1.

[5] The range of work currently being pursued on Eusebius, as well as a trend towards greater consideration of his less-studied works, is illustrated by the recent collection of papers: A. P. Johnson and J. M. Schott, eds., *Eusebius of Caesarea: Tradition and Innovations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). Eusebius' significance is acknowledged by the recent inclusion of an introduction to his works in the *Understanding Classics* series: A. P. Johnson, *Eusebius* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014).

The answer is simple—until now, there has been no comprehensive study of the role played by Eusebius' ideas about δαίμονες (demons) in shaping his thought. This book will highlight the prominent place occupied by demons in Eusebius' cosmology. In doing so, it will shed fresh light on Eusebius' ideas about human agency and moral responsibility, salvation history, and the role of a Christian emperor. With the exception of Eusebius' views on moral responsibility, which, as I will show in Chapter 4, merit rather more attention than they have hitherto received, these are topics that have long been of interest to Eusebian scholars. However, by examining these subjects through the prism of Eusebius' ideas about demons, this study will offer a very different interpretation of Eusebius from that with which late antique scholars are familiar. It will present a Eusebius far less at ease in his world than is generally assumed and will suggest that we need to reconsider the common belief that Eusebius was a complacent optimist.

PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP

Scholarship on Eusebius falls broadly into two main categories—that which uses Eusebius' works as a source of information either about the events they describe or about the emperor Constantine, and that which manifests an interest in Eusebius' ideas in their own right. The first approach has a long history and has frequently been linked to scholars' desire to understand the religious views and motives of the emperor Constantine. This trend in the scholarship can be seen as far back as the work of Jacob Burckhardt,[6] and arguably reached its peak over a century later in the comprehensive study of Timothy Barnes.[7] Despite their similar interest in using Eusebius' works to assess the figure of Constantine, these two scholars held directly opposite views of Eusebius himself. For Burckhardt, he was 'the first thoroughly dishonest historian of antiquity',[8] while Barnes, by contrast, suggested that Eusebius' works reveal his 'evident care and honesty'.[9]

[6] J. Burckhardt, *The Age of Constantine the Great*, trans. M. Hadas (New York: Dorset Press, 1989 [originally published in German, 1853]).
[7] *C&E*. [8] Burckhardt, *Age of Constantine*, 283. [9] *C&E*, 141.

Unsurprisingly, this led to very different characterizations of Constantine. According to Burckhardt, Constantine was a canny politician, whose attitude towards religious matters was one of 'political expediency',[10] yet Barnes, relying heavily on Eusebius' own portraits of the emperor, presented Constantine as a committed Christian.[11] Barnes, of course, was not uncritical of Eusebius—he notes that there are 'serious chronological errors' in Eusebius' *HE*,[12] and also points out that Eusebius often paraphrased and shortened his quotations in a way that might 'misrepresent' the original material.[13] Nevertheless, Barnes attributed such misquotation to scribal error.[14] Barnes' primary interest thus lay in the use of Eusebius' works to produce a picture of Constantine, rather than in an examination of Eusebius' rhetorical and literary technique.[15]

This question of Eusebius' 'reliability' recurs frequently as part of this first strand of Eusebian scholarship. Although it has been shown that at least one of the contemporary documents Eusebius quotes in his work was reported accurately,[16] this cannot, as Averil Cameron has pointed out, prove the accuracy of all the similar sources which he cites.[17] At times, Eusebius has received a rather negative assessment from modern historians hoping to find in his works an approach to historiography similar to their own.[18] This approach to Eusebius—using his works as more-or-less reliable 'sources' for the reign of Constantine—has, however, been challenged in more recent scholarship. Focusing in particular on the acutely problematic *VC*,[19]

[10] Burckhardt, *Age of Constantine*, 283. [11] *C&E*, especially 275.
[12] *C&E*, 146. [13] *C&E*, 141. [14] *C&E*, 141.
[15] See the review of A. Cameron, 'Constantinus Christianus', *JRS* 73 (1983), 184–90.
[16] A. H. M. Jones and T. C. Skeat, 'Notes on the Genuineness of the Constantinian Documents in Eusebius' *Life of Constantine*', *JEH* 5 (1954), 196–200.
[17] Cameron, 'Constantinus Christianus', 188.
[18] For example: Burckhardt, *Age of Constantine*, 283; K. M. Setton, *Christian Attitude towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1941); 42; T. G. Elliott, 'Eusebian Frauds in the *Vita Constantini*', *Phoenix* 45 (1991), 162–71; M. Grant, *The Emperor Constantine* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1993), 4–5; R. M. Grant, 'The Case against Eusebius: Or, Did the Father of Church History Write History?', *Studia Patristica* 12 (1975), 413.
[19] See, in particular: A. Cameron, 'Eusebius of Caesarea and the Rethinking of History', in E. Gabba, ed., *Tria Corda: Scritti in onore di Arnaldo Momigliano* (Como: Edizioni New Press, 1983), 71–88; A. Cameron, 'Eusebius' *Vita Constantini* and the Construction of Constantine', in M. J. Edwards and S. Swain, eds., *Portraits: Biographical Representations in the Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire*

Cameron has argued that Eusebius' works are 'unsuited to positivist critique'.[20] Elizabeth Clark has similarly noted the difficulty of using early Christian texts, such as the works of Eusebius, as 'sources of social data', arguing instead that we need to treat them 'first and foremost as literary productions'.[21] As a result of this critique of the traditional approach, the past two decades have seen a flourishing of further work on Eusebius—work which, in highlighting the value of studying Eusebius' ideas in their own right, falls firmly into the second category of scholarship on Eusebius.[22]

Of course, while study of Eusebius as a thinker and writer has received a new impetus and new direction in recent years, interest in Eusebius' thought is not entirely a phenomenon of the past two decades. In particular, scholarly interest in the past has tended to focus on Eusebius' political thought and his ideas about kingship and empire.[23] For many scholars, Eusebius' so-called 'Constantinian' writings—the *VC*, *LC*, and later books of the *HE*—can be said to have laid the foundations of later Byzantine theories of kingship.[24]

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 145–74; A. Cameron, 'Form and Meaning: The *Vita Constantini* and the *Vita Antonii*', in T. Hägg and P. Rousseau, eds., *Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 72–88. See also: Eusebius, *Life of Constantine*, trans. with intro. and commentary by A. Cameron and S. G. Hall (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) (henceforward cited as Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*).

[20] Cameron, 'Construction', 155. For further critique of Barnes' approach, see: A. Cameron, 'History and the Individuality of the Historian: The Interpretation of Late Antiquity', in C. Straw and R. Lim, eds., *The Past before Us: The Challenge of Historiographies of Late Antiquity* (Turhout: Brepols, 2004), 75.

[21] E. A. Clark, *History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 159. See also: Cameron, 'Form and Meaning', 86.

[22] This approach to Eusebius is exemplified in two recent edited collections: S. Inowlocki and C. Zamagni, eds., *Reconsidering Eusebius: Collected Papers on Literary, Historical and Theological Issues* (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations*.

[23] For example: N. H. Baynes, 'Eusebius and the Christian Empire', in N. H. Baynes, *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London: The Althone Press, 1955), 168–72, repr. from *Mélanges Bidez: Annuaire de l'institut de philology et d'histoire orientales* ii (Brussels, 1933), 13–18; R. Farina, *L'impero e l'imperatore Cristiano in Eusebio di Cesarea: La prima teologia politica del Cristianesimo* (Zurich: Pas Verlag, 1966); F. E. Cranz, 'Kingdom and Polity in Eusebius of Caesarea', *HTR* 45 (1952), 47–66; H. Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche in der Geschichtstheologie Eusebs von Cäsarea', *ZNW* 38 (1939), 97–115; J. M. Sansterre, 'Eusèbe de Césarée et la naissance de la théorie "césaropapiste"', *Byzantion* 42 (1972), 532–94.

[24] For example: F. Dvornik, *Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background* (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1966), vol. II, 616;

Following the work of E. Peterson, there has also been a tendency to characterize Eusebius as a 'political theologian', whose theological views were moulded to support an idea of divinely appointed supreme monarchy.[25] In many accounts, Eusebius appears as little more than a mouthpiece of the emperor Constantine.[26] More sympathetic readings have denied that Eusebius' theology bent to fit his political views and have suggested instead that Eusebius' existing theological views predisposed him to welcome the Constantinian regime and to justify it in the manner he did.[27]

Recent scholarship has tended to move away from this servile characterization of Eusebius and from a preoccupation with his political writings by turning to examine some of his previously neglected works.[28] These include works of exegesis and biblical commentary in which references to the empire and emperor occupy a less prominent place.[29] This has led scholars more recently to stress the

Baynes, 'Eusebius and the Christian Empire', 168–72; Farina, *L'impero*, 257; H. Ahrweiler, 'Eusebius of Caesarea and the Imperial Christian Idea', in A. Raban and K. G. Holum, eds., *Caesarea Maritima: A Retrospective after Two Millennia* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 541–6.

[25] E. Peterson, *Der Monotheismus Als Politisches Problem: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Politischen Theologie im Imperium Romanum* (Leipzig: Jakob Hegner, 1935), 71–84—recently translated in: E. Peterson, *Theological Tractates*, ed. and trans. with an intro. by M. J. Hollerich (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 68–105. See also: C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 183; A. H. M. Jones, *Constantine and the Conversion of Europe* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), 253; H. Berkhoff, *Die Theologie de Eusebius von Caesarea* (Amsterdam: Uitgeversmaatschappij Holland, 1939), 22.

[26] For example: P. R. L. Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity: From Marcus Aurelius to Muhammad* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1971), 86; J. Quasten, *Patrology*, vol. 3 (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1960; repr. 1975), 319.

[27] For example: G. Ruhbach, 'Die Politische Theologie Eusebs von Caesarea', in G. Ruhbach, ed., *Die Kirche angesichts der konstantinischen Wende* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 236–58; F. Young, *From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and Its Background* (London: SCM Press, 1983), 16.

[28] For criticism of the older approach and the need to pay greater attention to Eusebius' theological views, see, in particular: M. J. Hollerich, 'Religion and Politics in the Writings of Eusebius: Reassessing the First "Court Theologian"', *Church History* 59 (1990), 309–25.

[29] On Eusebius' works, see Chapter 1. Important work on Eusebius' biblical exegesis includes: M. J. Hollerich, *Eusebius of Caesarea's* Commentary on Isaiah: *Christian Exegesis in the Age of Constantine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); M. J. Hollerich, 'Eusebius' *Commentary on the Psalms* and Its Place in the Origins of Christian Biblical Scholarship', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations*, 151–67.

considerable importance of the church in Eusebius' thought and to focus on the way in which his theological views underpinned much of his thinking, even on high political topics.[30] No doubt this appreciation of a more independent Eusebius has also been facilitated by the recognition, following the work of Barnes, that Eusebius was not a 'court theologian' or close adviser of the emperor Constantine.[31] Rather, he could not have met the emperor more than a few times and was unlikely to have had much, if any, private conversation with him.[32] It is important to emphasize this point, for echoes of the older presentation of Eusebius as a religious advisor to the emperor continue to surface, even in some of the most recent scholarship.[33]

In shifting its focus to the lesser-known areas of Eusebius' *oeuvre*, recent scholarship has also begun to look far beyond Eusebius' ideas about sovereignty and kingship to explore other aspects of his thought. Aaron Johnson, for instance, has established the importance of ideas of ethnicity in Eusebius' presentation of Christian identity.[34] In this, Eusebius' apologetic approach can be seen to correspond to that of other early Christian thinkers.[35] Further work has explored Eusebius' attitude towards other religious groupings of pagans and Jews,[36] or has looked more closely at his theology and his role in the doctrinal disputes of his time.[37] Alongside this, the past two decades

[30] For example: Hollerich, 'Religion and Politics'; Hollerich, *Eusebius' Commentary on Isaiah*.

[31] *C&E*, 266–7. See also: B. H. Warmington, 'Did Constantine Have "Religious Advisers"?', *Studia Patristica* 19 (1989), 117–29. For the older view, see, for example: Quasten, *Patrology*, 309; Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 183–4; F. J. Foakes-Jackson, *Eusebius Pamphili: A Study of the Man and His Writings* (Cambridge: Heffer, 1933), 3; Setton, *Christian Attitude*, 40.

[32] *C&E*, 266.

[33] For instance, I. L. E. Ramelli describes Eusebius as the 'intellectual inspirer' of Constantine: *The Christian Doctrine of* Apokatastasis*: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 310, 312. Similarly, C. Kannengiesser describes him as a 'prominent theological adviser of the Emperor Constantine': *Handbook of Patristic Exegesis: The Bible in Ancient Christianity*, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2004), ii.675.

[34] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*.

[35] On whom, see: D. K. Buell, *Why This New Race? Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

[36] A. Kofsky, *Eusebius of Caesarea against Paganism* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); J. Ulrich, *Euseb von Caesarea und die Juden: Studien zur Rolle der Juden in der Theologie des Eusebius von Caesarea* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999).

[37] J. R. Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, Eusebius and Athanasius* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); M. DelCogliano, 'Eusebian Theologies of the Son as the Image of God before 341', *JECS* 14 (2006), 459–84;

have also produced a number of studies of Eusebius' scholarly background and literary technique, which have done much to improve our understanding of his approach.[38] We are thus much better placed than previous scholars of Eusebius' political thought to situate Eusebius in his broader intellectual context.

THIS STUDY

In focusing above all on Eusebius' thought, this study falls firmly into the second category of scholarship on Eusebius. Its aim is not to explore the religious beliefs of the emperor Constantine, or to establish how rapidly the 'Christianization' of the empire took place; it is rather to shed fresh light on key aspects of Eusebius' thought. In doing so, however, it is by no means ignoring the kinds of historical question that have for so long preoccupied scholars of the later Roman Empire, such as the question of how Christianity came to achieve a position of dominance. As Averil Cameron has shown, the growth and spread of Christianity owed at least as much, if not more, to the language and ideas adopted by early Christian thinkers as it did to the kinds of social, political, and economic factors traditionally emphasized by historians.[39] As a result, Cameron argues that any

M. DelCogliano, 'Eusebius of Caesarea on Asterius of Cappadocia in the Anti-Marcellan Writings: A Case Study of Mutual Defense within the Eusebian Alliance', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations*, 263–87.

[38] For example: A. Grafton and M. Williams, *Christianity and the Transformation of the Book: Origen, Eusebius and the Library of Caesarea* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2006); A. J. Carriker, *The Library of Eusebius of Caesarea* (Leiden: Brill, 2003); S. Inowlocki, *Eusebius and the Jewish Authors: His Citation Technique in an Apologetic Context* (Leiden: Brill, 2006); S. Inowlocki, 'Eusebius's Appropriation of Moses in an Apologetic Context', in A. Graupner and M. Woter, eds., *Moses in Biblical and Extra-Biblical Tradition* (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2007), 241–55; A. J. Droge, 'The Apologetic Dimensions of the *Ecclesiastical History*', in H. W. Attridge and G. Hata, eds., *Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 492–509; E. Gallagher, 'Eusebius the Apologist: The Evidence of the *Preparation* and the *Proof*, *Studia Patristica* 26 (1993), 251–60.

[39] A. Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 22–3. Older studies, which emphasize the importance of social, material, and political factors in encouraging conversion, include: Jones, *Constantine and Conversion*; R. MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire (AD 100–400)* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984).

attempt to understand the spread of Christianity must involve the study of its teachings and of the language and texts in which they were expressed.[40] Examining the views of Eusebius, who was a prominent church leader in this period of transition, can therefore provide considerable insight into some of the many changes that marked the early fourth century.[41]

In addressing questions relating to Eusebius' political thought, this study is building on a long tradition of interest in Eusebius' political ideas. However, unlike earlier work on this topic, which has often tended to focus upon the ideas of kingship and imperial sovereignty presented in later works like the *VC* and *LC*, it will adopt a broader understanding of what may be termed 'political'. Looking beyond those of Eusebius' works which directly discuss Constantine and the high political affairs of the empire, this study will examine Eusebius' views on topics such as human agency and responsibility, and the purpose and direction of human history. In influencing Eusebius' understanding of how individuals related to each other, society, and even the wider universe, such views are inherently relevant to 'political' questions about the best form of government for Christians and the most suitable style of leadership. Clear connections between these various topics will emerge over the course of this volume. This broad perspective, exploring the complex network of ideas that underpinned Eusebius' high political speculation, is one new contribution that this study can offer to scholarship on Eusebius' political thought.

A further, more significant innovation lies in the decision to approach Eusebius' thought through the lens of his ideas about demons. Despite prolific references to the demonic throughout many—although not all—of his works, dedicated studies of Eusebius' demonology are almost non-existent. Eusebius' references to demons are at times noted in passing by scholars, but for the most part are subjected only to the most fleeting, if any, analysis.[42] There has hitherto been no

[40] Cameron, *Christianity and Rhetoric*, 32, 46.

[41] Such is the premise of the most recent edited volume on Eusebius: A. P. Johnson, 'Introduction', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations*, 1.

[42] For example: Berkhoff, *Die Theologie*, 100–1, 109–11; H. Strutwolf, *Die Trinitätstheologie und Christologie des Euseb von Caesarea: Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung seiner Platonismusrezeption und Wirkungsgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 213–17; A. Momigliano, 'Pagan and Christian Historiography in the Fourth Century AD' in A. Momigliano, ed., *The Conflict*

study of how Eusebius' ideas about demons, expressed throughout a range of his works, influenced and interacted with his thinking on other subjects.

This tendency to overlook Eusebius' references to the demonic is unfortunate for, as work on other historical periods has demonstrated, examining writers' discussions of demons can reveal a great deal about their views on other subjects. In particular, Stuart Clark's work on early modern demonology has shown how intellectuals of this period could 'think with' demons, using their ideas on this subject to develop their views on other, most notably political, topics.[43] Clark's approach to ideas about the demonic has, however, been the subject of some criticism in more recent scholarship. Ellen Muehlberger, whose work on angels emphasizes the reality of these spiritual beings for late antique thinkers,[44] is particularly dismissive of such an approach, arguing that it implies a 'utilitarian motive' for ideas about angels and fails to allow for this strength of belief.[45] Such concern is justified. Clark's characterization of demons as an 'intellectual resource' makes little allowance for the very real fears about demons which many people in the late antique period must have had and is

between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 90; Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche', 102–3; Cameron, 'Form and Meaning', 76; G. F. Chesnut, *The First Christian Histories: Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret and Evagrius* (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1977), 103; D. S. Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea* (London: Mowbray, 1960), 149, 182; G. W. Trompf, *Early Christian Historiography: Narratives of Retributive Justice* (London: Continuum, 2000), 133; J. Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques d'Eusèbe de Césarée durant la période prénicéene* (Dakar: Université de Dakar, 1961), 183–5, 301–38; J. M. Schott, *Christianity, Empire and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 148; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 163–70. The only work which has focused on Eusebius' ideas about demons until now is Sharron L. Coggan's PhD thesis, which nevertheless restricts itself primarily to Eusebius' discussions in the *Praeparatio Evangelica* and is principally concerned with how Eusebius took over and adapted the earlier Greek terminology of the δαίμων as part of his apologetic effort: S. L. Coggan, 'Pandaemonia: A Study of Eusebius' Recasting of Plutarch's Story of the "Death of Great Pan"', PhD thesis, University of Syracuse, 1992.

[43] S. Clark, *Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), viii.

[44] E. Muehlberger, *Angels in Late Ancient Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 18–19.

[45] Muehlberger, *Angels*, 20. A similar note of caution was sounded by S. Lunn-Rockliffe, 'Thinking with Satan: Diabolical Inspiration and Human Agency in Late Antiquity', paper delivered at the Political Thought and Intellectual History Research Seminar, University of Cambridge, 1 November 2010.

thus unhelpful, at least for writers of Eusebius' era.[46] However, in acknowledging the reality of spiritual beings like angels and demons for thinkers like Eusebius, we do not need to follow Muehlberger in dispensing with the idea that they could be 'good to think with'.[47] Rather, this book combines both the idea of demons as 'good to think with' and the more recent scholarly recognition of the strength of late antique beliefs about demons, highlighted by the work of Gregory Smith,[48] in order to understand Eusebius' thought.

Finally, this study is comparatively unusual in adopting a broad perspective, which embraces a wide variety of Eusebius' works. While this is by no means unprecedented,[49] Eusebius' output was so large that scholars, particularly those interested in Eusebius' thought, have tended to limit themselves either to one specific work,[50] or to a narrow range of his works.[51] Such an approach, although often very fruitful, would not have been appropriate in this case. In order to gain as full and accurate a picture as possible of Eusebius' understanding of the demonic, it is necessary to adopt a broad perspective. Eusebius' apologetic concerns in works such as the *PE* mean that such works often offer only a partial picture of Eusebius' thinking about demons. Of course, references to demons are more plentiful in some of Eusebius' works than in others; inevitably, it is those which contain the most detailed accounts of demons that appear most frequently in this study. Works such as the *PE*, *Demonstratio Evangelica* (*DE*), *HE*, and *VC* have proved particularly fruitful for my examination of Eusebius' ideas about demons and, for that reason alone, will dominate the remaining chapters.

Such a broad perspective brings challenges as well as benefits, raising the question, for instance, of how far we can generalize about a writer's thought from works so different in style and form and often written

[46] Clark, *Thinking with Demons*, viii. The physical reality of demons for late antique thinkers has been highlighted by G. A. Smith, 'How Thin Is a Demon?', *JECS* 16 (2008), 479–512. On Eusebius' concerns about demons, see Chapter 2.

[47] As Lunn-Rockliffe's work shows: 'Thinking with Satan'.

[48] Smith, 'How Thin?'.

[49] For example: *C&E*; Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*.

[50] For example: Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*; S. Morlet, *La* Démonstration Évangélique *d'Eusèbe de Césarée: Étude sur l'apologétique chrétienne à l'époque de Constantin* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2009); M. Verdoner, *Narrated Reality: The* Historia Ecclesiastica *of Eusebius of Caesarea* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011).

[51] Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*.

many years apart. This is a question which I will address more fully in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, it is surely the case that, if we are to understand Eusebius' thought in all its variety and complexity, we need to have a combination of both detailed studies of individual works and broader surveys, since each can reveal different aspects of his thought.

This book thus adopts a new approach to an old issue—the nature of Eusebius' political thought. In doing so, it reaches conclusions about Eusebius' outlook and attitude towards the events of his lifetime that challenge what appears to be one of the most ingrained assumptions of Eusebian scholarship—namely, that he was a triumphal optimist, who viewed the events of his lifetime as the climax of human history. This view seems to be almost universal, even amongst the most recent scholarship on Eusebius.[52] For Barnes, Eusebius' outlook was characterized by 'unrestrained optimism';[53] his works represent 'a celebration of the success of Christianity'.[54] More recently, Johnson has suggested that 'triumphalism is a consistent feature of nearly all his works'.[55] The only question appears to

[52] Exhaustive citation is impossible here; a selection of works which characterize Eusebius as optimistic or triumphalist includes: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', 63–4; Morlet, *La* Démonstration Évangélique, 13; Hollerich, *Eusebius*' Commentary on Isaiah, 26; W. Adler, 'Early Christian Historians and Historiography', in S. A. Harvey and D. G. Hunter, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 595–6; J. R. Lyman, 'Eusebius of Caesarea', in E. Ferguson, M. P. McHugh, F. W. Norris, and D. M. Scholer, eds., *Encyclopedia of Early Christianity* (Chicago: St James Press, 1990), 326–7; P. W. L. Walker, *Holy City, Holy Places? Christian Attitudes to Jerusalem and the Holy Land in the Fourth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 93; C. Kelly, R. Flower, and M. S. Williams, 'Introduction', in C. Kelly, R. Flower, and M. S. Williams, eds., *Unclassical Traditions*, vol. 1: *Alternatives to the Classical Past in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4; D. Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque* (Louvain, 1945; repr. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1973), 345; A. S. Jacobs, *Remains of the Jews: The Holy Land and Christian Empire in Late Antiquity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 46; J. M. Schott, 'Eusebius' *Panegyric on the Building of Churches* (*HE* 10.4.2–72): Aesthetics and the Politics of Christian Architecture', in Inowlocki and Zamagni, eds., *Reconsidering Eusebius*, 177; V. Twomey, *Apostolikos Thronos: The Primacy of Rome as Reflected in the Church History of Eusebius and the Historico-apologetic Writings of St. Athanasius the Great* (Munster Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1982), 201; M. B. Simmons, 'Universalism in Eusebius of Caesarea: The Soteriological Use of *the Divine Power of the Saviour of Us All* in Book III of the *Theophany*', *Studia Patristica* 66 (2013), 132–3; Johnson, *Eusebius*, 67.

[53] *C&E*, 186. [54] *C&E*, 105.

[55] A. P. Johnson, 'The Ends of Transfiguration: Eusebius' *Commentary on Luke* (*PG* 24.549)', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations*, 196, n.23. See also: A. P. Johnson, 'The Blackness of Ethiopians: Classical Ethnography and Eusebius's *Commentary on the Psalms*', *HTR* 99 (2006), 186.

be, not whether Eusebius was an unreserved triumphalist, but when he became so.[56] However this characterization of Eusebius does not sit comfortably with the picture of hostile and threatening demons which this study identifies as a feature of many of his works. This book will therefore argue that this traditional characterization of Eusebius needs to be modified in the light of his views on demons.

Recognizing that an understanding of Eusebius' attitude towards the demonic can have a dramatic impact on how we read other aspects of his thought also has implications for the wider study of Christian demonology in the fourth century. Scholarly interest in this feature of early Christian culture has been growing in recent years, particularly following the publication of David Brakke's monograph *Demons and the Making of the Monk*, which highlighted the role of ideas about demons in the development of the idea of the Christian monk.[57] This has since been followed by studies which explore late antique ideas about the physicality of demons,[58] or the role of demons in works of hagiography, such as the *Vita Antonii*, and literature relating to the lives of desert saints.[59] With few exceptions,[60] however, scholars have appeared reluctant to explore the role of demons in the thought of the educated, intellectual Christians who held positions of leadership in urban communities. This discrepancy has previously been highlighted by Dayna Kalleres' work on the demonology of Gregory of Nazianzus.[61] By showing the importance of ideas of the demonic in Gregory's work, Kalleres also challenged the traditional view that the rich and complex demonology of Evagrius Ponticus

[56] Johnson, 'The Ends of Transfiguration', 196, n.23.

[57] D. Brakke, *Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early Christianity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). On which, see also: R. Valantasis, 'Daemons and the Perfecting of the Monk's Body: Monastic Anthropology, Daemonology, and Asceticism', *Semeia* 58 (1992), 47–79.

[58] Smith, 'How Thin?'.

[59] See, for example: N. Vos, 'Demons Without and Within: The Representation of Demons, the Saint and the Soul in Early Christian Lives, Letters and Sayings', in N. Vos and W. Otten, eds., *Demons and the Devil in Ancient and Medieval Christianity* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 159–82.

[60] Most notably: D. S. Kalleres, 'Demons and Divine Illumination: A Consideration of Eight Prayers by Gregory of Nazianzus', *Vigiliae Christianae* 61 (2007), 157–88; D. S. Kalleres, *City of Demons: Violence, Ritual and Christian Power in Late Antiquity* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015); M. Ludlow, 'Demons, Evil and Liminality in Cappadocian Theology', *JECS* 20 (2012), 179–211.

[61] Kalleres, 'Demons and Divine Illumination', 157–61. See also: Kalleres, *City of Demons*, 1–21.

should be traced to his later ascetic experiences, rather than his earlier training under Gregory.[62]

This problem also reaches much further than Evagrian scholarship, as some comments of Ramsay MacMullen illustrate. Discussing the place of Christian accounts of miracles and exorcisms in encouraging conversion to Christianity, MacMullen suggests that accounts of demonic exorcisms such as those found in Athanasius' *Vita Antonii* would have had the most impact 'among the simple folk illuminated by ascetic experience'.[63] He implies, by contrast, that such accounts would have had little effect on 'the learned and intellectual'.[64] Once again, we see a divide being created between 'learned' Christianity on the one hand and 'simple' or 'ascetic' Christianity on the other. For MacMullen, it appears, beliefs about demons can only be understood in the context of this, supposedly uneducated, Christianity. In focusing on the works of Eusebius, a prominent bishop and leading scholar of the time,[65] this study therefore goes some way towards filling a gap that presently exists in scholarship on early Christian demonology. It also demonstrates some of the benefits that can result from analysing, rather than dismissing, ideas about demons in the works of educated fourth-century Christian leaders. In doing so, this volume echoes the work of Kalleres in highlighting the importance of exploring references to demons in the writings of intellectual Christian elites.

Finally, brief mention of questions of translation and terminology must be made at the outset of this study. I refer throughout to 'demons' rather than the alternative 'daemons' or 'daimons', which represent more neutral translations of the ancient Greek δαίμων. Scholars working on late antique demonology have differed in their choice of the best translation for this word. Sharron Coggan adopted 'demon' when referring to Jewish or Christian uses of the term, and 'daemon' for the more traditional Greek usage. This, she suggested, accurately reflected the different moral connotations which these

[62] Kalleres, 'Demons and Divine Illumination', 187–8.
[63] MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, 112.
[64] Kalleres, 'Demons and Divine Illumination'.
[65] Eusebius' prominence is clear from the fact that he delivered speeches on important religious and imperial occasions—see, for example, *VC* 1.1.1, 4.33.1–2, 4.45.3–46.1. Constantine's request that Eusebius provide him with fifty copies of the Bible for churches in Constantinople suggests that Eusebius' scholarship was highly regarded at the time—see *VC* 4.36.1–4.

different writers attached to the term.[66] Such an approach, however, has rightly been criticized by Dale Martin on the grounds that it might convey the false impression that late antique writers were themselves using different terms.[67] We therefore need to make a choice between the different English terms and must use the same term consistently, regardless of the religious views of the writer under discussion. Martin's own preference for 'daimon' makes perfect sense in the context of a book which is, for the most part, concerned with earlier Greek uses of the word.[68] It would not be appropriate here, however. Like Brakke, who also studied early Christian ideas about demons, I have therefore opted to use the English 'demon'.[69] This more accurately reflects the negative character of these beings for Eusebius than would the more neutral 'daemon'.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This book is divided into six chapters. The first of these gives an overview of Eusebius' *oeuvre*, focusing on those works which have most to contribute to an understanding of his views on demons. It addresses, as necessary, any questions of dating or authenticity and attempts to situate Eusebius' various works in the context of the political and religious developments of the time. In the second chapter our attention turns to Eusebius' ideas about demons. Benefiting from recent work on early Christian demonology, particularly by Gregory Smith,[70] this chapter shows that demons were far more than merely a useful rhetorical tool for Eusebius. On the contrary, it demonstrates that Eusebius had a strikingly physical understanding of the demonic and also believed firmly in demonic power and the ability of demons to cause harm. It therefore argues that we need to move beyond readings of Eusebius' demons simply as metaphors.

The third chapter explores the implications of Eusebius' understanding of demons for his broader cosmology. It shows that Eusebius'

[66] Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', 3.
[67] D. B. Martin, *Inventing Superstition: From the Hippocratics to the Christians* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), xi.
[68] Martin, *Inventing Superstition*, x.
[69] Brakke, *Demons and the Making of the Monk*, 5.
[70] Smith, 'How Thin?'.

belief in a stark divide between the benevolent Christian God and the malevolent demons was reflected in a series of further polarized divisions in his thought. As a result, this chapter asks and answers the question of whether or not Eusebius' cosmology should be characterized as 'dualistic'.

From the fourth chapter onwards, we begin to engage with those aspects of Eusebius' thought that may be seen as more obviously 'political'. The fourth chapter itself offers an unprecedented study of the language of agency and responsibility in Eusebius' works. It moves beyond an anachronistic terminology of 'free will' to demonstrate the importance of the concept of προαίρεσις (loosely translated, 'choice')[71] in Eusebius' understanding of moral responsibility. In consequence, we see the great importance which Eusebius attached to the development of personal virtue in order to resist demonic attacks and achieve salvation. This chapter also sheds new light on Eusebius' presentation of the problematic figure of Licinius.

The fifth chapter addresses the role of demons in Eusebius' view of salvation history. Eusebius' understanding of the purpose of history has long been regarded as central to his perception of the events of his lifetime,[72] particularly to his view of the Roman Empire.[73] This chapter suggests, however, that Eusebius' outlook was rather less 'sanguine' than scholars have generally believed.[74] Where scholars have suggested in the past that Eusebius considered all demonic power to have effectively ceased with the incarnation, this chapter finds evidence that Eusebius believed demons still to be active in his own time. This leads to a reconsideration of Eusebius' presentation of the role of the church and the empire in his works.

Finally, the sixth chapter turns to those questions of sovereignty and imperial virtue that have traditionally dominated work on Eusebius' political thought. Rather than focusing on Eusebius' presentation of Constantine, however, this chapter is primarily concerned with Eusebius' presentation of tyranny. It shows that Eusebius believed non-Christian rulers to be enslaved to malevolent demons, making them, in his view, incapable of governing. Moreover, it

[71] The nuances of this term, and the difficulty of translating it, will be discussed in Chapter 4.

[72] See, for example: Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 67; Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 168–89; Ruhbach, 'Politische Theologie', 236–58, 242.

[73] Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 91.

[74] Adler, 'Early Christian Historians and Historiography', 596.

suggests that, as a result of a multilayered process of μίμησις (imitation), Eusebius believed impious tyranny to be, not merely unpleasant in practical terms, but morally corrupting and therefore damaging to human salvation. Lastly, it considers the implications of Eusebius' understanding of tyranny for his presentation of Constantine.

Each chapter explores a slightly different aspect of Eusebius' thought, although definite connections between these various elements emerge over the course of the book. Moreover, a clear picture of Eusebius is developed over the following chapters. It is a picture that is at odds with the present scholarly consensus on Eusebius' optimistic outlook. While not wishing by any means to dismiss the positive elements of Eusebius' thought, or to deny the profound relief with which he must surely have greeted Constantine's patronage of the church, I would suggest that this side of Eusebius has been somewhat overemphasized in the scholarship so far. It is time to rebalance our characterization of Eusebius by recognizing that he also had doubts, fears, and hesitations. In the shifting political and religious climate of the early fourth century, such a figure is surely far more credible than the 'unreserved optimist' we have been presented with in the past.

1

Eusebius' Works

Before turning to a full examination of Eusebius' ideas about demons, we must give some consideration to the nature of—and challenges posed by—the material in which those ideas were expressed. Eusebius was a prolific writer and a large number of his works survive, either in full, or in large parts. We also have extensive fragments of other works, and ancient translations of some of his writings which are now lost in the original Greek. Eusebius' output was as varied as it was extensive. His earliest works, dating from the last decade of the third century, and first decade of the fourth, were primarily pieces of biblical scholarship. Works such as the *Canones Evangeliorum* and the *Chronicon* were innovative tools to aid understanding of the scriptures—the *Canones* presented parallel passages of the gospels laid out in clear tabular form,[1] while the *Chronicon* synchronized various earlier dating systems, including those found in the Bible, in parallel columns to produce an overview of the chronology of the human past.[2] This interest in meticulous scholarship was one that

[1] E. Nestle, ed., *Novum Testamentum Graece* (Stuttgart: Privilegierte Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1953), 33*–7*. Secondary literature on this work is limited, but see: J. M. Schott, 'Textuality and Territorialization: Eusebius' Exegeses of Isaiah and Empire', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations*, 169–88; Quasten, *Patrology*, 335; H. K. McArthur, 'The Eusebian Sections and Canons', *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 27 (1965), 250–6. On the dating of this work, see: *C&E*, 122; Carriker, *Library*, 37. Eusebius outlined the system he had adopted in his *Epistula ad Carpianum*, which also survives: Nestle, *Novum Testamentum Graece*, 32*–3*.

[2] Eusebius, *Chronicorum canonum quae supersunt*, ed. A. Schoene, 2 vols (Zurich: Weidmann, 1866, 1875; repr. 1967).This work has been comparatively well studied and there is an extensive body of secondary literature. Highlights include: *C&E*, 111–20; A. A. Mosshammer, *The* Chronicle *of Eusebius and Greek Chronographic Tradition* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1979); R. W. Burgess, *Studies in Eusebian and Post-Eusebian* Chronography, with the assistance of Witold Witakowski, *Historia* Einzelschriften 135 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999); W. Adler,

Eusebius retained throughout his life. The *Onomasticon* (*Onom.*),[3] which as an account of biblical place names arranged in alphabetical order, was a similar aid to the study of the scriptures, and most probably dates from the 320s, or at least no earlier than 313.[4] Later still, Eusebius began to engage in detailed biblical exegesis, producing from the late 320s onwards commentaries on the books of Isaiah,[5] the Psalms,[6] and—disputedly—Luke.[7]

However, Eusebius' interests also stretched far beyond biblical scholarship. His *Historia ecclesiastica* (*HE*), widely regarded as the first history of the Christian church, has made him famous as an historian. He was also active in the theological disputes of his era. In the first decade of the fourth century, he helped his imprisoned

'Eusebius' *Chronicle* and its Legacy', in H. W. Attridge and G. Hata, eds., *Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 467–91; Grafton and Williams, *Christianity and the Transformation of the Book*, 133–77. The dating of this work is often linked to that of the *HE* and has therefore been a source of considerable controversy—for discussion, see in particular: T. D. Barnes, 'The Editions of Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*', *GRBS* 21 (1980), 191–201, and R. W. Burgess, 'The Dates and Editions of Eusebius' *Chronici canones* and *Historia ecclesiastica*', *JTS* 48 (1997), 471–504.

[3] Eusebius, *Das Onomastikon der Biblischen Ortsnamen*, ed. E. Klostermann, Eusebius Werke III.i, GCS (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1904; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966).

[4] The date of the *Onom.* is also disputed. T. D. Barnes has previously placed the work before 303: Barnes, 'The Editions', 193; T. D. Barnes, 'The Composition of Eusebius' *Onomasticon*', *JTS* 26 (1975), 415. However, Andrew Louth, whose dating I accept, has advanced several compelling reasons for a later date: A. Louth, 'The Date of Eusebius' *Historia Ecclesiastica*', *JTS* 41 (1990), 118–20.

[5] Eusebius, *Der Jesjakommentar*, ed. J. Ziegler, *Eusebius Werke* IX, GCS (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1975). The *CI* is cited throughout by page and line number in this edition. This commentary has received excellent treatment from Michael Hollerich, who dates the work to the 320s: *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 19–26.

[6] *PG* 23.66–1396; 24.9–76. This work continues to lack a modern critical edition, and, perhaps in consequence, has received scant scholarly attention. Exceptions include the work of C. Curti, much of which is collected in: C. Curti, *Eusebiana I: Commentarii in Psalmos* (Catania: Università di Catania, 1987); and, most recently, Hollerich, 'Eusebius' *Commentary on the Psalms*', 151–67.

[7] *PG* 24.529–606. These fragments of discussion of Luke were preserved in Nicetas of Heraclea's catenae on Luke. Aaron Johnson has argued that they represent the remains of an independent Eusebian commentary on Luke, challenging the position of D. S. Wallace-Hadrill and Michael Hollerich, who suggested that the fragments might have come from the lost tenth book of the *Generalis elementaria introductio*. On this debate, see: Johnson, 'The Ends of Transfiguration', 189–205; D. S. Wallace-Hadrill, 'Eusebius of Caesarea's *Commentary on Luke*: Its Origin and Early History', *HTR* 67 (1974), 55–63; Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 8. Since I do not believe that the case for an independent commentary has yet been proved, I will refer throughout, not to a commentary, but to the *Fr.Luc.*

mentor Pamphilus to compose the *Apologia pro Origene*, a defence of the views of the controversial theologian Origen.[8] Three decades later, at the very end of his life, Eusebius produced the *De ecclesiastica theologia* (*De eccl. theol.*) and *Contra Marcellum* (*CM*),[9] two treatises directed against Marcellus of Ancyra, one of his theological opponents. Alongside this, works such as the *Generalis elementaria introductio* (*GEI*),[10] from *c.*310,[11] and the *Quaestiones Evangelicae*,[12] from *c.*315–20,[13] reveal an interest in providing more general instruction to lay Christians and converts.[14]

[8] Pamphilus and Eusebius of Caesarea, *Apologie pour Origène, suivi de* Rufin d'Aquilée, *Sur la falsification des livres d'Origène*, ed. and trans. with notes by R. Amacker and E. Junod, Sources Chrétiennes 464 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2002). Eusebius mentions this work at *HE* 6.33.4.

[9] Eusebius, *Gegen Marcell; Über die kirchliche Theologie; Die Fragmente Marcells*, ed. G. C. Hansen and E. Klostermann, Eusebius Werke IV, GCS 14, 2nd edn (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1972). On the dating of these works, see: Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 37, 57; Quasten, *Patrology*, 341; H. W. Attridge and G. Hata, 'Introduction', in H. W. Attridge and G. Hata, eds., *Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 34; *C&E*, 278; DelCogliano, 'Eusebius of Caesarea on Asterius of Cappadocia', 267.

[10] Eusebius, *Eclogae Propheticae*, ed. T. Gaisford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1842).

[11] Eusebius refers to the *GEI* at *HE* 1.2.27, and questions about its date are therefore tied to the controversies surrounding the dating of the *HE*. Barnes argued that the *GEI* dates from around 303 (*C&E*, 167–8). More recently, however, the consensus has come to favour a later date of *c.*310–13—see: A. P. Johnson, 'Eusebius the Educator: The Context of *General Elementary Introduction*', in Inowlocki and Zamagni, eds., *Reconsidering Eusebius*, 100; Carriker, *Library*, 38; A. Kofsky, *Eusebius of Caesarea against Paganism* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 52.

[12] Eusebius, *Questions évangéliques*, ed. and trans. with intro. and notes by C. Zamagni, Sources Chrétiennes 523 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2008). These questions survive only in substantial fragments. The shorter Greek fragments, and fragments in other languages, have been brought together and translated in: Eusebius, *Gospel Problems and Solutions: Quaestiones ad Stephanum et Marinum*, ed. R. Pearse and trans. D. J. D. Miller, A. C. McCollum and C. Downer (Ipswich: Chieftain, 2010). This edition also reproduces Zamagni's edited text of the longer Greek epitome. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in assembling a full and reliable edition of this text, together with a list of all manuscripts hitherto identified as containing fragments of the *Questions*, see: C. Zamagni, 'New Perspectives on Eusebius' *Questions and Answers on the Gospels*: The Manuscripts', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations*, 239–61.

[13] On the dating of this work, see: C. Zamagni, 'Introduction', in Eusebius, *Questions évangéliques*, 11–60.

[14] Aaron Johnson has shown that the *GEI* shares many of the features of an *εἰσαγωγή*, an introductory teaching manual: 'Eusebius the Educator', 99–118. In the *Gospel Problems*, Eusebius offers answers to sixteen questions on the gospels, attempting to resolve tensions or contradictions between the different Gospel accounts.

In view of this variety within his *oeuvre*, it should come as no surprise that Eusebius did not mention demons in all of his works. Or that even some of those texts which do refer to δαίμονες contain only brief, passing references. To take only a couple of examples, the *CM* contains no uses of the term δαίμων, while the *De eccl. theol.* briefly mentions δαίμονες once, and contains one further reference to 'demonic activity'.[15] Such gaps can be explained as the result of the different purposes and audiences of Eusebius' various works. A text such as the *Onom.* offers little scope for discussion of the demonic and, unsurprisingly, contains only one, passing mention of Christ's healing of those possessed by demons, in reference to the location of Gergesa in Mark 5:1.[16] Lengthy discussion of demons would quite simply have been out of place in such a text.

Nevertheless, demons appear in enough of Eusebius' works both to demonstrate that they formed an important part of his understanding of the universe and to provide a sound basis for study. Moreover, they are not confined to one particular 'genre' of Eusebius' works, but appear throughout a range of writings, composed at various points throughout his life. The works which have proved most useful for this study are the *Praeparatio Evangelica* (*PE*), *Demonstratio Evangelica* (*DE*), *HE, Vita Constantini* (*VC*), and *De laudibus Constantini* (*LC*). These works span the fields of panegyric, apologetic, biography, and history and were written over the course of three decades. They nonetheless present a remarkably consistent picture of the demonic threat, in spite of the dramatic political and religious changes that affected the Roman Empire during the same period.

This is significant, for some scholars have attempted in the past to tie apparent changes in elements of Eusebius' thought, such his eschatology or his political ideas, to external political and religious developments.[17] It has been suggested, for example, that Eusebius'

[15] *De eccl. theol.* 1.12.4.4 and 1.12.10.6 (ἐνεργείᾳ δαιμονικῇ). For the sake of consistency, I have opted throughout to use the standard Latin titles for Eusebius' works, as given in *CPG*, where these exist. Where there is no standard Latin title—for instance, with some lost works—I have opted for a Greek or Latin title based on the account of either Photius or Jerome.

[16] *Onom.* 74.13.

[17] For example: Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche'; W. Tabbernee, 'Eusebius' "Theology of Persecution": As Seen in the Various Drafts of his *Church History*', *JECS* 5 (1997), 319–34; Schott, *Christianity, Empire and the Making of Religion*, 155; Twomey, *Apostolikos Thronos*, 5, 7; R. M. Grant, *Eusebius as Church Historian* (Oxford:

interest in 'conventional' apocalyptic eschatology declined as the earthly success of the church increased with the patronage of Constantine.[18] The fact that demons are prominent even in works written towards the end of Eusebius' life, most notably the *VC* and *LC*, means that it is impossible to make a similar argument concerning Eusebius' ideas about demons. Moreover, since demons appear in a range of Eusebius' works, spanning a variety of 'genres', it cannot be claimed that they were simply a literary feature of a particular type of text.

If, however, we are to argue for the significance of demons in Eusebius' thought partly on the basis that they appear in a range of works of various dates and 'genres', we must acknowledge that, in many cases, the date, 'genre', and even authorship of several of Eusebius' works have been subject to considerable debate. It is therefore necessary to clarify at the outset the positions taken on these questions—particularly where they concern those key works that will underpin the remainder of this study.

QUESTIONS OF 'GENRE'

The debates surrounding the 'genre' of some of Eusebius' most famous works, most notably the *VC* and *HE*,[19] make it clear that many of Eusebius' works cannot be straightforwardly assigned to separate

Clarendon Press, 1980), 1. Arguing for development, although by no means rupture, in Eusebius' understanding of history, see: Cameron, 'Rethinking'.

[18] Wallace-Hadrill, 'Eusebius' *Commentary on Luke*', 63. This view has, however, been challenged in particular by: F. S. Thielman, 'Another Look at the Eschatology of Eusebius of Caesarea', *Vigiliae Christianae* 41 (1987), 226–37.

[19] See, for example, *VC*: Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 27–34; T. D. Barnes, 'Panegyric, History and Historiography in Eusebius' *Life of Constantine*', in R. Williams, ed., *The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 94–123, repr. in T. D. Barnes, *From Eusebius to Augustine: Selected Papers, 1982–1993* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994); J. Moreau, 'Zum Problem der *Vita Constantini*', *Historia* 4 (1955), 234–45. *HE*: D. J. DeVore, 'Genre and Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*: Towards a Focused Debate', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations*, 19–49; D. J. DeVore, 'Eusebius' Un-Josephan History: Two Portraits of Philo of Alexandria and the Sources of Ecclesiastical Historiography', *Studia Patristica* 66 (2013), 161–79; M. Verdoner, 'Transgeneric Crosses: Apologetics in the Church History', in A.-C. Jacobsen and J. Ulrich, eds., *Three Greek Apologists: Origen, Eusebius and Athanasius* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007), 75–92.

categories. Eusebius is often regarded as something of a literary innovator[20]—indeed, he claims as much for himself.[21] If Eusebius was attempting to produce new and innovative works, this might explain the difficulty of assigning his writings to particular 'genres'. Yet Eusebius' originality should not be overstated. As David DeVore has noted in the case of the *HE*, this work did not spring into existence from nowhere, independent of any prior literary tradition.[22] The same could also be said of many of Eusebius' other works. However hard he strove to be original, Eusebius could not help but be influenced by existing works and the prior expectations of his audience. As a result, the *VC* has been described as 'a literary hybrid',[23] while even DeVore's attempt to encourage a more considered discussion of the 'genre' of the *HE* resulted in the conclusion that this text combines elements of 'heresiology, apology . . . martyr drama . . . [and] national, war, and intellectual historiography',[24] demonstrating the difficulty of describing the 'genre' of such works with any precision.

Moreover, for some scholars, Eusebius' works have far too much in common to allow them to be assigned to separate 'genres'. Sharron Coggan, for instance, felt that all of Eusebius' works could be categorized as a form of apologetic.[25] Michael Frede similarly questioned why, on a broad understanding of the term 'apologetic', a treatise such as Eusebius' *Quaestiones Evangelicae* should not be classified as an apology.[26] In large part, this surely reflects more widespread scholarly uncertainty about where to draw the boundaries of an 'apologetic genre'.[27] Recent scholarship has come to see the

[20] For example: Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 26; Burgess, *Studies in Eusebian Chronography*, 73; Johnson, 'Introduction', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations*, 11; Verdoner, *Narrated Reality*, 1, 4; Cameron, 'Rethinking', 82; Cameron, 'Form and Meaning', 72.

[21] For example at: *HE* 1.1.3; *LC Prol.*2; *PE* 1.3.5.

[22] DeVore, 'Genre', 19.

[23] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 27.

[24] DeVore, 'Genre', 44–5.

[25] Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', 17.

[26] M. Frede, 'Eusebius' Apologetic Writings', in M. Edwards, M. Goodman, and S. Price, eds., *Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 223.

[27] For some expressions of this uncertainty, see the contributions in Edwards, Goodman, and Price, *Apologetics in the Roman Empire*. For analysis of this volume in particular, as well as the question of 'apologetics' in general, see: A. Cameron, 'Apologetics in the Roman Empire: A Genre of Intolerance?', in J. M. Carrié and R. Lizzi Testa, eds., *'Humana Sapit': Études d'antiquité tardive offertes à Lellia Cracco Ruggini* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 219–27.

traditional understanding of Christian apologetic as directed primarily at a hostile external audience in defence of the Christian position as unhelpfully restrictive. Indeed, several scholars have denied the existence of a clear-cut 'apologetic genre' altogether.[28] Averil Cameron, for instance, suggested that apologetics represent, 'not a genre but a tone or method of argument'.[29] Frances Young likewise distinguished between the 'surface-genre' and the 'apologetic character' of various works written in defence of the Christian faith during the second century, similarly implying that 'apologetics' should not be seen as a fixed genre.[30]

This, indeed, is in line with Eusebius' own use of the term ἀπολογία (apology). While Eusebius' use of the term at times appears to refer to a narrow group of works addressed to Roman emperors and governors in defence of Christianity, in other cases, he adopts a broader understanding of the term.[31] For instance, Frede notes that the only one of Eusebius' works which he himself expressly referred to as an 'apology', the *Apologia pro Origene*,[32] is 'not an apologetic writing even in an extended sense, since it does not involve a response to an attack on Christianity, or on a Christian on account of his Christianity'.[33] Thus it appears that, in Eusebius' usage, ἀπολογία could refer to a range of texts far wider than that traditionally classified by scholars as Christian apologetics. We should therefore avoid trying to identify particular features of an 'apologetic genre', but recognize instead that, for early Christian works, a variety of different literary forms could share a common apologetic purpose.

As the validity of the concept of an 'apologetic genre' has been questioned, so too has the assumption that the purpose of apologetics

[28] For example: Cameron, 'Apologetics', 219–27, esp. 223; F. Young, 'Greek Apologists of the Second Century', in Edwards, Goodman, and Price, *Apologetics in the Roman Empire*, 90–1; M. Edwards, M. Goodman, S. Price, and C. Rowland, 'Introduction: Apologetics in the Roman World', in Edwards, Goodman, and Price, *Apologetics in the Roman Empire*, 1–2.

[29] Cameron, 'Apologetics', 227.

[30] Young, 'Greek Apologists of the Second Century', 82.

[31] Frede, 'Eusebius' Apologetic Writings', 229.

[32] Although the Latin title is not, of course, Eusebius' own, he does describe the work as an ἀπολογία at *HE* 6.33.4. This text was not exclusively the work of Eusebius, but was written in conjunction with his mentor Pamphilus during the latter's imprisonment. For more on this work, see: R. Amacker and E. Junod, 'Avant-Propos', in Pamphilus and Eusebius, *Apologie pour Origène*.

[33] Frede, 'Eusebius' Apologetic Writings', 225.

was exclusively a defence against hostile external attacks. Cameron suggested that 'one function of apologetic has clearly to do with the search for identity and self-definition',[34] arguing that the writing of apologetic did not cease with the apparent triumph of the church under Constantine, but continued long into the fourth century in the genres of biblical commentary and exegesis.[35] Aaron Johnson has similarly argued that early Christian apologetic literature was 'fundamentally about the formation of identity',[36] and has expertly highlighted the key role played by questions of 'ethnic' identity in one of Eusebius' major 'apologetic' writings, the *PE*.[37] Thus, apologetics could have in view an audience as much of 'insiders' as of those hostile either to Christianity or to a particular version of it.[38] When we adopt this broader understanding of the nature and purpose of apologetic literature, it becomes clear that Coggan and Frede were right to see much of the Eusebian corpus as sharing a common apologetic thread.

Even so, noting the similarity of purpose between Eusebius' works, whilst valuable, only takes us so far.[39] To appreciate Eusebius' thought, we need also to recognize that, in order to achieve his apologetic goals, Eusebius produced a variety of very different works. These were often apparently aimed at slightly different audiences and make different points, albeit in support of the same overarching goals of shaping Christian identity and promoting the Christian message, as it appeared to Eusebius. These differences could have an effect both on what Eusebius chose to say in each work, and on how he chose to say it.[40] There are therefore clear differences of emphasis between many of his works. We can only begin to appreciate what effect such differences might have had on his presentation of his political and demonological

[34] Cameron, 'Apologetics', 223. See also: A. K. Petersen, 'The Diversity of Apologetics: From Genre to a Mode of Thinking', in A.-C. Jacobsen, J. Ulrich, and D. Brakke, eds., *Critique and Apologetics: Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009), 16.

[35] Cameron, 'Apologetics', 226.

[36] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 1.

[37] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*; A. P. Johnson, 'Identity, Descent and Polemic: Ethnic Argumentation in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica*', *JECS* 12 (2004), 23–56.

[38] Young, 'Greek Apologists of the Second Century', 92. See also the discussion of the question of the audience of 'apologetics' at: Cameron, 'Apologetics', 222–3.

[39] As Frede recognized: 'Eusebius' Apologetic Writings', 224.

[40] As Averil Cameron and Stuart Hall noted, Eusebius was capable of using a particular 'language and literary manner' in order to appeal to different and varied audiences: *Life of Constantine*, 34.

ideas if we acknowledge the differences between his various works, as well as their similarities.

QUESTIONS OF DATING AND COMPOSITION

Similarly complex—at least for many of Eusebius' works—are questions of dating and composition. In some cases, such as that of the *VC*, these debates have now settled into a broad scholarly consensus. In others, particularly that of the *HE*, the debate remains very much alive. It is beyond the scope of this book to offer definitive conclusions on all the debates concerning the composition of Eusebius' works—although my views on a number of questions may be inferred from the chronological table at the beginning of this book. I will therefore focus solely on those questions which are of greatest relevance to the arguments that follow in subsequent chapters.

Historia Ecclesiastica

The *HE* is arguably Eusebius' most famous work;[41] it is also one of the most challenging for scholars to date, as it appeared in several editions—the exact number is disputed[42]—over the course of at least a decade.

It survives in an edition of ten books,[43] and covers the history of the church from its beginning with Christ to the events of Eusebius'

[41] The edition used here is: Eusebius, *Die Kirchengeschichte: Uber die Martyrer in Palestina*, ed. E. Schwartz, *Eusebius Werke* II: i–iii, GCS 9 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1903–9).

[42] Barnes, for instance, argues for four distinct editions: *C&E*, 149–50. Tabbernee suggests three or four editions, the first dating from *c*.313–14, and the fourth simply removing references to Constantine's disgraced son Crispus in 326. Tabbernee also suggests a first, unpublished draft of the *HE* from before 303: Tabbernee, 'Eusebius' "Theology of Persecution"'. Burgess argues for two editions: 'Dates and Editions'. Most recently, A. P. Johnson has challenged the multiple-edition thesis, suggesting a single edition of *c*.324: *Eusebius*, 85–112. However, even while suggesting a single 'published' edition, Johnson still finds composition over a long period of time essential to explaining some features of the work: *Eusebius*, 109.

[43] For discussion of the manuscript tradition of the *HE*, see: K. Lake, 'Introduction', in Eusebius, *The Ecclesiastical History I–V*, ed. and trans. K. Lake (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), xxvii–xxxiii.

own lifetime. It is often regarded as a groundbreaking work,[44] the beginning of a genre of ecclesiastical history that would be continued by Eusebius' fifth-century successors.[45] In his preface to the work, Eusebius emphasized that he was attempting to produce something new, describing himself as 'the first to set upon this purpose'.[46] The first seven books of the *HE* cover the period up to Eusebius' lifetime, including an extended discussion of the life of Origen in book 6.[47] Book 8 describes the events of the persecution that began in 303, overlapping significantly in terms of content with another of Eusebius' works, the *De martyribus Palaestinae* (*Mart. Pal.*).[48] In three of its manuscripts, book 8 also contains a section known as the *Appendix*,[49] which covers the gruesome deaths of the persecuting emperors. In book 9 the work addresses the end of the persecution, the defeat of the persecutors, and the victory of the Christian emperors Constantine and Licinius. The final book celebrates the success of the church following this victory and consists in large part of a speech which Eusebius delivered at the dedication of the Church at Tyre in 315,[50] as well as a variety of documents showing Constantine's favour towards the church. The later chapters of this book were evidently added after Constantine's defeat of Licinius in 324, as they outline the actions which Eusebius suggests had brought Licinius to destruction.[51]

The final, revised edition of the *HE* was clearly completed shortly after Licinius' defeat in 324;[52] however, the question of the date, and

[44] G. Downey, for instance, described it as 'epoch making': 'The Perspective of the Early Church Historians', *GRBS* 6 (1965), 57. See also: DeVore, 'Genre', 19; Verdoner, *Narrated Reality*, 4; Attridge and Hata, 'Introduction', 27; Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 31; Momigliano, 'Pagan and Christian Historiography', 90.

[45] On which, see: Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*; R. A. Markus, 'Church History and the Early Church Historians', in D. Baker, ed., *The Materials, Sources and Methods of Ecclesiastical History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), 1–17.

[46] *HE* 1.1.3.

[47] Eusebius' biographical presentation of Origen in *HE* 6 has been excellently analysed by P. Cox, *Biography in Late Antiquity: A Quest for the Holy Man* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 69–101. Cameron has highlighted the similarities between Eusebius' approach to writing the biography of Origen, and his later approach in the *VC*: Cameron, 'Construction', 153.

[48] *C&E*, 149–50.

[49] The *Appendix* is found in manuscripts AER: T. Christensen, 'The So-Called *Appendix* to Eusebius' *Historia Ecclesiastica* VIII', *Classica et Mediaevalia* 34 (1983), 177–209.

[50] *HE* 10.4. For the date, see: *C&E*, 162.

[51] *HE* 10.8.2–10.9.5.

[52] As is widely acknowledged by, for example: Verdoner, *Narrated Reality*, 38; F. Winkelmann, 'Historiography in the Age of Constantine', in G. Marasco, ed., *Greek*

length, of its first edition has proved much more controversial. There are two main camps into which scholars divide on this issue. The first, adopted by E. Schwartz in his edition of the text, argues for a first edition in eight books, appearing in *c.*312,[53] while the second puts a first edition of seven books much earlier, before the outbreak of the persecution in 303.[54] The most notable champion of an early date in recent years has been Barnes, putting the first edition before 300.[55] However, the arguments in favour of an early date have been convincingly disproved in recent years by the work of R. Burgess and A. Louth,[56] and there are several compelling reasons for believing that the first edition consisted of at least eight, if not nine books, and was published shortly after the end of the persecution, around 313. Indeed, even Barnes now accepts that Burgess and Louth have disproved his theory of an early first edition.[57]

The content of the first eight books of the *HE* suggests that they were written after 303, for there are several references in the first seven books to the events of the persecution,[58] including in the preface to book 1 where Eusebius states that he will refer to the 'martyrdoms of our lifetime'.[59] Although these could be later additions, this would imply extensive revision of the first seven books, for which there is no evidence.[60] Moreover, the biography of Origen

and Roman Historiography in Late Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 23; *C&E*, 150; Carriker, *Library*, 40; Louth, 'The Date', 111; Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 39; Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 2.

[53] E. Schwartz, 'Einleitung', in Eusebius, *Die Kirchengeschichte*, lvi.

[54] A brief, if now somewhat outdated, summary of the two positions can be found in Quasten, *Patrology*, 315.

[55] *C&E*, 128, 277; Barnes, 'The Editions', 191–201. Earlier exponents of this view include: Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 41, and R. Laqueur, 'Ephoros', *Hermes* 46 (1911), 189.

[56] Louth, 'The Date'; Burgess, 'Dates and Editions', 471–504.

[57] T. D. Barnes, 'Eusebius of Caesarea', *Expository Times* 121.1 (2009), 6–7.

[58] Burgess, 'Dates and Editions', 485. [59] *HE* 1.1.2.

[60] Burgess, 'Dates and Editions', 485; Grant, however, has argued for extensive revision to the first seven books of the *HE*, based on differences he identifies between the surviving manuscripts of the *HE* and the *Chronicle*: Grant, *Eusebius as Church Historian*. While Grant refuses to commit himself on the date of the first edition of the *HE*, he does suggest that an earlier edition would allow more time for the revisions which he posits, 15. Nevertheless, Grant does identify one of the main themes addressed by Eusebius in the *HE* as 'martyrdom and persecution', surely implying that the work was conceived after the beginning of the persecution, 114–25. Tabbernee also believes that the first seven books were written, although not published,

which occupies most of book 6 appears to be based on the largely lost *Apologia pro Origene*, which Eusebius helped his mentor Pamphilus to complete during the latter's imprisonment in 308–10.[61] Crucially, however, there is simply no manuscript evidence for an edition of 303, making its existence purely speculative.[62] Consequently, it appears most likely that the first edition of the *HE* was written in response to the events of the persecution and appeared *c.*313 in eight or nine books. The tenth book can only have been added after 315, since it is made up largely of a speech which Eusebius delivered in that year.[63] This book was then extended sometime after 324 to address the defeat of Licinius.

Establishing even a broad outline of the dates of these editions is essential to any assessment of the purpose and character of the *HE*, as many of those involved in these debates have recognized.[64] Giving an early date to the first edition of the *HE* allowed Barnes to present it as evidence of the church's position immediately prior to the outbreak of the Diocletianic persecution,[65] revealing 'the optimistic assumptions of a Christian' in this period of comparative peace for the church.[66] By contrast, the later date of *c.*313, after the persecution, sets the work in a completely different context and forces us, in Burgess' phrase, to look at it 'in the light of . . . propaganda and apologetic, not of confidence, peace and pure scholarship'.[67] Burgess is by no means the only scholar to have identified a strong apologetic element in the *HE*, with A. J. Droge suggesting that Eusebius used his version of history to defend the church against the attacks of its opponents.[68] In line with the broader understanding of 'apologetic' outlined in the section 'Questions of "Genre"', Marie Verdoner also recognized that the *HE* played a role in shaping Christian self-definition.[69]

before 303, but he rejects Grant's suggestion of extensive revision: 'Eusebius' "Theology of Persecution"', 321.

[61] Louth, 'The Date', 121–2. See also: Grant, 'The Case against Eusebius', 418.

[62] Burgess, 'Dates and Editions', 484.

[63] *C&E*, 162.

[64] Louth, 'The Date', 123; Burgess, 'Dates and Editions', 496; T. D. Barnes, 'Some Inconsistencies in Eusebius', *JTS* 35 (1984), 471. See also: the review article of Cameron, 'Constantinus Christianus', 185.

[65] Barnes, 'Some Inconsistencies', 471.

[66] *C&E*, 146.

[67] Burgess, 'Dates and Editions', 496.

[68] Droge, 'The Apologetic Dimensions', 492–3.

[69] Verdoner, *Narrated Reality*, 1.

Praeparatio Evangelica and Demonstratio Evangelica

The *PE* and *DE* clearly merit combined discussion.[70] Although both works can stand independently—and, indeed, have received independent treatment in the literature[71]—they were expressly envisaged by Eusebius as part of the same larger project,[72] originally running to thirty-five books in total. The *PE*, of which we have all fifteen books intact, has been described as 'the culmination (though by no means the end) of the apologetic tradition'.[73] Together with the *DE*, of which only the first ten books, together with fragments of the fifteenth book, survive from an original total of twenty books,[74] this work was clearly an enormous undertaking. Although the date of these works is generally placed between *c*.313 and *c*.325, the date of the Council of Nicaea,[75] there is considerably more disagreement about their purpose and audience.

Barnes believed that the combined work was primarily intended to refute the work of Porphyry, whose treatise, *Contra Christianos*, represented a serious attack on Christian belief.[76] As such, Barnes considered the *PE* and *DE* to have been aimed mainly at an audience of 'sympathetic pagans'.[77] More recent work has challenged this, however, arguing that it is wrong to see the *PE* and *DE* primarily as

[70] Eusebius, *Die Praeparatio Evangelica*, ed. K. Mras and E. Des Places, *Eusebius Werke* VIII:i–ii, GCS 43 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1982–83); Eusebius, *Die Demonstratio Evangelica*, ed. I. A. Heikel, *Eusebius Werke* IV, GCS 23 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1913). As Ulrich insists: *Euseb und die Juden*, 36.

[71] On the *PE*, see: Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*; and, on the *DE*: Morlet, *La* Démonstration Évangélique.

[72] *PE* 1.1.1. [73] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 11.

[74] J. Moreau, 'Eusebius von Caesarea', in T. Klauser, ed., *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 6 (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1966), 1068. The original number of books for the *PE* and *DE* is given in Photius *Bibliotheca* 9–10.

[75] See, for example: Carriker, *Library*, 39; Moreau, 'Eusebius von Caesarea', 1068; *C&E*, 278; K. Mras, 'Einleitung', in *Die Praeparatio Evangelica*, ed. Mras and Des Places, liv–lv; J. Sirinelli, 'Introduction Générale', in Eusebius, *La préparation évangélique*, ed. and trans. É. Des Places, G. Schroeder et al., Sources Chrétiennes 206 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1974), 8–15; Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 49; Ulrich, *Euseb und die Juden*, 37; Kofsky, *Eusebius against Paganism*, 74.

[76] *C&E*, 175. Compare: Barnes, 'Eusebius of Caesarea'; Quasten, *Patrology*, 331; Lyman, 'Eusebius of Caesarea', 326; R. L. Williams, 'Eusebius on Porphyry's "Polytheistic Error"', in D. E. Aune and R. D. Young, eds., *Reading Religions in the Ancient World: Essays Presented to Robert McQueen Grant on his 90th Birthday* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 274. Frede similarly considered the *PE* to be a response to questions raised by Porphyry: 'Eusebius' Apologetic Writings', 241–50.

[77] *C&E*, 178.

a response to the work of Porphyry.[78] As noted in the section 'Questions of "Genre"', Johnson's insightful work on the *PE* has revealed that these works may have been intended as much to help shape Christian identity among those already within the church as to refute attacks from those outside.[79] This certainly corresponds to Eusebius' declaration at the start of the *PE* that he envisaged this first part of the work as being most suitable for 'those who have just come to us from the nations', while the *DE* would provide further instruction for those who had either just read the *PE*, or who already had a more advanced understanding of Christianity from other sources.[80] This suggests that both the *PE* and the *DE* were aimed, at least in part, at an internal audience, perhaps of recent converts.

Barnes' classification of the *PE* as a polemic barely does justice to the complexity of either the *PE* or its companion work, the *DE*.[81] As Johnson has noted, the *PE* appears to combine two different genres—apology, and introductory instruction manual.[82] Its purpose therefore seems to be less about defence and more about instruction—Eusebius is providing recent converts with the means to understand their new faith in relation to their former religion, culture, and education. Likewise, Sébastien Morlet has suggested that the *DE* should be regarded as primarily a 'work of instruction, conceived as a confirmation of the faith and an aid to argumentation'.[83] As such, both these works should be viewed as trying to shape the collective identity of those already within the church and to respond to attacks from outside.[84]

[78] S. Morlet, 'Eusebius' Polemic against Porphyry: A Reassessment', in Inowlocki and Zamagni, eds., *Reconsidering Eusebius*, 125–6; Morlet, *La* Démonstration Évangélique, 628. See also: A. P. Johnson, Review of: Sébastien Morlet, 'La *Démonstration évangélique* d'Eusèbe de Césarée: Étude sur l'apologétique chrétienne à l'époque de Constantin', *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2010.11.47. Kofsky felt that, while 'Porphyry was a key figure behind the work', the *PE* and *DE* were not intended primarily to refute his *Contra Christianos*, but were more broadly directed against opponents of Christianity: *Eusebius against Paganism*, 313.

[79] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 14–15; Johnson, 'Identity, Descent and Polemic', 23–56. See also: Ulrich, *Euseb und die Juden*, 37–8.

[80] *PE* 1.1.12.

[81] *C&E*, 175.

[82] A. P. Johnson, 'Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* as Literary Experiment', in S. F. Johnson, ed., *Greek Literature in Late Antiquity: Dynamism, Didacticism, Classicism* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 75. See also: Johnson, *Eusebius*, 27.

[83] Morlet, *La* Démonstration Évangélique, 80: 'une oeuvre d'enseignement, conçue comme une confirmation de la foi et une aide à l'argumentation'.

[84] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 15.

Oratio de laudibus Constantini

It is now widely accepted that the work traditionally known as the *Oratio de laudibus Constantini*,[85] which was transmitted as part of a lengthy appendix to the *VC*, in fact consists of two entirely separate speeches.[86] These are, firstly, the true *De laudibus Constantini* (*LC*), consisting of chapters 1–10, and, secondly, another oration in chapters 11–18. The arguments in favour of seeing this work as two different orations have been convincingly set out by H. A. Drake and Barnes and will only be summarized here.[87] A key point raised by Drake is the length of the supposed oration. As one work, Drake suggests that it is far too long to have been delivered as a single speech—a problem which disappears once it is seen as two separate orations.[88] Drake acknowledges the possibility that the speech might have been rewritten and extended for publication, but doubts that Eusebius would have had the time to enlarge the work so substantially between delivering the speech in 336 and his death in 339, given the amount of other work, including the *VC*, which he was producing at the same time.[89] Furthermore, in several of the manuscripts of the orations there is evidence of a gap between chapters 10 and 11,[90] while some manuscripts only contain the first part of the orations.[91] These two parts are clearly distinct in terms of style and content, with each part comfortably able to stand alone as an independent work.[92]

[85] Eusebius, *Uber das Leben Constantins, Constantins Rede an die Heilige Versammlung, Tricennatsrede an Constantin*, ed. I. A. Heikel, *Eusebius Werke* I, GCS 7 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1902).

[86] See, for example: H. A. Drake, 'Introduction: A Historical Study', in Eusebius, *In Praise of Constantine: A Historical Study and New Translation of Eusebius' Tricennial Orations*, trans. H. A. Drake (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), 30–45; T. D. Barnes, 'Two Speeches by Eusebius', *GRBS* 18 (1977), 341–5; C. Kannengiesser, 'Eusebius of Caesarea, Origenist', in H. W. Attridge, and G. Hata, eds., *Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 453; Attridge and Hata, 'Introduction', 34; C. T. H. R. Ehrhardt, 'Eusebius and Celsus', *Jahrbuch fur Antike und Christentum* 22 (1979); Cameron, 'Rethinking', 75; Kofsky, *Eusebius against Paganism*, 48–50; Farina, *L'impero*, 14. For the older view, see: Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 44. To make clear the distinction between the two works, I will adopt the practice suggested by Drake of referring to the two speeches by separate titles, the *De laudibus Constantini* (*LC*), and *De sepulchro Christi* (*SC*), although this is not universal practice.

[87] Drake 'Introduction', 30–45; Barnes, 'Two Speeches'.

[88] Drake, 'Introduction', 30.

[89] Drake, 'Introduction'.

[90] Barnes, 'Two Speeches', 341.

[91] Drake, 'Introduction', 30.

[92] Barnes, 'Two Speeches', 341.

Finally, a reference in chapter 11 suggests that these later chapters were delivered in Jerusalem,[93] whereas the *LC* was, we know from the *VC*, delivered in the imperial palace in Constantinople.[94]

Consequently, it is clear that the two parts of this manuscript should be treated as separate works. The first part is the *LC*, delivered in celebration of the emperor's *tricennalia*, most likely in July 336.[95] The second part has been identified instead as the speech which Eusebius gave at the dedication of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in September 335,[96] and labelled by Drake the *De sepulchro Christi* (*SC*).[97] As two different speeches, these works would clearly have had different audiences. The audience of the *SC* would surely have consisted in large part of the bishops and other lay Christians who might be expected to have attended the dedication of a new church and Drake suggests a largely clerical audience on the basis of references at *SC* 17.6 and 17.11.[98] The possibility that the audience might also have contained important pagans cannot be discounted either.[99] As Drake has noted, however, the internal situation within the church in 335 was 'theologically charged', with the dedication of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre closely following the Council of Tyre, at which Eusebius' opponent Athanasius had been excommunicated.[100] As a result, even if speaking mainly to Christians or even to clerics, Eusebius need not have been addressing an entirely sympathetic audience.

[93] Barnes, 'Two Speeches', 342; *SC* 11.2. [94] *VC* 4.46.1.

[95] Drake and Barnes both reject the traditional dating of July 335 in favour of delivery at the closing festivities of the tricennial year, in July 336: Barnes, 'Two Speeches', 343; H. A. Drake, 'When was the *De Laudibus Constantini* Delivered?', *Historia* 24 (1975), 345–56. The most compelling reason for opting for the later date is Eusebius' reference in the *LC* to 'four Caesars' (*LC* 3.4). This means that Dalmatius must already have been made Caesar at the time when the oration was delivered. Since Dalmatius only became Caesar in September 335, that puts the *LC*, at the earliest, sometime after then: Drake, 'When was the *LC* Delivered?', 347.

[96] Drake, 'Introduction', 31; Barnes, 'Two Speeches', 343. Eusebius refers to this speech at *VC* 4.46.1, the same passage in which he promises to attach a copy of his tricennial speech to the end of the *VC*.

[97] Drake 'Introduction', 31. [98] Drake, 'Introduction', 36.

[99] Ehrhardt suggests that the audience of the *SC* would have included both 'influential pagan members of the imperial service' and 'recent and superficial converts': 'Eusebius and Celsus', 41; Cameron suggests a largely pagan audience: 'Rethinking', 78. Johnson argues that it was addressed mainly to 'critics of Christianity': *Eusebius*, 154–5.

[100] Drake, 'Introduction', 36.

For the *LC*, delivered at the imperial palace in Constantinople,[101] the audience would arguably have been more religiously diverse.[102] The audience for this speech certainly included Constantine, and therefore probably many senior officials. The question of the religious balance at Constantine's court, and how far Christianity had penetrated the ranks of the aristocracy by this point, is very much contested.[103] However, Cameron and Hall's suggestion that 'court circles contained people of all persuasions as well as many who prudently kept their own counsel' seems perfectly reasonable.[104] As such, Eusebius most likely delivered the *LC* to an audience containing not just Christians and those sympathetic to Christianity, but also to those who were possibly wary of, or even hostile towards, Christianity.

This question of the audience of the *LC* has been used by some to help explain what appears to be a curious feature of the speech.[105] The *LC* does not mention Christ, or Christianity, by name, referring instead to the 'Logos'.[106] One possible reason for this is that Eusebius may have been trying to make his arguments appeal to as wide an audience as possible, including to pagans at Constantine's court.[107] Drake rejects the idea that Eusebius was simply following the conventions of classical rhetoric by omitting Christian language in this speech, on the grounds that, as a bishop, he would have been more interested in expressing his Christianity than in adhering rigidly to literary precedent.[108] Yet, by expressing his ideas in terms that would have been familiar even to non-Christians, Eusebius might have hoped to make his views more easily understood by his audience, and hence more appealing. As Cameron and Hall have noted in connection with the *VC*, using 'a language and a literary manner which conform at least in general terms to classical expectations' would have allowed Eusebius to appeal to an audience of varied religious sentiments.[109]

[101] *VC* 4.46.1.

[102] Drake, 'Introduction', 52; Cameron suggests that it was aimed at a partly pagan audience: 'Rethinking', 81.

[103] See, for example: T. D. Barnes, 'Statistics and the Conversion of the Roman Aristocracy', *JRS* 85 (1995), 135–47.

[104] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 34.

[105] Drake, 'Introduction', 51–2; Cameron, 'Rethinking', 78–82.

[106] It should be noted, however, that the *SC* does refer to Christ by name: Drake, 'Introduction', 46. See, for example: *SC* 16.3, 16.5.

[107] Cameron, 'Rethinking', 81.

[108] Drake, 'Introduction', 49.

[109] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 34.

Vita Constantini

While the debates surrounding these two orations have tended to concern questions of date and audience, the problems that have attended the study of the more famous *VC* have been rather different.[110] For many years the authenticity of the *VC* was questioned by scholars reluctant to attribute it to Eusebius.[111] This was made possible by Jerome's failure to mention the *VC* in his catalogue of Eusebius' works.[112] However this is far from conclusive, especially since Jerome did not claim to be giving an exhaustive list of all Eusebius' writings, ending with a reference to Eusebius' *multa alia* works.[113] Indeed, the *VC* may have appeared far less significant to Jerome than it has done to later scholars, for, as Cameron and Hall have shown, the *VC* was not widely known in the centuries immediately after its publication.[114]

To a large extent, scholarly doubts about the authorship of the *VC* can be traced to a misunderstanding of its nature.[115] Scholars who wished to find an honest and reliable historian in Eusebius were understandably reluctant to attribute this work, which has been described as 'fraudulent' in its presentation of events,[116] to Eusebius. Indeed Henri Grégoire, who argued strenuously against the Eusebian authorship of the *VC*, even pointed out that his approach was 'very fortunate for Eusebius' memory', since it helped 'to acquit him of the accusation . . . of having deliberately distorted history.'[117] Grégoire's argument rested in the main on supposed 'factual inaccuracies' in the work, and he singled out for particular criticism the discussion

[110] The most recent edition is: Eusebius, *Uber das Leben des Kaisers Konstantin*.

[111] See, for example: W. Seston, 'Constantine as "Bishop"', *JRS* 37 (1947), 127–31; H. Grégoire, 'Eusèbe n'est pas l'auteur de la "Vita Constantini" dans sa forme actuelle et Constantin ne s'est pas "converti" en 312', *Byzantion* 13 (1938), 561–83. For a full survey of debates over the authenticity of the *VC*, see: F. Winkelmann, 'Zur Geschichte des Authentizitätsproblems der *Vita Constantini*', *Klio* 40 (1962), 187–243.

[112] Jerome, *de Viris Illustribus* 81; Seston used this as a reason to doubt Eusebius' authorship of the work: 'Constantine as "Bishop"', 127.

[113] Jerome, *Vir.Inl.* 81.

[114] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 48–9. See also: Cameron, 'Rethinking', 74.

[115] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 4–9, 46; Drake, 'Introduction', 8.

[116] Elliott, 'Eusebian Frauds', 163.

[117] Grégoire, 'Eusèbe n'est pas l'auteur', 578: '. . . très heureux pour la mémoire d'Eusèbe'; 'l'acquitter de l'accusation . . . d'avoir délibérément faussé l'histoire'.

of the causes of Constantine's war against Licinius.[118] Eusebius suggests that this conflict arose as a result of Licinius' persecution of Christians, a claim which Grégoire felt Eusebius would have known to be false.[119] As a result, he attributed the *VC* to the work of a later forger.[120]

However, as Cameron and Hall recognized, the *VC* is 'a highly apologetic work',[121] one of the aims of which is to support and enhance Constantine's reputation.[122] This would have involved defending Constantine's actions in attaining sole rule of the empire, particularly the civil wars against fellow emperors like Licinius. Cameron and Hall therefore suggest that the account given in the *VC* of the war between Constantine and Licinius should be understood in this apologetic light.[123] Consequently, it is unnecessary to see the presentation of this war as arising from the misunderstanding of a later writer, as Grégoire had imagined.[124] Moreover, Cameron and Hall refute the idea that parts of the *VC* were the result of later interpolation by pointing to the consistency of the work's style, noting as well that it is difficult to believe a later writer could have imitated Eusebius' distinctive tone so successfully.[125] There remains, finally, the fact that in all its manuscripts the *VC* is consistently attributed to Eusebius.[126] As a result, the Eusebian authorship of this work is now generally accepted,[127] and discussion has turned instead to questions about its 'genre' and purpose.

[118] Grégoire, 'Eusèbe n'est pas l'auteur', 582.
[119] Grégoire, 'Eusèbe n'est pas l'auteur'.
[120] Grégoire, 'Eusèbe n'est pas l'auteur', 578.
[121] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 2. See also: Cameron, 'Construction', 152–3, 172–3; Cameron, 'Rethinking', 83.
[122] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 7. See also: Cameron, 'Construction', 152.
[123] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 7. See also: Cameron, 'Construction', 149–50.
[124] Grégoire, 'Eusèbe n'est pas l'auteur'.
[125] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 8. See also: Cameron, 'Rethinking', 74.
[126] Cameron, 'Rethinking', 74.
[127] For example: *C&E*, 401, n.66; Drake, 'Introduction', 8–9; Elliott, 'Eusebian Frauds', 171; Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 4; Cameron, 'Constantinus Christianus', 187; Cameron, 'Rethinking', 75; Cameron, 'Construction', 146, n.5; C. Dupont, 'Décisions et texts constantiniens dans les oeuvres d'Eusèbe de Césarée', *Viator* 2 (1971), 2; Moreau, 'Eusebius von Caesarea', 1073–4; Winkelmann, 'Zur Geschichte', 242; Farina, *L'impero*; Ulrich, *Euseb und die Juden*, 55, n.122.

Much of this debate has concerned the manner in which the work was composed. The fact that the *VC* contains several repetitions and in places appears poorly structured has led many scholars to believe that the work was left unfinished when Eusebius died.[128] The chapter headings at least were most likely the work of a later editor,[129] who assembled the work and the speeches appended to it for publication after Eusebius' death.[130] The varied style of the *VC*, combining elements of panegyric and biography, together with the extended quotation of documents so characteristic of the *HE*, has led Barnes to conclude that the *VC* as we have it was in fact a conflation of two different works, hastily and clumsily assembled by Eusebius.[131] Barnes has even suggested that 'every sentence of the *Life* can be assigned with ease to one of its three constituent elements', which he identifies as 'an unfinished *basilikos logos*', 'a continuation of the *Ecclesiastical History*', and 'the additions of the editor'.[132] This claim, however, has been rightly criticized by Cameron and Hall, who, while accepting that the work was a 'literary hybrid', argue that it cannot be so easily divided into various parts.[133] Even if it were possible to identify two separate drafts of the *VC* so precisely, it is difficult to see what benefit that would bring, for in combining the two drafts, Eusebius would surely have been intending to create a new work, which is best understood on its own terms.[134] It therefore seems more sensible to consider the work as the whole which it was

[128] See, for example: G. Pasquali, 'Die Composition der *Vita Constantini* des Eusebius', *Hermes* 45 (1910), 386; Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 3; Cameron, 'Eusebius of Caesarea', 576; *C&E*, 265, 279; T. D. Barnes, 'Constantine's Prohibition of Pagan Sacrifice', *AJP* 105 (1984), 69; Grafton and Williams, *Christianity and the Transformation of the Book*, 223.

[129] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 52; F. Winkelmann, 'Einleitung', in Eusebius, *Uber das Leben des Kaisers Konstantin*, xlviii.

[130] Acacius, Eusebius' successor as bishop of Caesarea, has been suggested as a possible editor by: *C&E*, 265; T. D. Barnes, 'The Two Drafts of Eusebius' *Life of Constantine*', in Barnes, *From Eusebius to Augustine*, XII, 1; Pasquali, 'Die Composition', 386; Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 9.

[131] Barnes, 'Eusebius of Caesarea'; Barnes, 'Panegyric, History and Historiography'. See also: Pasquali, 'Die Composition'.

[132] Barnes, 'Eusebius of Caesarea', 8. See also: Barnes, 'Two Drafts', 7.

[133] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 27. See also: Cameron, 'Construction', 147–8.

[134] Cameron noted that attempting to distinguish between the various revisions of the *VC* can prevent us appreciating its 'overall ideology': Cameron, 'Construction', 146.

on its way to becoming, rather than trying to break it apart into its constituent pieces.[135]

The composition of the *VC* is generally dated to the last two years of Eusebius' life, between the death of Constantine in 337 and Eusebius' own death in 339.[136] Although it has been suggested that Eusebius may have begun research into the project before 337, perhaps as early as 335,[137] the majority of the writing was most likely carried out during the uncertain years which followed Constantine's death.[138] This was a time both of considerable political upheaval and of theological controversy within the church.[139] The question of the imperial succession remained unsettled, particularly during 337, a year which saw dynastic murders, and led to the division of the empire between Constantine's three remaining sons.[140] Meanwhile, 337 also saw Athanasius recalled from exile, meaning Eusebius, who had presided at the Council of Tyre which had excommunicated Athanasius two years earlier, was called upon once again to defend his theological views.[141] Shortly before, or at around the same time as writing the *VC*, Eusebius was also working on two treatises intended to refute the views of his theological opponents, the *CM* and *De eccl. theol.*[142] In the *VC*, Eusebius therefore had much to gain from associating himself, and particularly his theological views, as closely as possible with those of the late emperor.[143] It has therefore been suggested that the *VC* should be seen as a 'mirror for princes', encouraging Constantine's sons to pursue a policy towards the church which Eusebius favoured.[144]

[135] This is the approach recently adopted by Johnson, *Eusebius*, 146.

[136] This dating has been accepted by scholars including: *C&E*, 278–9; Carriker, *Library*, 41; Pasquali, 'Die Composition' (who, however, misdated Eusebius' death to 338), 386.

[137] H. A. Drake, 'What Eusebius Knew: The Genesis of the *Vita Constantini*', *CP* 83 (1988), 20–38. Various positions are summarized at: Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 9.

[138] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 3, 9–12; Pasquali, 'Die Composition' 384–6.

[139] The importance of considering the *VC* in the context of these wider events has been highlighted by Cameron: 'Construction', 153–5.

[140] For an overview of these events, see: *C&E*, 161–3.

[141] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 11; Cameron, 'Construction', 153–4.

[142] Cameron, 'Construction', 153–4.

[143] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 11–12; Cameron, 'Construction', 167–8; Drake, 'What Eusebius Knew', 32.

[144] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 12; Cameron, 'Construction', 154; Cameron, 'Form and Meaning', 73; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 195; Ruhbach, 'Politische Theologie', 250.

Contra Hieroclem

Finally, we must turn to the short, but much-disputed, *Contra Hieroclem* (*CH*).[145] This one-book treatise was a response to a work by Hierocles, a high-ranking imperial official and persecutor of Christians,[146] entitled either *The Lover of Truth* or *The Truth-Loving Discourse*.[147] Since Hierocles' work no longer survives, its contents can only be reconstructed from references in Eusebius' *CH*, as well as in Lactantius' *Divine Institutes*, which also mentions Hierocles' treatise.[148] It seems, however, that Hierocles' work consisted of a lengthy comparison between Jesus and Apollonius of Tyana, which the *CH* sought comprehensively to refute.[149]

The debate surrounding the *CH* centres on the question of its authorship. In 1992, Tomas Hägg first questioned whether the *CH* was in fact a work by Eusebius.[150] More recently, his doubts have found support from Timothy Barnes and Aaron Johnson.[151] These doubts focus on differences of language and style between the *CH* and Eusebius' other works, as well as on the fact that Eusebius does not refer to the *CH* in any of his other works. Hägg's position, however,

[145] The most recent editions of this work are: Eusebius, *Contre Hiérocles*, ed. É. Des Places, trans. with intro. and notes by M. Forrat, Sources Chrétiennes 333 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1986) and the version in Philostratus, *Apollonius of Tyana*, vol. 3: *Letters of Apollonius, Ancient Testimonia, Eusebius' Reply to Hierocles*, ed. and trans. C. P. Jones, LCL (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). In citing this work, I have followed the division into chapters and sections adopted by Jones. The *CH* has been variously dated to before the beginning of the persecution in 303, to its end in 313—before 303: T. D. Barnes, 'Sossianus Hierocles and the Antecedents of the "Great Persecution"', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 80 (1976), 240–1. Around 311–13: Quasten, *Patrology*, 334; Carriker, *Library*, 38; Ulrich, *Euseb und die Juden*, 52, n.105; É. Des Places, 'Le *Contre Hiéroclès* d'Eusèbe de Césarée à la lumière d'une edition récente', *Studia Patristica* 19 (1989), 38.

[146] On Hierocles' career, see M. Forrat, 'Introduction', in Eusebius, *Contre Hiéroclès*, 11–18.

[147] For a discussion of this title, see: T. Hägg, 'Hierocles the Lover of Truth and Eusebius the Sophist', *Symbolae Osloenses* 67 (1992), 138–50.

[148] Hägg, 'Hierocles the Lover of Truth', 140; Lactantius *Divine Institutes* 5.2.12.

[149] S. Borzi, 'Sull'autenticità del *Contra Hieroclem* di Eusebio di Cesarea', *Augustinianum* 43 (2003), 400–1.

[150] Hägg, 'Hierocles the Lover of Truth', 147–50.

[151] Barnes, 'Eusebius of Caesarea', 1; A. P. Johnson, 'The Author of the *Against Hierocles*: A Response to Borzi and Jones', *JTS* 64 (2013), 574–94. Here, Johnson is modifying his earlier position, in which he found Hägg's arguments 'insufficient to reject its [the *CH*'s] authenticity': 'Literary Experiment', 68, n.11.

has been challenged by both S. Borzi and C. P. Jones, and there are counter-arguments to many of the points he raises.[152]

Hägg argues that the style of the *CH*, which demonstrates familiarity with the techniques of the Second Sophistic movement, is unlike that of Eusebius' other writings.[153] However, in separate articles both Jones and C. Smith have identified the influence of the Second Sophistic in other works by Eusebius, the authenticity of which has never been questioned. Jones notes several parallels between the language of the *CH* and book 6 of the *PE*,[154] while Smith points to Second Sophistic techniques in the panegyric on the dedication of the Church at Tyre which is preserved in book 10 of the *HE*.[155] Moreover, Borzi has drawn attention to the similarity of theme and expression between chapters 45–7 of the *CH*, and book 6 of the *PE*.[156]

A further point raised by Hägg is that Eusebius does not quote from the Bible in the *CH*, which Hägg regards as a significant departure from Eusebius' usual style.[157] However, Eusebius did not use direct biblical quotations in his *LC* either and scholars have remarked on the largely classical language of that oration.[158] As works like the *LC* demonstrate, Eusebius was adept at adjusting his style to suit his audience. The absence of biblical citation in the *CH* therefore cannot be taken as proof that the work is not Eusebian. Thirdly, Hägg notes that Eusebius does not refer to the *CH*, or quote from it, in his other works.[159] It is true that Eusebius tended to refer back to his other works where relevant. However, this is by no means conclusive—if nothing else, a large number of Eusebius' other works have been lost, meaning that possible cross-references to the *CH* could also have been lost. Moreover, there remains a compelling argument in favour of Eusebian authorship, which Hägg does not dispute—in all the manuscripts, the *CH* is attributed to

[152] Borzi, 'Sull'autenticità'; C. P. Jones, 'Introduction to Eusebius' *Reply*', in Philostratus, *Apollonius of Tyana*, vol. 3, 152.

[153] Hägg, 'Hierocles the Lover of Truth', 147–9.

[154] C. P. Jones, 'Apollonius of Tyana in Late Antiquity', in Johnson, ed., *Greek Literature in Late Antiquity*, 50–1. See also: Borzi, 'Sull'autenticità', 413.

[155] C. Smith, 'Christian Rhetoric in Eusebius' Panegyric at Tyre', *Vigiliae Christianae* 43 (1989), 231.

[156] Borzi, 'Sull'autenticità', 410–11.

[157] Hägg, 'Hierocles the Lover of Truth', 147.

[158] For example: Cameron, 'Rethinking', 79; Drake, 'Introduction', 29.

[159] Hägg, 'Hierocles the Lover of Truth', 147.

Eusebius.[160] Once again, this is not conclusive, but it must be taken into consideration.

The question of the authorship of the *CH* is therefore far from being resolved, and this debate will no doubt continue to run. As there are few references to demons in the *CH*, the work is of limited relevance to the present study. However, its discussion of fate and personal freedom means it is of interest in the context of Chapter 4. In view of the doubts that continue to surround the work's authorship, I have sought to avoid basing any arguments solely on the evidence of the *CH*. However, where appropriate, I have drawn attention to themes and passages in the work that demonstrate similar concerns to passages in Eusebius' other writings, particularly the *PE*. As will become clear, there is considerable similarity between some of the views expressed by Eusebius in book 6 of the *PE* and the discussion of fate in the final chapters of the *CH*—a fact that might itself also point to Eusebian authorship for the *CH*.

METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

This discussion has highlighted, if nothing else, the extraordinary variety to be found within the Eusebian corpus. Eusebius' works not only spanned a remarkably lengthy chronological period, but also took a range of forms, addressing different audiences in different ways. This poses an undoubted challenge to anyone seeking to understand his thought. There remains a danger that, in trying to extract Eusebius' ideas from a range of texts that may originally have had very different purposes, we may be tempted to overlook or smooth over inconsistencies in order to produce a coherent picture of his views.

This challenge is hardly unique to Eusebius. It has already been raised by scholars in relation to other late antique writers.[161] Peter Brown noted the importance of terminology when discussing the thought of ancient writers, preferring the term 'attitude' to refer to

[160] Hägg, 'Hierocles the Lover of Truth', 150. See also: Borzi, 'Sull'autenticità', 397.

[161] For example: P. R. L. Brown, 'St. Augustine's Attitude to Religious Coercion', *JRS* 54 (1964), 107–16; S. Lunn-Rockliffe, *Ambrosiaster's Political Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 6.

Augustine's views on religious coercion, rather than 'doctrine', which might imply a more carefully formulated set of ideas.[162] Similarly, when describing Eusebius' views, the language of 'thought' and 'ideas' is surely preferable to the older terminology of 'political philosophy' adopted by scholars like Francis Dvornik.[163] Eusebius did not write works of kingship theory, nor, as far as we can tell, was he seeking to develop a coherent 'political philosophy'.[164] Where 'philosophy' or, even worse, 'theory' implies a deliberate and developed scheme of thought, a more flexible terminology of 'thought' and 'ideas' recognizes the fluid and often nebulous nature of Eusebius' thinking on political subjects.[165] A judicious choice of terminology can therefore go some way towards mitigating this problem.

Nonetheless, there remains the question of how to avoid, not only implying, but also imposing false consistency on Eusebius' ideas. There is no straightforward solution to this, although being alert to the difficulty is no doubt the first step towards managing the problem. It is perhaps, above all, a question of managing our own expectations, and of being prepared, where necessary, to accept that Eusebius does not provide us with answers to all of our questions. Again in the case of Augustine, Brown recognized that a 'historian . . . must resign himself, as best he can, to living with this ambivalence'.[166] There are lacunae in Eusebius' thought just as there are in his works, and we must not try to fill those gaps.

Brown also drew an important distinction between seeing a writer's 'thought as a whole' and trying 'to make it seem consistent'.[167] This will be a crucial distinction for this study. By surveying the ideas put forward by Eusebius in a range of works composed over a number of years, we are attempting to form a full picture of his thought in all its variety. That is very different from trying to pull together his different ideas and mould them into an intellectually satisfying 'political philosophy'. There are areas of consistency in Eusebius' thought—we

[162] Brown, 'Augustine's Attitude', 107. [163] Dvornik, *Political Philosophy* II.

[164] As S. Toda has argued: 'The "Political Theology" of Eusebius of Caesarea: A Reappraisal', in D. Luckensmeyer and P. Allen, eds., *Studies of Religion and Politics in the Early Christian Centuries* (Virginia: Australian Catholic University, 2010), 123–35.

[165] Compare the similar treatment of Ambrosiaster's thought in: Lunn-Rockliffe, *Ambrosiaster's Political Theology*, 4–5.

[166] Brown, 'Augustine's Attitude', 107.

[167] Brown, 'Augustine's Attitude', 108.

shall see, for instance, that his belief in demonic hostility appears to have altered very little—but there are also tensions and apparent contradictions, as when Eusebius appears in one work, the *PE*, to imply that all demonic power has ceased, while in others, such as the *VC*, he appears to suggest that the demonic threat continues into his own time.[168] Recognizing this can be of enormous value, for, by highlighting areas of tension between Eusebius' works, rather than avoiding them, we may in fact discover unexpected emphases in his thought or new avenues to be investigated.

Overall, the approach taken in this book, of focusing in particular on Eusebius' notions of demons, leads us to join those scholars who have argued that Eusebius' basic outlook was little altered by the dramatic political changes of his lifetime.[169] We find little sign of a waning interest in demons, nor of a decline in Eusebius' concern about the threat they might pose. Eusebius' basic cosmology does not appear to have been altered by the changing situation of the church. However, rather than joining these scholars in seeing Eusebius as a perennial triumphalist,[170] the conclusions drawn later in this book will suggest, to the contrary, that it is time to reassess our assumptions about the optimistic mind-set of this, supposedly familiar, figure. The following chapters will reveal instead a more cautious figure, arguing that Eusebius continued throughout his lifetime to demonstrate concern about potential challenges to the 'orthodox' teaching of the church and about the possibility of Christians straying from the path of virtue.

[168] On this, see Chapter 5, this volume.

[169] For example, *C&E*, 164; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 156.

[170] For instance, *C&E*, 102; Johnson, 'The Blackness of Ethiopians', 167; Johnson, 'The Ends of Transfiguration', 196, n.23.

2

The Nature of Demonic Threats

A study that seeks to explore the role played by Eusebius' ideas of the demonic in his political thought must be based on a reasonably firm understanding of what those ideas were. However, despite frequent references to demons in many of Eusebius' works, there has as yet been no thorough study of his discussions of the demonic throughout a range of his works. While Eusebius' evident interest in the subject of demons has not entirely escaped the attention of earlier scholars, previous work on the topic is either clearly outdated,[1] or limited in scope.[2]

In the past, scholarship on Eusebius has tended to treat his ideas about demons only briefly, if at all.[3] In such cases, the discussion has been largely restricted to only one or two of Eusebius' works, most often the *Praeparatio Evangelica* (*PE*) and *Demonstratio Evangelica* (*DE*).[4] This may be understandable, since these works contain by far the fullest and most detailed of Eusebius' descriptions of demons,[5] but it is nonetheless unfortunate, for such a heavy focus on these apologies leads to an imbalanced picture of Eusebius' thought in this area. For instance, Jean Sirinelli was led to suggest that the primary purpose of Eusebius' discussions of demons was 'to explain pagan error'.[6]

[1] For example: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia'; Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 59–60, 124–9.

[2] For example: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia'; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 163–70; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 312–26, 337–8; Martin, *Inventing Superstition*, 207–25; Morlet, *La* Démonstration Évangélique, 470.

[3] The exception is Coggan's PhD thesis: 'Pandaemonia'. However, even this, which is by far the most sustained exploration of Eusebius' attitude towards the demonic, takes as its primary focus only the *PE*.

[4] For example: Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 163–70; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 312–26, 337–8; Morlet, *La* Démonstration Évangélique, 470.

[5] Particularly in books 4, 5, and 7.16 of the *PE*, and book 4 of the *DE*.

[6] Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 317: '. . . d'expliquer l'erreur paienne'.

As we shall see, however, Eusebius' understanding of the demonic involved far more than simply an explanation of the origin of the pagan cults. Moreover, much of the previous work that touches—however briefly—on Eusebius' views of the demonic predates the important work of Gregory Smith. Smith's work has done much to improve our understanding of late antique and early Christian thinking on the demonic, and has emphasized in particular the importance of acknowledging the physicality of demons in the eyes of late antique writers.

In order to achieve a full and balanced picture of Eusebius' views of demons, we need to look beyond the discussions of the *PE* and *DE* and to take into account references to demons throughout a range of his works. Yet even when adopting a broader perspective which encompasses a variety of Eusebius' works, it remains a challenging task to establish with any clarity what Eusebius' view of demons was. Despite the abundance of references to the demonic throughout Eusebius' works, he in fact provides us with little in the way of a coherent or systematic 'demonology'. Heidi Marx-Wolf has described the writing of demonology in late antiquity as a process of 'systematization', in which intellectuals sought to impose order on the wide range of popular beliefs about the demonic.[7] This idea that demonology was about systematizing and classifying the demonic can also be found in studies of later demonologies—for instance, the idea that demonology was about asserting control through 'a structure of classification' forms a key part of David Frankfurter's understanding of the term.[8]

While it is open to question how far any demonological writings were ever purely systematic explorations of the nature of the demonic,[9] on this understanding of the term 'demonology', none of Eusebius' works could accurately be described as purely, or even primarily, 'demonological'.[10] We must remember that Eusebius' accounts of

[7] H. Marx-Wolf, 'Third Century Daimonologies and the *Via Universalis*: Origen, Porphyry and Iamblichus on *Daimons* and Other Angels', *Studia Patristica* 46 (2010), 207.

[8] D. Frankfurter, *Evil Incarnate: Rumors of Demonic Conspiracy and Ritual Abuse in History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 26.

[9] Stuart Clark noted that, shortly after beginning his research into early modern demonology, he 'rapidly discovered that there was too much demonology embedded in . . . books of all kinds and on many subjects—for it to be attributed to one kind of writer': *Thinking with Demons*, viii–ix.

[10] As Sirinelli recognized: *Les vues historiques*, 301 ('Ce serait une erreur de perspective que d'en retrace une tableau systématique qu'il n'a jamais cherché à donner').

demons in the *PE* and *DE* were included in support of an overall apologetic goal—clearly set out at the beginning of the *PE*—of demonstrating why Christians had made the correct decision in choosing to abandon the traditional cults of Greece and Rome.[11] It is therefore necessary to supplement the lengthier discussions in these works with numerous additional remarks about demons to be found in other works such as the *Historia ecclesiastica* (*HE*) and *Vita Constantini* (*VC*), in which Eusebius' focus was different. Even brief and scattered references to demons can reveal a great deal about Eusebius' understanding of the demonic. Such references can show some of the ways in which he believed them to act, or highlight details of their relations with humankind.

Overall, when remarks about the demonic throughout a range of Eusebius' works are taken into consideration, a reasonably clear picture emerges of his views. Of course there are gaps, and even at times apparent contradictions—this is hardly surprising given that Eusebius' aim was not specifically to elaborate his views of demons. Even so, the frequency of Eusebius' references to the demonic is enough to demonstrate the important role that they occupied in his understanding of the world. This chapter will show that Eusebius saw demons as an active and dangerous presence in the universe, that he believed them to live in close proximity to humankind and to be a force for evil, seeking to derail human salvation. In the past, some scholars have regarded Eusebius' references to demons as little more than a useful literary or rhetorical device.[12] By contrast, this chapter will suggest that such an approach underestimates the significance of the demonic threat for Eusebius. Like many of his era, Eusebius appears to have believed firmly in demons as an active, physical presence. It is only by acknowledging this that we can come to appreciate fully the role which demons played in his thought. This chapter will first explore Eusebius' views on the physical nature of demons, before moving on to consider his opinion of their moral character, and his understanding of their powers. It will argue that, for Eusebius, demons represented a potent threat, against which all Christians needed to remain constantly on their guard.

[11] *PE* 1.5.11–13.
[12] For example: Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 59–60, 128.

THE DEMONOLOGICAL CONTEXT

In speculating about the nature and activities of demons, Eusebius was far from alone among late antique and early Christian writers. Demons played a prominent role in the works of many early Christian writers, yet they were by no means an exclusively Christian concept, and thinking about the demonic had a long history among Greek and Jewish writers.[13] The extensive quotations on the subject of demons in the *PE* and *DE*, which have been drawn from a variety of thinkers,[14] attest both to the strength of this tradition of thinking about demons, and to the range of possible influences on Eusebius' own views about the demonic. Since the surviving ancient literature on the demonic is so extensive, it will be necessary to confine ourselves here to brief discussion only of those writers whose views on demons appear to have exercised the greatest influence on Eusebius' own ideas—Porphyry and Origen.

Despite the difference in their religious positions, there are some striking similarities between the views which these two writers expressed on demons, as indeed there were between the views of other Neoplatonist and Christian writers of the period.[15] From

[13] The bibliography on the development of Jewish and early Christian ideas about demons and the devil is now considerable. Some of the most helpful examples are: V. Flint, 'The Demonisation of Magic and Sorcery in Late Antiquity: Christian Redefinitions of Pagan Religions', in B. Ankarloo and S. Clark, eds., *Witchcraft and Magic in Europe: Ancient Greece and Rome*, vol. 2 (London: Athlone Press, 1999), 281–96; E. Pagels, *The Origin of Satan* (New York: Random House, 1995); J. Burton Russell, *Satan: The Early Christian Tradition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981); N. Forsyth, *The Old Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); A. Y. Reed, *Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity: The Reception of Enochic Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Parallels between the Rabbinic concept of the evil *yetzer* and late antique ideas about demons are explored by I. Rosen Zvi, *Demonic Desires:* Yetzer Hara *and the Problem of Evil in Late Antiquity* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). For summaries, see: G. J. Riley, 'Demon', in K. van der Toorn, B. Becking, and P. W. Van Der Horst, eds., *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 445–55, and G. J. Riley, 'Devil', in van der Toorn, Becking, and Van Der Horst, eds., *Dictionary of Deities and Demons*, 463–73.

[14] Including, for example: Porphyry (*PE* 4.15.1–2), Clement of Alexandria (*PE* 4.16.12–13), Plutarch (*PE* 5.16.1–17.12), the Book of Isaiah 10:13 (*DE* 4.9.2).

[15] On which, see Marx-Wolf, 'Third Century Daimonologies', 207–15; and H. Marx Wolf, 'A Strange Consensus: Daemonological Discourse in Origen, Porphyry and Iamblichus', in R. M. Frakes and E. DePalma Digeser, eds., *The Rhetoric of Power in Late Antiquity: Religion and Politics in Byzantium, Europe and the Early Islamic World* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 219–39.

Plato onwards, there had been a strong tradition of discussing the demonic among Platonist writers.[16] According to Plato's *Symposium*, demons were spiritual intermediaries, located midway between the highest gods and mortals, passing messages between the two realms.[17] In the earlier Platonic tradition, these beings had lacked the extreme, negative moral character they were to acquire in the later Christian tradition. By the third century, however, there had been a marked shift in perceptions of the demonic. By this period, we find both Christian and non-Christian philosophers arguing that there were overtly wicked demons, responsible for much human suffering.[18]

One such philosopher was Porphyry, a Neoplatonist and opponent of Christianity. Given Porphyry's staunch anti-Christian views—his treatise *Contra Christianos* is now lost, but was successful enough to warrant a full-length rebuttal from Eusebius[19]—it may seem surprising that Eusebius cites Porphyry extensively on the subject of demons in the *PE*. While Eusebius goes to considerable lengths to refute many of Porphyry's arguments, there are nevertheless some striking areas of agreement. For instance, in the *PE* Eusebius agrees with the rejection of animal sacrifice advocated in Porphyry's treatise *de Abstinentia*.[20]

Although much of Porphyry's extensive *oeuvre* is now either lost or highly fragmentary, enough remains of his work to permit a reasonably detailed reconstruction of his views on a range of subjects, including demons.[21] The most valuable text for understanding Porphyry's views on demons is the four-volume *de Abstinentia*.[22]

[16] For the history and development of Platonic ideas about demons, see: A. Timotin, *La démonologie platonicienne: histoire de la notion de daimon de Platon aux derniers néoplatoniciennes* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); and, in the context of wider Middle Platonic thought: J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism, 80BC to AD220* (London: Duckworth, 1977; rev. edn. 1996).

[17] Plato, *Symposium*, 202d–e.

[18] Marx-Wolf discusses both the parallels between Neoplatonic and Christian views on evil demons, as well as the differences, in: 'A Strange Consensus'.

[19] A now-lost *Contra Porphyrium* by Eusebius is mentioned by Jerome in his catalogue of Eusebius' works: *Vir. Inl.* 81. See: S. Morlet, ed., *Le traité de Porphyre contre les chrétiens: un siècle de recherches, nouvelles questions. Actes du colloque international organisé les 8 et 9 septembre 2009 à l'Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2011).

[20] *PE* 4.14.10.

[21] The most comprehensive study of Porphyry's thought, drawing on the full range of his works, is: A. P. Johnson, *Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre: The Limits of Hellenism in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[22] Porphyry, *De l'abstinence*, ed. and trans. with intro. by J. Bouffartigue, M. Patillon, and A. P. Segonds, (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1977–95).

In this work, Porphyry presents a system of good and wicked demons, arguing against what he suggests is the widespread view that demons are changeable, and capable of both good and evil acts.[23] This, Porphyry declares, is impossible, since beneficent beings capable of goodness cannot also be responsible for suffering and hurt.[24] The good demons, according to Porphyry, are those mentioned by Plato in the *Symposium*, who have the task both of passing human prayers to the gods and of revealing the views of the gods through oracles.[25] In addition, these benevolent demons are said to have oversight of such benefits to humankind as music, learning, and medicine.[26] The bad demons, by contrast, are said to be responsible for such troubles as plagues, earthquakes, and droughts, as well as for inciting humankind to the vices of vanity and greed.[27] Intriguingly, Porphyry finds these moral differences between good and bad demons paralleled in physical differences. Although both good and bad demons are said to be imperceptible to humans because they lack a 'firm body' (*στερεὸν σῶμα*), good demons are said to be 'in symmetry' (*ἐν συμμετρίᾳ*), while bad demons are not.[28] Moreover, bad demons, Porphyry suggests, take nourishment from animal sacrifices, growing fat (*πιαίνεται*) on the blood and flesh of the slaughtered animals.[29]

This interest in the physicality of wicked demons was not unique to Porphyry; as Gregory Smith has shown, discussion of the physical form and bodily needs of demons recurs throughout a number of late antique texts by Christian as well as non-Christian writers.[30] It is an interest we find reflected in the discussions of Origen. According to Origen, the bodies of demons are 'naturally delicate, and fine like air', as a result of which they are often said—mistakenly in Origen's view—to be 'incorporeal'.[31] Just like Porphyry, Origen also suggests that demons feed on 'the meaty smells and bloods and vapours of sacrifices'.[32] They are, moreover, said to be responsible for such evils as famine, crop failure, and plague.[33]

Nevertheless, while there are some evident similarities between the views of Origen and Porphyry, there are also some significant areas of disagreement, the most striking of which is Origen's refusal to accept

[23] Porph. *Abst.* 2.37. [24] Porph. *Abst.* 2.38. [25] Porph. *Abst.* 2.38.
[26] Porph. *Abst.* 2.38. [27] Porph. *Abst.* 2.40. [28] Porph. *Abst.* 2.39.
[29] Porph. *Abst*. 2.42. [30] Smith, 'How Thin?'.
[31] Origen, *de Principiis, Praef*. 8. [32] Origen, *Contra Celsum*, 7.35.
[33] Orig. *Cels.* 8.31.

the existence of good demons. For Origen, 'demon' signifies a being that has departed from the way of God—these creatures were not originally created wicked and thus were not at first 'demons'. Rather, they became demons in the process of falling away from God.[34] Moreover, Origen's demons occupy a very clearly defined position within a spiritual hierarchy. For Origen, a creature's wickedness and distance from God are dependent upon the extent of its initial fall.[35] For Origen, there are different beings located at various points along a continuum away from God. According to Origen, demons have fallen the furthest—further than humans, who in turn have fallen further than angels.[36] Thus Origen's demons, although physically similar to Porphyry's, are nevertheless understood as part of a distinctively Christian cosmology.

Many of the ideas expressed by both Porphyry and Origen are ones that we find reappearing in Eusebius' discussions of demons. In the case of Origen, this is perhaps not surprising—Eusebius' high regard for Origen has long been recognized.[37] In the case of Porphyry, however, it is more remarkable, especially since Eusebius devotes considerable energy to refuting many of Porphyry's ideas in the *PE*. What such similarities demonstrate is that belief in demons was by no means unusual or idiosyncratic in the period when Eusebius was writing. On the contrary, demons were an entirely acceptable part of high theological and philosophical discussion, and there were several ideas, particularly about the physicality of demons, that were held in common by those of different religious views.[38] It will be important to remember, as we examine how Eusebius' political views are intertwined with his ideas about demons, that much of what he wrote about demons in themselves was neither original nor

[34] Orig. *Cels.* 7.69.

[35] Origen, *de Princ.* 1.8.4, 2.9.2.

[36] See Orig. *de Princ.* 1.5.1–5 and, for discussion of Origen's cosmology: E. Muehlberger, *Angels in Late Ancient Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 33–4.

[37] See, for example: *C&E*, 94–5; Berkhoff, *Die Theologie*, 125; Kannengiesser, 'Eusebius of Caesarea, Origenist'; I. L. E. Ramelli, 'Origen, Eusebius, the Doctrine of *Apokatastasis*, and Its Relation to Christology', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 307–23; Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology*, 85; E. C. Penland, 'The History of the Caesarean Present: Eusebius and Narratives of Origen', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 83–95.

[38] For more on the physicality of demons, and examples of these views in other writers, see: Smith, 'How Thin?'. On the similarities between the views of Origen, Porphyry, and Iamblichus, see: Marx-Wolf, 'Third Century Daimonologies'.

particularly controversial; demons were simply an accepted part of the fabric of the cosmos.

PHYSICAL DEMONS

Modern scholars have often dismissed late antique and early Christian references to demons as little more than 'figures of speech', brushing aside the many discussions of the physicality of demons which appear in these texts.[39] However, as Smith has demonstrated, recognizing this aspect of late antique speculation about the demonic has much to offer our understanding not only of late antique demonology but also of other topics, such as late ancient ideas about physics and biology.[40] It is therefore essential, he suggests, to treat references to the demonic in late antique works 'as literally, as physically, as possible'.[41] Previous work on Eusebius' ideas about demons, however, has consistently overlooked his discussions of the physical nature of the demonic. It is clear from his remarks on this subject that Eusebius considered the realm of the demonic to be closely connected to the human world. Demons, in his view, were corporeal, albeit invisible, beings, who participated in events in the earthly realm. Demons were thus not abstract 'personifications',[42] or even a distant and obscure element of the universe for Eusebius. Rather, they were an active presence in the recognizable everyday world which he and his readers inhabited. In order to understand Eusebius' attitude towards the demonic, and in particular if we are to appreciate the severity of the demonic threat in his eyes, it is necessary to highlight this aspect of his thought on the subject.

Although Eusebius did not discuss the nature of demonic bodies to the same extent as, for instance, Origen had done, it is clear even from his few scattered references to the subject that he shared many of these assumptions about the physical nature of demons. In the *VC*, Eusebius refers to sacrifices as 'demonic festivals' (δαιμονικὰς

[39] A problem which Smith highlights: 'How Thin?', esp. 479–83.
[40] Smith, 'How Thin?', 496. [41] Smith, 'How Thin?', 483.
[42] Chesnut suggested that demons in Eusebius' works were the 'personification' of φθόνος: *First Christian Histories*, 128.

ἑορτάς),[43] and elsewhere describes 'those wicked demons which, lurking in images and sunk into dark corners, covet the libations and fatty smoke of sacrifices'.[44] Crucially, Eusebius also believed these physical demons to live in places very close to humans. Demons, he asserts, 'are near the earth and subterranean, and wander about the heavy and misty air about the earth and . . . are fond of inhabiting the tombs and memorials of the dead'.[45] Although people cannot see these demons, Eusebius suggests that 'spreading great error, chthonic and demonic beings, invisible to us, are flying about the air around the earth, unknown and indistinct to men'.[46] Thus Eusebius' demons effectively surround human beings, inhabiting the spaces above, below, and among them. The human and demonic realms are envisaged as existing in close proximity to each other.

As well as situating demons within a recognizable human world of graves, temples, and sacrificial rituals, Eusebius also firmly roots his demons within historical time. In his accounts of the human past, Eusebius gives demons an active and intimate role in the events he believed to have unfolded. He suggests, for instance, that traditional Greek and Roman polytheistic worship is to be attributed to the malign influence of demons.[47] In this, of course, Eusebius was hardly original among early Christian writers. The idea that the pagan gods were in reality demons appears in the Psalms—in his own discussion of demons, Eusebius quotes the idea found in Psalm 95(96).5 that 'all the gods of the nations are demons'.[48] A similar idea recurs in the letters of Paul, who wrote that 'what pagans sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God'.[49] Picking up on this scriptural idea, we find several Christian apologists making the same point. Like Eusebius, Origen had earlier drawn attention to Psalm 95(96),[50] while Justin Martyr wrote that, in the past, people 'not understanding that they

[43] *VC* 3.48.2. Compare: *Mart. Pal.* [SR] 4.8.

[44] *SC* 13.4. Compare: *PE* 5.2.1.

[45] *PE* 5.2.1.

[46] *DE* 4.8.4. This is perhaps a reference to the 'ruler of the power of the air' in Eph. 2:2—I am grateful to the audience at the King's College London Classics Department Research Seminar, 13 December 2011, for raising this possibility.

[47] *PE* 4.16.20, 5.1.1, 5.1.16, 5.15.3, 6.11.82, 7.16.10. See also: for example: *LC* 7.2, 7.7; *SC* 13.4; *DE* 4.10.3, 6.20.5, 8.*Praef*.9; *CPs PG* 23.680.38, 23.684.45–6, 23.692.2–3, 23.865.5, 23.1020.11; *Fr.Luc., PG* 24.553.25, 24.553.42–6; *CI* 80.28–9.

[48] . . . πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν δαιμόνια. In this case, I have not followed the NRSV translation, which, translating the Hebrew rather than the Greek Septuagint, has 'idols' instead of 'demons'. Cited by Eusebius at: *PE* 4.16.20.

[49] 1 Cor. 10:20, NRSV trans.

[50] Orig. *Cels.* 3.2.

were wicked demons, called them by the name of gods'.[51] In suggesting that traditional pagan cult was offered, not to truly divine beings, but rather to malevolent demons, Eusebius was therefore following a strong early Christian tradition.

Moreover, Eusebius' description of the process by which he believed polytheism to have become established is far from vague, and he had clearly given the topic some thought. In the *DE*, Eusebius suggests that polytheism had not been the original form of worship, even among people who had not been capable of recognizing the true God.[52] Rather, Eusebius suggests that God had set up some of his angels to watch over these people, permitting them a simple form of astral worship instead.[53] This, Eusebius suggests, was intended to bring them as close to true worship as was possible for them, by allowing them devotion to the most beautiful elements of God's creation.[54] However, this early human state was then, in Eusebius' view, undermined by the activity of the devil and his demons, who drew these people away from the worship of the stars towards a less moral and less pious polytheism.[55] As part of this historical sketch, Eusebius shows humankind as suffering the effects of a higher, cosmic battle between God and his demonic adversaries: the demons challenge God by undermining his plans for humankind. Their rebellion against God takes the form of subjugating humankind to their own rule, thereby jeopardizing humankind's salvation.[56]

Likewise, when Eusebius writes of the beginnings of a decline in demonic power in the *PE*, he again places it firmly within a recognizable historical framework. Describing the end of the practice of human sacrifice, which he considered to be a manifestation of demonic influence, he even goes so far as to give it a precise date in the reign of Hadrian.[57] This date appears to be based on a reference at Porphyry's *de Abstinentia* 2.56.3, which Eusebius cites at *PE* 4.16.7.[58] Here Porphyry mentions a statement by the writer Pallas, working in the reign of Hadrian, who claimed that the practice of human sacrifice had been almost entirely abolished by that time. Eusebius picks up on this claim, but finds a new significance in the timing, pointing out that

[51] Justin Martyr, *First Apology* 5.2. See also: Tatian, *Oratio ad Graecos* 8, 18.
[52] *DE* 4.6.9–4.9.12. [53] *DE* 4.6.9, 4.8.1. [54] *DE* 4.8.2–5.
[55] *DE* 4.9.5–8. [56] *DE* 4.9.1–12.
[57] *PE* 4.15.6, 4.17.4. See also: *Theoph.* 3.16; *SC* 16.10.
[58] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 169.

during the reign of Hadrian 'like a light, the teaching of Christ was already shining through every place'.[59]

A similarly deliberate pinpointing of the decline of demonic power occurs at *PE* 5.17.13, where Eusebius dates the 'death' of a demon, supposedly described by Plutarch,[60] to the reign of Tiberius. Once again, the choice of this date is not Eusebius' own, but is based on references to Tiberius within Plutarch's story.[61] However, at *PE* 5.17.13, Eusebius does draw particular attention to what he considered the significance of this date to be—the fact that the reign of Tiberius was the time of Christ's activity on earth. In both cases, Eusebius makes a connection—entirely absent from these earlier sources—between the spread of Christianity and the decline of demonic influence. Describing both the emergence and the decline of demonic influence, Eusebius therefore places them within a structured, linear historical framework. Eusebius' interweaving of cosmic and human stories is not left in the abstract; rather, he firmly grounds cosmic events in what he considered to be traceable human history.

It is further worth noting that the demons in Eusebius' works are consistently depicted as an external force. This is significant because, while demons were often envisioned in very physical terms, especially in later antiquity, this was not the only way in which they might be conceived. As Andrei Timotin has recently shown, speculation on the nature of Socrates' δαίμων, as described by Plato, led Middle Platonists like Plutarch and Apuleius to develop the notion that the philosopher might be guided in leading a virtuous life by a higher, more spiritual, 'demonic' part of the soul—in effect, a 'guardian' demon linked to the individual human soul.[62] Among early Christian and Jewish writers of the first three centuries CE, this idea began to encompass the notion of two personal demons, one good and one bad, which were continually vying to control the direction of each

[59] *PE* 4.15.6.

[60] Eusebius quotes Plutarch, *De Defectu Oraculorum* 418E–419F to support his point (*PE* 5.17.1–12). For a detailed discussion of Eusebius' treatment of this passage of Plutarch, see: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia'. Coggan's thesis focuses on the way in which Eusebius used this passage as part of his apologetic attack on traditional pagan religion. Using this passage effectively as a case study, she considers the way in which Eusebius altered the meaning of traditionally ambiguous terms such as *Πὰν* and δαίμων to make their meaning exclusively negative.

[61] Plut. *De Defect. Orac.* 419D.

[62] Timotin, *La démonologie platonicienne*, 321.

person's life.[63] This idea emerges particularly clearly in Origen's *Homily on Luke*:[64]

> Two angels, one of righteousness, the other of injustice, stand by each one of us. If there are good thoughts in our heart and righteousness grows in our soul, no doubt it is an angel of the Lord who speaks to us. If, indeed, bad thoughts are moving in our heart, it is an angel of the devil who speaks to us.[65]

In this context, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that writers might have been using the notion of demons or angels to understand or describe aspects of human psychology. Nor was such a use of the concept of the angel or demon incompatible with a more physical view of the demonic realm as well, for Origen also entertained strikingly physical ideas about demons' bodies.[66] However, this idea of personal or guardian demons is not one that we find emphasized in Eusebius.

This contrasts with the recent suggestion, based on a passage in the *DE*, that Eusebius did believe all Christians to have a permanent, guardian angel.[67] In the passage in question, Eusebius writes: 'so that men on earth would not be without leaders and inspectors like irrational creatures, [God] established heavenly angels as their guardians and curators, like leaders of a herd and shepherds'.[68] However,

[63] Timotin, *La démonologie platonicienne*, 271–2.

[64] Timotin, *La démonologie platonicienne*, 272–3. On Origen's understanding of 'guardian angels', see also: C. Blanc, 'L'angélologie d'Origène', *Studia Patristica* 14 (1976), 103–4.

[65] Origen, *Homilia in Lucam* 12.4. Origen's thirty-nine *Homilies on Luke* survive mainly in the Latin translation of Jerome, with only a few Greek fragments remaining. Although the translation has been criticized in the past, F. Fournier, one of the editors of the Sources Chrétiennes edition, found that, where the Latin translation could be compared with the remaining Greek fragments, it was largely accurate and suggested that Jerome 'expresses the ideas of the Alexandrian master well': F. Fournier, 'Introduction II: Les *Homélies sur Luc* et leur traduction par S. Jérome', in Origen, *Homélies sur S. Luc: texte latine et fragments grecs*, ed. and trans., H. Crouzel, F. Fournier, and P. Périchon, Sources Chrétiennes 87 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1962), 85–7.

[66] On Origen's views on demonic corporeality, see: Smith, 'How Thin?', 508.

[67] Muehlberger, *Angels*, 118.

[68] *DE* 4.6.9. A similar idea is expressed in Porphyry's *Commentary on the Timaeus* (fr. 17 Sodano). As there is no direct intertext, we should be cautious about positing direct influence here. Nevertheless, the appearance of this idea in Porphyry's work, as well as in the works of writers like Eusebius and Origen, illustrates the point that there was much common ground between Christian and non-Christian demonological discourse.

Eusebius does not mention 'Christians' at all here. Instead, he refers more broadly to 'the men on earth' (*οἱ ἐπὶ γῆς ἄνθρωποι*). More importantly, Eusebius' reference to angels acting like 'shepherds' suggests that he envisaged the angels watching over large groups of people, rather than being assigned to each individual. Finally, this passage is immediately followed by a quotation of Deuteronomy 32:7–9, in which, according to the Septuagint version, it is said that God divided the human nations between the 'angels of God' (*ἀγγέλων Θεοῦ*).[69] This passage should therefore be read as a reference, not to the notion of 'guardian angels', but rather to the idea of the 'angels of the nations', also found in Origen, according to which God had arranged for different angels to supervise the various human nations.[70]

Since Eusebius accorded the notion of personal demons such little attention, despite its appearance in the work of Origen, we should be particularly cautious before attempting to read Eusebius' demons in any 'psychological' or 'internal' way. Eusebius' emphasis is on demons as a physical, external presence and, as a result, this is how we must principally attempt to treat them.

WICKED DEMONS

For Eusebius, demons were not simply a physical presence, but a dangerous one too. That all demons were a threat to be both feared and if possible avoided is central to Eusebius' conception of the demonic. In the *PE*, the point about demons which Eusebius makes most insistently is that there can be no such thing as a good demon,[71] thereby distancing himself from the view of contemporary non-Christian philosophers like Porphyry.[72] On this point, he makes it clear that there is no room for doubt, asserting that 'our divine sayings never name any demon at all as good'.[73] As Coggan has

[69] *DE* 4.7.1.

[70] Blanc, 'L'angelologie d'Origène', 88–92, citing Orig. *Cels.* 5.30; *Hom. in Luc.* 35.8; *de Princ.* 3.2–3. This is also how Johnson reads this passage: *Ethnicity and Argument*, 166–7.

[71] See, for example: *PE* 4.10.4, 4.14.10, 4.15.3–4, 4.16.20, 4.16.23, 4.17.5–7, 4.17.10, 4.21.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.16, 5.3.8, 5.4.4, 6.6.1.

[72] As, for instance, very deliberately at: *PE* 4.15.3–9.

[73] *PE* 4.5.4.

shown, Eusebius' discussions of the demonic in the *PE* effectively serve to 'redefine' the term δαίμων and to remove from it any of the ambiguity which had traditionally been attached to it.[74]

This attempt to undermine the traditional Greek understanding of the nature of the demonic can be seen most clearly in the alternative etymology for the word δαίμων that Eusebius proposes at *PE* 4.5.4. Demons, Eusebius informs us, 'are fittingly called demons, not, as it seems to the Greeks, because they are knowledgeable (δαήμονας) and skilled, but for fear (τὸ δειμαίνειν), since they fear and cause fear'.[75] It seems likely that Eusebius took his 'traditional' etymology of the word δαίμων from Plato's *Cratylus*, in which the character of Socrates suggests that Hesiod named the demons δαίμονες 'because they were prudent and knowledgeable (δαήμονες)'.[76] Although Eusebius does not name his source here as Plato, this is most probably because Eusebius usually prefers to quote Plato approvingly, as support for his understanding of the demonic, whereas here Eusebius is seeking to distance himself from the Platonic idea.[77] Significantly, Plato's etymology occurs in the context of a discussion about how the names of natural creatures and objects might come from 'a more divine power than the power of men', and thus reflect something essential to their nature.[78] In the course of this discussion, Socrates and Hermogenes agree that 'the good are also the prudent', before progressing to associate the name δαίμων with the qualities of knowledge and prudence or understanding.[79] As such, an acceptance of the traditional etymology of the term δαίμων might also be taken as an acceptance of the essential goodness of the demons' nature. Thus, in redefining the word as he does, Eusebius is making clear to his

[74] Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', iii. Coggan's thesis focuses on the way in which Eusebius transforms the meanings of the words Πὰν and δαίμων as part of his apologetic approach in the *PE*. See also: A. Mendelson, 'Eusebius and the Posthumous Career of Apollonius of Tyana', in Attridge and Hata, eds., *Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism*, 518.

[75] *PE* 4.5.4.

[76] Plato, *Cratylus* 398b. As Riley also noted: 'Demon', 445. Riley, however, believes that the 'most likely' etymology of the word δαίμων is not that of either Plato or Eusebius. Instead, he suggests that it came from the word δαίω, meaning 'to divide (destinies)', and thus referred to 'the spirit controlling one's fate', 445. Clearly, however, neither Plato nor Eusebius had this in mind, but instead found etymologies for the word that best suited their own understanding of the nature of demons.

[77] Eusebius expresses his general admiration for Plato, albeit with some reservations, at *PE* 11.*Praef*.5, 13.13.66.

[78] Plat. *Cra.* 397c. [79] Plat. *Cra.* 398b.

readership the distance that lies between the traditional Greek view of the demonic and his own, recognizably Christian, view. At the same time, he is also drawing attention to one of the most significant aspects of his view of the demonic—the idea that they are to be feared.

To support his argument about the malevolence of demons in the *PE*, Eusebius draws, as so often, on the works of earlier writers, exploiting areas of common ground, but also at times using their own arguments against them. In his discussion of demons in book 4 of the *PE*, Eusebius makes particularly extensive use of some of Porphyry's works, most notably the *de Abstinentia*.[80] With its condemnation of the practice of animal sacrifice, the *de Abstinentia* contains several areas in which Eusebius might easily find himself in agreement with Porphyry, and Eusebius in fact brings these to the reader's attention. Introducing his discussion of the *de Abstinentia*, Eusebius even goes so far as to suggest that Porphyry had been 'moved by correct reason' in his basic argument against sacrifice,[81] and later agrees with Porphyry that sacrifice is 'profane, unjust, and hurtful'.[82]

However, having established this area of common ground by using lengthy quotations from Porphyry's own text to condemn sacrificial practices, Eusebius then launches an immediate challenge to the part of Porphyry's argument with which he disagrees: the suggestion that sacrifices are offered to 'demons, either good or bad', rather than to the gods.[83] Agreeing that sacrifices are not offered to the true God, but only to demons,[84] Eusebius then uses Porphyry's own arguments about the unholy nature of animal sacrifice to suggest that no good being would require such a practice.[85] As such, Eusebius argues, sacrificial cults could never have been demanded by good demons, but only by the wicked.[86] Rather than condemning Porphyry's views outright, and thereby perhaps asking his readers to reject entirely the ideas about demons which they might have held prior to their conversion to Christianity,[87] Eusebius instead uses these views as a foundation on which to build his own arguments. His focus is on highlighting the key area of difference between the Christian view of the demonic and the Neoplatonic view expressed by Porphyry—that is, the moral character of demons.

[80] As, for example, at: *PE* 4.11.1–12.1, 4.14.1–9, 4.16.1–9, 4.18.1–19.2, 4.22.1–12.
[81] *PE* 4.10.1. [82] *PE* 4.14.10. [83] *PE* 4.15.1. [84] *PE* 4.14.10.
[85] *PE* 4.14.10–4.15.4. [86] *PE* 4.14.10–4.15.4.
[87] See also on Justin Martyr: Reed, *Fallen Angels*, 186.

Eusebius' uncompromising belief in the malevolent character of demons can also be found reflected in a range of his other works, and is particularly evident in his description of the demonic as μισόκαλος (good-hating),[88] or φιλοπονήρος (evil-loving).[89] These terms, particularly μισόκαλος, can be found in many early Christian texts, describing not only demons, but also the devil.[90] Eusebius' use of these terms therefore points to another important feature of the demonic in his eyes—their relationship with the devil.[91] Moreover, the description of demons as μισόκαλος significantly reinforces the sense that demons are a force to be feared. Creatures considered to be invariably 'good-hating' would pose a particularly serious and unpredictable threat, since their actions against human interests would require no provocation in the form of human transgression.

ENVIOUS DEMONS

This sense that demons are universally wicked is further reflected in the association which Eusebius draws between demons and the characteristic of envy. There are three terms which Eusebius uses in this context: φθόνος,[92] βασκανία,[93] and ζῆλος.[94] As P. Walcot has shown, there was considerable overlap in meaning between these terms in classical Greek texts,[95] and it is clear that this continued in Eusebius' use of them. At times, they appear almost synonymous for Eusebius. At *DE* 4.9.1, for instance, Eusebius combines the terms φθόνος and βασκανία in his description of the demons' fall, thereby suggesting that envy was seen by Eusebius as characteristic of demonic activity from the very beginning of their existence:

[88] E.g. *HE* 4.7.1, 5.21.2; *PE* 7.10.14.

[89] E.g. *HE* 10.4.14, 10.4.57, 10.8.2. See also: *HE* 4.7.10.

[90] G. J. M. Bartelink, '*Μισόκαλος*, Épithéte du Diable', *Vigiliae Christianae* 12 (1958), 37.

[91] On which, see the section 'Demons and the Devil'.

[92] E.g. *PE* 7.10.15; *DE* 4.9.1; *HE* 10.4.14, 10.4.57, 10.8.2; *VC* 1.45.3, 2.73.1.

[93] E.g. *PE* 7.10.14; *DE* 4.9.1; *HE* 5.21.2; *VC* 2.73.1, 4.41.2.

[94] E.g. *HE* 10.4.57. See also: ἀντίζηλος at *HE* 4.15.40 (a quotation from the *Martyrdom of Polycarp*).

[95] P. Walcot, *Envy and the Greeks: A Study of Human Behaviour* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1978), 2, citing Lysias 2.48 and 79, citing Demosthenes 20.24.

> [T]hrough envy (φθόνῳ) of the salvation of men they took the opposing side, scheming by all kinds of wicked means against all the nations and against the Lord's lot itself through their jealousy (βασκανίᾳ) of the good.

In his oration on the dedication of the Church at Tyre, Eusebius similarly combined φθόνος and ζῆλος in his description of 'the evil-loving demon'.[96] Nor was Eusebius the only fourth-century writer to use these terms at times almost interchangeably—in Basil of Caesarea's homily *On Envy*, we likewise find all three terms employed to describe a nexus of negative envious emotions associated with demonic evil.[97] It therefore seems that, in the fourth century, the meaning of these three words was similar enough to allow them to be used synonymously, or to be combined for emphatic effect, as by Eusebius at *DE* 4.9.1.

Nevertheless, the three terms did have slightly different connotations, which it is important to recognize. Of these terms, ζῆλος stands out as being able to convey, on occasion, a positive connotation. Walcot suggests that, for earlier writers like Aristotle and Plutarch, φθόνος and ζῆλος might be distinguished in a similar manner to the English 'envy' and 'emulation', with the latter regarded as a positive, rather than a negative, emotion.[98] Similarly, among early Christian authors, ζῆλος could be used to refer to the imitation of God by humankind, or even to describe God himself.[99] Indeed, even in the works of Eusebius, we find forms of ζῆλος also applied to a more positive emulation, such as the attempt to live up to the example of the virtuous patriarchs like Abraham and Joseph.[100] Yet ζῆλος is also the term which Eusebius applies least often to the demons.[101] This is surely connected to the fact that it could, in certain circumstances, be

[96] *HE* 10.4.57.

[97] For example: *PG* 31.380.3–10, where all three terms appear together in quick succession in the same passage. On this homily, see: V. Limberis, 'The Eyes Infected by Evil: Basil of Caesarea's Homily, *On Envy*', *HTR* 84 (1991), 163–84.

[98] Walcot, *Envy*, 14, citing Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica* 1387b–1388b and Plutarch, *De fraterno amore*, 487a–b.

[99] *PGL, s.v.* ζῆλος.

[100] For example: *PE* 7.8.24, 7.8.25, 7.8.32, 11.4.5. Compare: *HE* 2.17.5.

[101] In the *HE*, for example, Eusebius uses ζῆλος only once to describe demons (*HE* 10.4.57). In the same work, Eusebius associates the demons with βασκανία once in his own voice (*HE* 5.21.2), and once in a quotation (*HE* 4.15.40). Demons are associated most often with φθόνος, which appears three times in connection with demons in the *HE* (*HE* 10.4.14, 10.4.57, 10.8.2).

open to a more positive interpretation. In association with demons, Eusebius preferred to use another word for 'envy', one which had an unambiguously negative meaning—φθόνος.

Their association with φθόνος would not only have marked Eusebius' demons as wicked, but also as distant from true divinity. Plato, in a passage of the *Timaeus* that was widely discussed in antiquity,[102] had stressed that 'in one who is good no envy (φθόνος) is ever possible regarding anything'.[103] This claim occurred in the context of a discussion about the nature of the Demiurge, the world's creator, in which the character of Timaeus was made to suggest that the creator was so good, and so free from envy that 'he wished very much that everything might come into being similar to himself' and that 'as much as possible all might be good and nothing wicked'.[104] As such, in Platonic thought, envy was seen as an emotion entirely incompatible with the ultimate divinity; in fact, a key characteristic of this divine creator was the very absence of envy. This was clearly an idea that held particular appeal for Eusebius, since he quoted this line from the *Timaeus* on several occasions.[105] On one occasion in the *PE*, Eusebius' quotation of Plato's line occurs in the context of his own discussion about 'the essence of the good',[106] in which Eusebius asserts that according to scripture 'the good itself is nothing other than God'.[107] For Eusebius, then, just as for Plato, there is a clear association between goodness, divinity, and freedom from envy. By describing the demons as envious, Eusebius is therefore highlighting several ways in which they are distant from the true God. A division is established between goodness, a lack of envy, and true divinity on the one hand and wickedness, unrestrained envy, and a lack of divinity on the other.

Likewise, in the early Christian tradition, φθόνος was seen, not simply as incompatible with the divine, but even as directly opposed to it. In the New Testament, φθόνος appears as a fault among humans,[108] at times lined up for criticism alongside other

[102] On use of this passage by later writers, see: M. W. Dickie, 'The Place of *Phthonos* in the Argument of Plato's *Phaedrus*', in R. M. Rosen and J. Farrell, eds., *Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honour of Martin Ostwald* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 381–2.

[103] Plato, *Timaeus*, 29e. See also: Plato, *Phaedrus*, 247a7.

[104] Plat. *Tim*. 29e; Plat. *Tim*. 30a.

[105] See: *PE* 11.21.2, 15.5.2; *CH* 6.4.

[106] *PE* 11.21.1.

[107] *PE* 11.21.1.

[108] Matt. 27:18; Mark 15:10; Gal. 5:26; Phil. 1:15.

vices such as licentiousness, deceit, and wickedness.[109] Crucially, however, φθόνος was also associated by early Christians with the devil. According to the apocryphal Book of Wisdom, it was 'by the φθόνος of the devil' that death had first come into the world.[110] This idea was repeated in the first epistle of Clement,[111] and Eusebius also cites this passage in the *PE*.[112] Clement of Alexandria denied the possibility that God could feel envy, since God was untouched by the passions.[113] Instead, in what appears to be an oblique reference to the devil, Clement suggests that 'the one who is envious (ὁ φθονῶν) is another, one who has been approached by passion'.[114] By characterizing the demons as motivated by φθόνος, Eusebius is therefore hinting at a connection between demons and the devil which he elaborated most fully in the *PE* and *DE*.[115] It is striking that Eusebius draws such a close link between demons and φθόνος, encouraging us to see this vice as characteristic of the demonic. More than once in Eusebius' works we find φθόνος and a 'wicked demon' working in combination.[116] Furthermore, Eusebius also characterizes φθόνος as μισόκαλος, the same designation that he sometimes gives to demons.[117] This suggests that φθόνος is so characteristic of Eusebius' demons that the noun φθόνος could even be used in works such as the *VC* to stand in place of a reference to demons.

Since the φθόνος of the gods was an essential feature of traditional Greek historiography, some scholars have suggested that the earliest Christian historians, struggling to reconcile this notion with their belief in a benevolent God, 'reinterpreted' the φθόνος of the gods as the φθόνος of demons.[118] Although it is true that references to demonic envy are more numerous in Eusebius' arguably more 'historical' works, the *HE* and *VC*, similar references can also be found elsewhere. In the *DE*, where there is no historiographical or narrative need for a replacement for the 'jealousy of the gods', demons are still closely

[109] Rom. 1:29; Gal 5:21; 1 Tim. 6:4; Titus 3:3; 1 Pet. 2:1. Note, however, the use of φθόνος at Jas. 4:5, referring to God, which appears to be an entirely anomalous use of the term.

[110] Wisd. 2:24. [111] 1 Clem. 3:4, citing Wisd. 2:24.

[112] *PE* 13.3.38. [113] Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, 7.2.7.2.

[114] Clem. Alex. *Stro*. 7.2.7.2. [115] See the section 'Demons and the Devil'.

[116] E.g. *HE* 10.4.14, 10.8.2; *VC* 1.49.1–2, 2.73.1.

[117] E.g. *VC* 1.49.2, 3.1.1, 4.41.1; *HE* 10.4.14, 10.8.2. On demons as μισόκαλος, see section 'Wicked Demons'.

[118] Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 59–60.

linked with the emotion of envy. At *DE* 4.9.1, demons are not simply linked loosely to envy, but the object of their jealousy—the salvation of humankind—is identified, and given as a reason for their initial fall. This characteristic thus appears to have been integral to Eusebius' understanding of the demonic character, rather than merely fulfilling an historiographical requirement.

It is also significant that the φθόνος of Eusebius' demons is significantly more serious than the traditional jealousy of the Greek gods. As D. L. Cairns has argued, the traditional divine φθόνος 'presupposes at least a minimal notion of human offence';[119] the φθόνος of Eusebius' demons, by contrast, required no such provocation. In Eusebius' works, the φθόνος of the demons is regularly linked to other demonic traits, such as their hatred of the good and their love of evil, as when Eusebius writes of the 'good-hating envy (ὁ μισοκάλος φθόνος), even the evil-loving demon' resenting the prosperity of the church.[120] Eusebius is thus able to create a closely linked group of key negative associations for the demons. This suggestion that demonic envy might arise simply from a 'hatred of the good', rather than as a response to some form of human transgression served once again to make the nature of their threat seem far more unpredictable. It also made it clear that the φθόνος of the demons, unlike that of the traditional gods, did not contain any element of divine justice, but was itself unjust and indiscriminate in its targeting of humankind.

Like φθόνος, the characteristic of βασκανία is unambiguously negative for Eusebius. Traditionally, the verb βασκαίνω had referred not only to being jealous, but also, significantly, to the idea of 'casting the evil eye' upon someone.[121] As Vasiliki Limberis has shown in the case of Basil of Caesarea, some early Christian writers sought to bring popular fears about the power of the 'evil eye' (βάσκανος ὀφθαλμός) into the remit of the church, by suggesting that envy and the evil

[119] D. L. Cairns, 'The Politics of Envy: Envy and Equality in Ancient Greece', in D. Konstan and N. K. Rutter, eds., *Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 250. Konstan has similarly noted that, in classical Greek literature, φθόνος might in some cases convey the idea of 'righteous indignation', and played a role in the maintenance of social and divine hierarchies: D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 121.

[120] *HE* 10.8.2. Compare: *HE* 10.4.14, 10.4.57; *VC* 1.49.1–2.

[121] Walcot, *Envy*, 79, citing Plat. *Phaedo*, 95b, and Plutarch, *Quaestiones Convivales* 680c. On the tradition of the 'evil eye', see Walcot, *Envy*, 77–90.

eye were the work of demons and the devil, to be combatted through the pursuit of virtue.[122] It is possible that we see Eusebius similarly attempting a Christian explanation for the power of *βασκανία* when he suggests in the *HE* that 'the good-hating demon' is 'jealous (*βάσκανος*) in his nature'.[123] For Eusebius, it seems that *βασκανία* is naturally demonic, and may be explained as a product of demonic activity. Although clearly very closely connected to *φθόνος* for Eusebius, *βασκανία* perhaps represents for him the active, harmful product of the demonic characteristic of *φθόνος*.

Moreover, the characteristic of *βασκανία* would further have hinted at the connection between demons and the devil for early Christians, as one of the several possible meanings of the term *βάσκανος* was 'slanderous'.[124] In older Greek texts, such as Aristophanes and Plato, the word used by Christians for the devil, *διάβολος*, usually had the meaning simply of 'slanderous'.[125] It is therefore striking that, at *DE* 4.9.1, where the demons are said to be driven by their 'jealousy of the good' (*βασκανίᾳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν*), this emotion is described as so extreme that they even act 'against the Lord's lot itself' (*αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ κυρίου κλήρῳ*). By 'the Lord's lot', Eusebius is doubtless referring those who are virtuous. Shortly before this passage, Eusebius offers an interpretation of Deuteronomy 32:7–9, in which 'the Lord's part' (*μερίς Κυρίου*) is named as 'Jacob'.[126] Glossing this passage, Eusebius explains that 'Jacob' refers to that part of humankind who display 'clear-sightedness' (*τὸ διορατικὸν*) and are 'pious' (*θεοσεβής*).[127] Thus the implication is that piety and insight bring a person closer to God. More specifically, for Eusebius, these virtues bring people closer to Christ, for he makes it clear in his interpretation of Deuteronomy that he understands '*Κύριος*' to refer to Christ.[128] These virtues would also draw people away from the demons, standing in sharp contrast to the 'jealous' and 'good-hating' character of the demons. As a result of their *βασκανία*, the demons are thus set up in opposition to Christ and the goodness associated with him, and are tied instead to the devil. For Eusebius, envy (*φθόνος*) and the malignant jealousy that accompanied it (*βασκανία*) were essential

[122] Limberis, 'The Eyes Infected'. [123] *HE* 5.21.2.
[124] *LSJ s.v. βασκαίνω*.
[125] Riley, 'Devil', 463, citing Aristophanes, *Knights*, 45 and Plato, *Apology* 37b.
[126] *DE* 4.7.1–2. [127] *DE* 4.7.2. [128] *DE* 4.7.2.

characteristics of demons, which not only helped to reinforce the sense of their malevolence, but also established them as opponents of God, and allies of the devil.

DECEPTIVE DEMONS

For Eusebius, the demonic threat to humankind consisted, not primarily in coercion or physical danger, but rather in deception. Eusebius frequently characterizes demons in terms of *πλάνη* and *ἀπάτη*, both of which meant 'error' or 'deceit'.[129] In comparison, direct physical attacks by demons on humankind are rare in Eusebius' works.[130] In one case, even when Eusebius does mention demons causing human illnesses, this physical attack is linked to the demons' broader strategy of deception. At *PE* 5.2.1, Eusebius describes how demons were able to deceive 'foolish souls' in part by seeming to 'cure' illnesses that they had previously caused. This tactic of causing and then resolving illnesses is presented as simply one of a range of methods by which demons lead people astray—in the same passage, they are also said to deliver oracles and to cause statues to move, with the same aim of deceiving people.[131] Moreover, Eusebius suggests that demonic deception was driven by the demons' desire to usurp the place of the true God and be proclaimed as divine in his place.[132] For Eusebius, demonic deception is therefore multilayered—the everyday tricks and deceits of the demons are directed towards a larger goal that is, in itself, fraudulent.

This sense that demons were highly deceptive beings recurs in several writers—non-Christian as well as Christian—from this period. In the *Vita Antonii*, for instance, Antony dismisses what appear to be prophecies made by demons, explaining that this seeming foreknowledge in fact stems from the demons' ability to move at great speed and consequent ability to carry news quickly, rather than from any

[129] See, for example: *ἀπάτη*: *PE* 4.21.6, 5.2.1, 6.6.3, 6.11.82, 7.10.15, 7.16.10; *DE* 9.14.7; *SC* 13.6; *HE* 7.17.1; *CI* 130.21. *πλάνη*: *PE* 4.14.10, 4.15.6, 6.6.3, 6.11.82; *DE* 4.9.8, 5.4.2, 6.20.12, 9.1.7; *SC* 16.3; *CI* 107.7; 263.6–7; 266.5; 273.10–11; *HE* 7.17.1; *Fr.Luc., PG* 24.553.25; *CPs, PG* 23.821.6.

[130] Such attacks are, however, mentioned on occasion—for instance in Eusebius' treatise on Easter, *De Solemnitate Paschale*: *PG* 24.697.20.

[131] *PE* 5.2.1. [132] *PE* 7.16.10.

real insight into the future.[133] A similar explanation of demonic prophecies was also given by Augustine.[134] For Christian writers, of course, there was good reason to downplay the prophetic power of demons by attributing their predictions to deception, since this left the true power of prophecy exclusively with their one, true God. It is more striking to find a similar emphasis on the deceptive nature of malicious demons in the discussions of the non-Christian writer, Porphyry.

In the *de Abstinentia*, Porphyry describes malevolent demons as 'full of all *phantasia* and far enough advanced to deceive through marvels'.[135] In particular, he suggests that, despite being responsible for many kinds of human suffering, from plagues and infertility to earthquakes and droughts, malicious demons manage to shift the blame for such events onto the benevolent gods and demons instead. This, for Porphyry, is among the worst of the wicked demons' actions, for it encourages, among those less clear-sighted than himself, the view that the highest gods are changeable and capable of inflicting harm.[136] Porphyry differs from Eusebius and other Christian writers in suggesting that prophecies—in particular, warnings about the dangers posed by malevolent demons—are sent by beneficent demons and thus are not part of the wicked demons' deception. Nevertheless, there is a further remarkable parallel between Eusebius' and Porphyry's explanations of the deception of wicked demons, for Porphyry suggests that demons 'wish to be gods and the power which stands over them to be seen as the greatest God'.[137] Despite their differences, both writers see wicked demons as engaged in a grand fraud to impersonate the true divinity.

DEMONS AND THE DEVIL

A further important aspect of Eusebius' understanding of the demonic is the relationship between demons and the devil. In his account of the origins of the demons in the *PE*, where he offers by far

[133] Antony, *Vita Antonii*, 31.2–3, cited in Smith, 'How Thin?', 505.
[134] Smith, 'How Thin?', 506, citing Augustine *de Genesi ad litteram* 12.17.34–8.
[135] Porph. *Abst.* 2.42. [136] Porph. *Abst.* 2.40.
[137] Porph. *Abst.* 2.42.

his fullest account of the origins of the 'opposing power' (ἐναντίος δύνάμις),[138] Eusebius suggests that the wicked spiritual beings known, amongst other things, as demons, were, in his view, originally angels.[139] That Eusebius should have chosen to elaborate on this particular story is of considerable significance, since it was not the only explanation of demonic origins in circulation among early Christian writers. For some, such as Justin Martyr, and Eusebius' Latin contemporary Lactantius, demons were not angels, but rather the maliciously inclined spirits of the giants, which were themselves the deformed and malevolent offspring of a forbidden union between fallen angels and human women.[140] This story was most likely drawing on the account found in the Enochic *Book of the Watchers*, according to which the angels sent to watch over humankind had fallen from heaven as a result of their lust for human women.[141] Their offspring, the giants, were then said to have spread terror and destruction on earth until they were destroyed at God's command. However, while the giants and the fallen angels themselves were supposed to have been confined by God, the spirits of the giants were allowed to remain free on earth, continuing to cause trouble as demons.[142]

Eusebius was no doubt aware of the Enochic story, yet we find only faint traces of it in the *PE*—as, for example, when Eusebius tells us that, while some of the fallen angels were confined in Tartarus, others were allowed to remain free on earth.[143] Similarly in the *Commentarii in Isaiam* (*CI*), quoting directly from Genesis 6:2 rather than from its

[138] *PE* 7.16.1. [139] *PE* 7.16.2, 7.16.9. See also: *PE* 13.15.1.

[140] E. Pagels, 'Christian Apologists and "The Fall of the Angels": An Attack on Roman Imperial Power?', *HTR* 78 (1985), 303; A. Y. Reed, 'The Trickery of the Fallen Angels and the Demonic Mimesis of the Divine: Aetiology, Demonology and Polemics in the Writings of Justin Martyr', *JECS* 12 (2004), 141–71. See Justin Martyr, *Second Apology* 4(5).3; Lact. *Div. Inst.* 2.14.1–5.

[141] 1 Enoch 6–11.

[142] P. S. Alexander, 'Contextualising the Demonology of the Testament of Solomon', in A. Lange, H. Lichtenberger, and K. F. Diethard Romheld, eds., *Die Damonen/ Demons: The Demonology of Israelite-Jewish and Early Christian Literature in Context of their Environment* (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 629. See also: J. C. VanderKam, '1 Enoch, Enochic Motifs and Enoch in Early Christian Literature', in J. C. VanderKam and W. Adler, eds., *The Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in Early Christianity* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1996), 61–2; Pagels, *Origin of Satan*, 50–3. See also: Reed, 'The Trickery of the Fallen Angels', 148.

[143] *PE* 7.16.7–8.

elaboration in 1 Enoch, Eusebius offers two alternative explanations for the origins of wicked spiritual powers:

> And so the adverse powers are either the souls of the giants or the angels fallen down from heaven, from whom come 'those descended of the giants', of which the writing recorded by Moses says: 'The angels of God, seeing that the daughters of men were fair, took them to themselves as wives out of all the things which they selected.'[144]

Here we find both possibilities raised: the wicked powers might be either fallen angels, or they might be the remnants of the giants. Eusebius does not appear to see any contradiction between the two explanations; indeed, it is entirely possible that he believed the giants and the fallen angels to be the same thing. In his *de Gigantibus*, Philo of Alexandria had suggested that 'demons', 'angels', and 'giants' were in fact the same, despite the fact that they were often referred to by different names.[145] Philo's discussion of Genesis 6:2 included the suggestion that different souls had fallen away from the service of God to different degrees—a position which had far more in common with that of Origen than with the *Book of the Watchers*.[146] Thus, even in his brief reference to Genesis 6:2 and to the giants in the *CI*, it is entirely possible that Eusebius still had in mind the idea of fallen angels.

Nevertheless, Eusebius' evident familiarity with the story of the giants makes it particularly striking that, in his longer explanation in the *PE*, he chose to focus on the story of the fallen angels. The hints of the story of the giants that appear in the *PE* make it clear that Eusebius was already aware of this version when he wrote this work; it is not a later discovery made between the composition of the *PE* and the *CI*. Rather, it seems that Eusebius deliberately chose to emphasize the original link between demons and angels, claiming that the demons have fallen directly from the 'blissful and angelic choruses'.[147] This has the effect of drawing a much closer link between the demons and the figure regarded as their leader, the devil, for it appears that Eusebius also saw the devil as a fallen angel.

[144] *CI* 95.21–5.

[145] Philo of Alexandria, *de Gigantibus*, 16. Carriker has shown that Eusebius would have had access to the *de Gigantibus*, along with many of Philo's other works, through the library at Caesarea: Carriker, *Library*, 174.

[146] Philo, *de Gig.* 12–15. On Origen, see the section: 'The Demonological Context'.

[147] *PE* 7.16.7.

In both the *PE* and the *DE*, Eusebius describes the initial fall of a clearly diabolical figure, identified with the fallen day-star of Isaiah 14:12.[148] This figure, also labelled in the *PE* as a 'dragon' (δράκων) and 'snake' (ὄφις),[149] in line with the description of the devil in Revelation,[150] is said to have fallen directly from among 'the better'.[151] Moreover, he is said to have fallen for similar reasons to the demons, whose offences are described as 'equal' (παραπλησίοις) to his.[152] Crucially, in the *DE*, this figure is labelled as a 'great demon' (μεγαλοδαίμων).[153] Thus, according to Eusebius' account of their origins, the demons and their leader are the same *kind* of being—the devil is not just the leader of the demons, but a demon himself, albeit a 'great demon'.

Moreover, this figure is described as 'responsible for the departure from the better which happened both to himself and to the rest'.[154] As to precisely what the cause of this fall may have been, Eusebius offers at least two possible options in the *PE* and *DE*, likely reflecting the fact that a number of different understandings of the devil's fall were current among Christian writers of the first few centuries. Sirinelli identified two main views that were prevalent at the time: the first, which he attributed to writers including Tertullian, Athenagoras, and Lactantius, placed the devil's fall after the creation of humans, and considered it to stem from the devil's envy of humankind.[155] The second view, advocated by Origen, saw the cause of the devil's fall as pride, arising independently of the creation of humankind.[156]

Previous scholarship has suggested that Eusebius followed Origen in ascribing the devil's fall to the sin of pride.[157] This is certainly the impression conveyed at *PE* 7.16, where Eusebius blames the 'boastfulness and battle against God' of this diabolical δράκων for his fall.[158] A quotation from Ezekiel, suggesting that God had told this figure

[148] *DE* 4.9.1–8; *PE* 7.16.1–7. Isaiah 14:12–15 is cited directly at *PE* 7.16.4 and *DE* 4.9.4.

[149] *PE* 7.16.3. [150] Rev. 12:9. [151] *PE* 7.16.3; *DE* 4.9.5.

[152] *PE* 7.16.7. [153] *DE* 4.9.1–2. [154] *PE* 7.16.3.

[155] Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 305.

[156] Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 306. More recently, however, this idea that early Christian views on the cause of the devil's fall can be neatly divided into two camps—one favouring pride and the other envy—has been rightly criticized by S. Lunn-Rockliffe, who has demonstrated that many writers held far more complex understandings of the devil's fall: 'The Diabolical Problem of Satan's First Sin: Self-Moved Pride or a Response to the Goads of Envy?', *Studia Patristica* 63 (2013), 121–40.

[157] Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 306. [158] *PE* 7.16.7.

that he was cast out of heaven because 'your heart is proud, and you have said "I am a god; I sit in the seat of the gods" ', further reinforces the sense that it was pride and a desire to be like God that brought about this initial fall.[159] However, in a shorter account of the fall of the wicked powers at *DE* 4.9, we also find a prominent role being allocated to envy of humankind,[160] with particular emphasis placed on the actions taken by the μεγαλοδαίμων to undermine God's plans for humanity.[161] Thus, rather than straightforwardly adopting one view of the fall of the μεγαλοδαίμων, or suggesting that his—and the demons'—evil behaviour had just one cause, Eusebius combines a range of influences to produce a picture in which pride and envy become the defining characteristics of the demonic forces opposed to God.

Recognizing the close relationship between demons and their diabolical leader is crucial to understanding Eusebius' attitude towards the demonic. Eusebius envisaged a cosmology in which the supreme God was opposed by a hostile 'rebellious power' (ἀποστατικῆς δυνάμεως),[162] variously described as the διαβόλος,[163] and the μεγαλοδαίμων,[164] identified with the fallen day-star of Isaiah 14:12,[165] and named as Beelzebul.[166] The link between this figure and the demons is made explicit in several places—the supporters of the μεγαλοδαίμων are described as the 'demons and worse spirits',[167] while a clearly diabolical figure is called 'the beginner of their [the demons and wicked spirits'] fall',[168] and the 'ruler' (ἄρχων) of the demons.[169] Not only is there a clear link, but the relationship is evidently envisaged as hierarchical—the devil leads, and the demons follow.

While Eusebius was by no means the first Christian writer to consider demons as subordinates and followers of the devil, this Christian position did mark a significant departure from that of

[159] Ezek. 28:2, NRSV trans., cited at *PE* 7.16.5. Eusebius also cites Ezek. 28:12–15, 28:17, and Isa. 14:13–14 at *PE* 7.16.4–6.

[160] *DE* 4.9.1. [161] *DE* 4.9.1, 4.9.3. [162] *DE* 4.9.1.

[163] *PE* 11.26.5. [164] *DE* 4.9.1. [165] *DE* 4.9.4; *PE* 7.16.4.

[166] *PE* 4.22.15. In Luke 11:15–19, Beelzebul is clearly identified with 'the Satan' (ὁ Σατανᾶς). Moreover, an association between Beelzebul and demons occurs in three different Gospel accounts of the same story: when Jesus is accused of driving out demons 'by Beelzebul', his accusers identify Beelzebul as the 'ruler of the demons' (ἄρχων τῶν δαιμονίων): W. Herrmann, 'Baal Zebub', in Van Der Toorn, B. Becking, and P. W. van der Horst, eds., *Dictionary of Deities and Demons*, 293–6. See: Matt. 12:24; Mark 3:22; Luke 11:15.

[167] *DE* 4.9.1. [168] *PE* 7.16.3. [169] *DE* 4.9.8. See also: *DE* 4.9.1.

earlier Greek philosophy. According to Origen's report, Celsus had found the idea that the supreme god might have an adversary to be 'most impious' (ἀσεβέστατα),[170] and had further considered all demons to be 'of god' (τοῦ θεοῦ).[171] Even when Plutarch acknowledged that some demons might cause harm to humans, the source of their misbehaviour was seen as their susceptibility to passion.[172] There was no suggestion that they might be acting as part of a wider hostile force, with an identifiable leader. Thus, the demons we find in Eusebius' works appear to be considerably more co-ordinated and deliberate in their threat than the occasional rogue demons of earlier Greek philosophy.

DEMONIC POWER

For Eusebius, then, demons were a hostile force, characterized by envy and deceit, and opposed both to the benevolent Christian God and to those virtuous humans who followed him. Alongside this, a firm belief in the power of demons to cause harm was central to Eusebius' perception of the demonic threat. Although Eusebius makes it clear that the demons' power could not match that of the truly divine Christian God, he nonetheless allows them a level of ability and knowledge considerably beyond that of humans. This is neatly illustrated in the example from the *PE* that we considered in the section 'Deceptive Demons', in which demons are said to send illnesses to afflict people, before deceptively pretending to 'cure' them in order to gain worship.[173] Here, Eusebius is at the same time granting demons considerable power—the ability to inflict ill-health—and restricting the scope of that power by arguing that they do not have the ability truly to cure sickness. In this passage, demons are placed within a clear hierarchy of power—above humans, but below true divinity.

[170] Orig. *Cels.* 6.42.

[171] Orig. *Cels.* 8.24. For discussion of Celsus' criticisms of Christianity, see: S. Benko, 'Pagan Criticism of Christianity during the First Two Centuries AD', *ANRW* 2.23.2 (1980), 1101–8.

[172] Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 217. See Plutarch, *De facie in orbe luna* 944c–d.

[173] *PE* 5.2.1.

A similar positioning of demonic power can also be seen in Eusebius' discussion of oracles and divination in the preface to the fifth book of the *DE*. Questioning whether the traditional Greek oracles are the work of demons or of true gods, Eusebius suggests that 'it seems that the oracles were of demons, applicable to the detection of a thief, or the destruction of a utensil, or other such things, of which it was not improbable that those haunting the air around the earth should have some small knowledge'.[174] Eusebius does not attempt to deny that the traditional oracles might have revealed information that was hidden to humans, attributing the demons' greater knowledge to their ontological superiority.[175] However, he is at the same time quick to stress the limitations of their power, immediately contrasting these demonic oracles with the predictions of the 'Hebrew prophets', such as Moses.[176] While the traditional oracles dealt only with the 'small and lowly',[177] the divinely inspired prophecies of the Jewish and Christian scriptures 'contributed to great things'.[178] As such, even while accepting some degree of demonic power, Eusebius carefully places it within a wider hierarchy of power and ability, in which the Christian God, as always, is superior.

This belief in the existence of some demonic power was clearly of considerable significance for Eusebius, since he deliberately dismisses an alternative explanation for the traditional oracles that would have downplayed the extent of the demons' power—namely, that the oracles were the result of human fraud. Introducing his discussion of oracles in book 4 of the *PE*, Eusebius acknowledges that some writers might choose to argue against the validity of the traditional oracles by suggesting that 'the whole thing is a deceit and the contrivances and misdeeds of human sorcerers'.[179] However, Eusebius prefers the alternative explanation that the oracles were the result of demonic influence,[180] as the demons attempted to draw people away from the true God, towards a life of immorality.[181] The furthest Eusebius is prepared to go in allowing a role for human fraud in

[174] *DE* 5.*Praef*.17.
[175] Compare the *V. Ant.* 31:2–6, cited in Smith, 'How Thin?', 505.
[176] *DE* 5.*Praef*.20. [177] *DE* 5.*Praef*.22. [178] *DE* 5.*Praef*.21.
[179] *PE* 4.1.8. See also the full discussion at *PE* 4.1–2.
[180] See especially: *PE* 5.21.6, where Eusebius criticizes Oenomaus for suggesting that oracles are the result of human fraud, rather than admitting that they come from demons.
[181] See, for example: *PE* 4.4.1–2, 4.14.10, 5.18.4–5, 6.6.3–4.

oracular predictions is in his suggestion that the priests of various oracles might have conspired alongside the demons to create the impression that the oracles were more powerful than was in fact the case.[182] Even here, however, Eusebius attributes the initial impetus behind the oracles to the demons, writing that 'again the wicked demons themselves began the instruction of these matters to their attendants',[183] and describing the demons as 'responsible for establishing the sorcery that was the root of wickedness for all the life of men'.[184] Thus, Eusebius appears to have been firmly wedded to the view that the demons did have a role in the operation of the traditional oracles. Eusebius was fully aware that there were alternative explanations for oracular predictions available to him, but he deliberately chose not to use them. Instead, he downplayed the role of human fraud, and stressed instead the malign influence of the demons.

In fact, the idea that demonic power was real, but at the same time considerably weaker than that of the truly divine Christian God, was of central importance to Eusebius' apologetic argument in the *PE* and *DE*. Eusebius' defence of the power of Christ in these works depends in part upon a belief in the power of demons. Eusebius was able to contrast the extent of the demons' power with that of the power of Christ, which he considered to be much greater, by suggesting that the struggle between Christianity and the polytheistic cults on earth was simply a manifestation of the more significant cosmic conflict taking place between the demons on the one hand, and Christ on the other. Eusebius brings this to the fore by posing to his readers the direct question of why the supposed 'gods' of paganism have failed to stop the spread of Christian teaching:

> Indeed, if he is a mortal man, as they may say (perhaps even a deceiver, they may say), but they are saviours and gods, why indeed have they all fled in crowds, even Asclepius himself, their backs towards this mortal, and why have they handed over all humankind in their control, one after another, to this one, who, so they say, no longer exists?[185]

Eusebius finds 'evidence' for the supposed decline of pagan oracles and the civic cults in discussions drawn from non-Christian writers like Porphyry and Plutarch about cases of failed or abandoned oracles.[186]

[182] *PE* 5.2.5. [183] *PE* 5.2.5. [184] *PE* 5.2.5.
[185] *PE* 5.1.12. [186] See, for example: *PE* 5.1.9–10, 5.17.13.

He then contrasts these with the spread of Christian teaching, and the success of the Christian church.[187] At times, Eusebius makes his case for the greater power of Christ even more explicitly, remarking that 'our saviour, undertaking his teachings among men, is described as having driven out the whole race of demons from the life of men, so that already some of the demons fell to their knees and supplicated him not to give them up to the Tartarus that was waiting for them'.[188] Here, the power of Christ is presented as so far superior to that of the demons that they are reduced to the position of mere suppliants, forced to appeal for mercy. Acknowledging the reality of demonic power thus allows Eusebius to argue for the reality of the power of Christ as well. Depicting the Christian God as the strongest of a variety of spiritual powers provides valuable support to Eusebius' claim in the *PE* and *DE* that the Christians had acted sensibly in turning away from the old civic cults towards Christianity. By suggesting that the power of Christ has overcome the power of the demons, Eusebius is implying that the Christians have chosen the protection of a stronger divinity than those that oversaw the old pagan civic cults.[189] If Eusebius had not regarded the demons as exercising genuine power, albeit of a limited kind, it would have made Christ's supposed undermining of that power appear considerably less impressive. That Eusebius sought to construct part of his defence of Christianity on the basis that demons exercised considerable power illustrates not only the depth of his own belief in their power, but also his confidence that his audience would share his sense of demons as a strong and powerful presence in their world.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, this survey of Eusebius' discussions of the demonic throughout a range of his works has revealed a remarkably consistent picture

[187] See, for example: *PE* 5.1.13–15.

[188] *PE* 5.17.13. See also: *DE* 6.13.8. The question of exactly what effect Eusebius believed the incarnation to have had on demonic power will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

[189] As Martin has argued: *Inventing Superstition*, 225. Martin joins Ferguson in suggesting that a substantial part of Christianity's appeal lay in the protection it claimed to offer from the harm that demons were widely believed to cause: Martin, *Inventing Superstition*, 243; E. Ferguson, *Demonology of the Early Christian World* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon Press, 1984), 129.

of demons. It has shown that Eusebius held demons to be an active and hostile presence in the universe. In league with the devil, demons ranged themselves against God and his virtuous followers. Although Eusebius was adamant that their power could not match that of the true God, it was nevertheless strong enough to enable demons to interfere considerably in human existence, partly by causing physical harm through the infliction of illnesses, but more significantly by inflicting moral harm through the deceptive encouragement of polytheism and vice. For Eusebius the demonic threat was potent.

In consequence, while Eusebius may at times have chosen to emphasize particular features of demonic activity in certain of his works for apologetic ends,[190] we must be careful to avoid reading Eusebius' references to the demonic simply as part of a convenient apologetic strategy. Rather, we need to acknowledge his genuine concern about the danger which demons might pose. The depth of this concern can further be seen from the way in which Eusebius' idea of a stark divide between the good Christian God and the wicked demons manifested itself in a series of further polarities in Eusebius' thought, expanding into a picture of a universe fundamentally divided between hostile spiritual opponents. This, however, will be the subject of Chapter 3.

[190] Such as, in Johnson's suggestion, arguing against the power of the oracles in order to undermine the 'political theology' of the Greek *poleis*: *Ethnicity and Argument*, 163–70.

3

A Divided Universe

Previous work on demons in Eusebius has returned repeatedly to the idea that demons were associated above all with polytheistic cults and oracles, and deployed primarily to attack the foundations of traditional Greek and Roman religion.[1] However, this was only one aspect of the demonic presence for Eusebius, albeit the one that emerges most obviously from a reading of the *Praeparatio Evangelica* (*PE*). To achieve a more rounded picture of his views, we need to recognize the extent to which Eusebius' ideas about demons permeated and helped to structure his understanding of the universe more generally. Throughout Eusebius' works we repeatedly find the fundamental opposition between God/Christ on the one hand and the devil/demons on the other reflected in a series of extreme polarities,[2] demonstrating how Eusebius' ideas about demons underpinned his thought more broadly. This chapter will propose a reading of Eusebius' works that takes full account of the depth and sincerity of his belief in demons. It will suggest that Eusebius' understanding of malevolent demons as the opponents of the benevolent God led him to view the universe as fundamentally divided. This basic division then found expression in a range of other terminological and conceptual extremes.

In what follows, I will explore how Eusebius' demons are associated in his works with a series of further negative concepts. Demons are not only excluded from goodness, but are set up in direct opposition

[1] See, for example: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', 189; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 317; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 163–70; and, to a lesser extent, Martin, *Inventing Superstition*, 209–13.

[2] The extreme polarities in Eusebius' thought have previously been recognized by: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', 183–7; Martin, *Inventing Superstition*, 221.

to anything which might be presented as good or virtuous. The result is a universe of hostile, even warring, extremes, in which there is no middle ground and, it appears, little room for reconciliation. This raises the question of how far Eusebius subscribed to a dualistic view of the universe. Although at times Eusebius appears to come very close to dualism in his suggestion of an absolute cosmic divide, I will nevertheless show that he consistently resists placing the demonic powers on an equal footing with the divine.

DEMONS AND ANGELS

The extent to which Eusebius saw the universe as starkly divided between good and evil is evident from his presentation of another group of spiritual beings, similar to demons in terms of physicality, but fundamentally opposed to them in their moral character—that is, the angels.[3] Eusebius' benevolent spirits, described as the 'angels of God' (*οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ*), are characterized by light as opposed to the demons' association with darkness.[4] Throughout Eusebius' works, darkness is a frequent attribute of the demonic.[5] At one point, he even describes 'the wicked demon' as 'belonging to darkness',[6] suggesting that he saw darkness as fundamental to the demonic character. Moreover, in the course of their fall, demons are said to have 'taken darkness over light'.[7] This is in clear contrast to Eusebius' angels, who are described as 'shining', and likened to the 'stars in heaven'.[8] These contrasting associations for Eusebius' demons and angels help to tie these two groups to their respective leaders—the devil and God—by reflecting the language in which these two figures were also regularly described. Echoing terms common to descriptions of the devil and demons both in the New Testament, and in works by other earlier

[3] It is surprising that, despite recognizing the extreme polarization of Eusebius' universe, neither Coggan nor Martin displays much interest in his opposition of demons and angels: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia'; Martin, *Inventing Superstition*.

[4] *PE* 11.26.5. See also: *PE* 7.16.1.

[5] See, for example: *PE* 1.5.1, 5.2.1, 7.16.7–9, 13.15.7; *VC* 1.49.1; *HE* 10.4.13. This association is also noted by Strutwolf, *Die Trinitätstheologie*, 214.

[6] *DE* 5.*Praef*.26.

[7] *PE* 7.16.2.

[8] *PE* 7.16.1. For other examples of angels being associated with light, see: *Theoph.* 1.38; *VC* 3.26.1.

Christian writers,[9] Eusebius drew a connection between darkness and an identifiably diabolical figure described as the 'dragon' (δράκων) and 'snake' (ὄφις)—terms which had already been applied to the devil in Revelation.[10] Stemming from this, darkness was also associated for Eusebius with other negative concepts, such as distance from God or ignorance of correct religion.[11]

When discussing the fall of this diabolical δράκων, Eusebius even goes so far as to describe this figure as 'the maker (ποιητής) of darkness and irrationality',[12] showing how closely Eusebius associated the wicked spiritual powers with these negative characteristics. Eusebius' choice of the word 'ποιητής' here is particularly striking, since this was a term that Eusebius also applied to God.[13] This hints at a tension within Eusebius' thought. Although, as I will show in the section 'A "Dualistic" view', Eusebius avoided attributing equal power to the wicked powers and to God, we nevertheless sense here Eusebius' discomfort with the idea that God might be responsible for the creation of evil. Describing this diabolical δράκων as a ποιητής in his own right helps to absolve God of responsibility for the creation of negative things. It also highlights the extent to which Eusebius viewed the universe as starkly divided.

By contrast, God and his Logos are, for Eusebius, characteristically associated with light.[14] Christ, for instance, is described as 'a sun of

[9] For the devil associated with darkness, see, for example: Acts 26:18; Eph. 6:12; Bar. 18.1; Justin Martyr, *Dialogue with Trypho* 76.17; Clem. Alex. *Stro.* 4.8.68.4, 4.14.96.1; Orig. *de Princ.* 3.2.4.

[10] See, for example: *PE* 7.10.15; 7.16.3. Compare: Rev. 12:9.

[11] See, for example: *PE* 2.5.2; *DE* 6.18.47, 7.2.42, 9.8.10, 9.15.9, 10.7.7; *VC* 2.19.1, 3.1.8.

[12] *PE* 7.16.3. [13] For example at *PE* 4.5.4.

[14] See, for example: *HE* 9.8.15, 10.4.13; *PE* 1.1.4, 1.1.6, 1.5.1, 4.15.6, 5.1.2, 5.1.8; *DE* 3.1.3, 4.3.2–3, 4.6.1, 4.10.4, 4.17.19, 5.*Praef.*27, 9.1.14, 10.2.16; *CH* 6.4; *VC* 3.26.4; *Ecl. Proph.* 202.5; *SC* 14.11; *Theoph.* 1.5; *LC* 1.1–2, 6.20. As Strutwolf also noted: *Die Trinitätstheologie*, 214. In this, Eusebius was again echoing biblical language, where light is frequently evoked as a characteristic of both God and Christ. See, for example: 2 Sam. 22:29; Job 29:3; Ps. 4:6; Ps. 18:28; Ps. 27:1; Isa. 2:5; Mic. 7:8; Tobit 3:17; Bar. 5:9; Luke 2:32; John 1:4–9; John 8:12; 1 John 1.5; Rev. 22:5. An association between light and the divine or the Good was also common in Platonic philosophy: J. Dillon, 'Looking on the Light: Some Remarks on the Imagery of Light in the First Chapter of the *Peri Archon*', in C. Kannengiesser and W. L. Peterson, eds., *Origen of Alexandria: His World and His Legacy* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 229; J. F. Finamore, 'Iamblichus on Light and the Transparent', in H. J. Blumenthal and E. G. Clark, eds., *The Divine Iamblichus: Philosopher and Man of Gods* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1993), 57.

intellectual and rational souls',[15] while God is 'inexpressible light'.[16] By linking his angels with light, Eusebius is thereby also stressing their proximity to God. Eusebius' demons are established as the opponents of benevolent spiritual forces and his universe becomes polarized between two hostile groups. For Eusebius, two opposing figures in the universe—God and the devil—are each joined and supported by their own followers, which are equally opposed to each other. Eusebius makes it very clear that, in his view, these opposing spiritual forces are entirely incompatible when he poses to his readers the question: 'how could the bad at any point become a friend to the good, unless it were to be said that it is possible for light and darkness to become one combination?'[17] Eusebius' characterization of demons and angels by the contrasting associations of darkness and light highlights the fundamental—and seemingly unbridgeable—division which he envisaged between the two.

Eusebius was not alone among Christian writers of this period in holding that there was a clear distinction between ἀγγέλοι and δαίμονες, and in seeking to demonstrate in his works the difference between Christian and non-Christian understandings of the terms.[18] As with the word δαίμονες, early Christian writers shared the term ἀγγέλοι with their non-Christian contemporaries. Although the word was frequently used to refer to ordinary, human messengers, from the second century onwards non-Christian authors were also using ἀγγέλοι to describe spiritual messengers, acting as intermediaries between the divine and human realms.[19] However, while pagan and Jewish philosophers saw little difference between angels and demons, early Christian writers were insistent on separating the terms.[20] Philo of Alexandria had considered that 'souls and demons and angels have different names, but on the same one foundation'.[21] Yet Origen

[15] *PE* 2.5.2. [16] *DE* 4.3.3.

[17] *PE* 4.17.11. This question echoes that of Paul at 2 Cor. 6:14, where he asks: 'what partnership is there between righteousness and lawlessness? Or what fellowship is there between light and darkness?' NRSV trans. The incompatibility of light and darkness was a recurring theme among early Christian writers—for example: Irenaeus of Lyons in his *Adversus Haereses.* 2.12.5; Clem. Alex. *Stro.* 5.9.57.5 (quoting 2 Cor. 6:14).

[18] R. Cline, *Ancient Angels: Conceptualising* Angeloi *in the Roman Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 4.

[19] Cline, *Ancient Angels,* 3–4.

[20] See Cline, *Ancient Angels,* 4–11 for discussion of Origen and Augustine.

[21] Philo, *de Gig.* 16.

deliberately differentiated between angels and demons on the grounds that, while angels, like humans, could be either good or bad, demons were without exception wicked.[22] Eusebius makes his division between angels and demons even clearer than that of Origen, by placing his angels fully on the side of the good, while demons remain firmly on the side of the wicked. The complete polarization of these two groups would have served to reinforce Eusebius' claim that there could not be any good demons. It also illustrates the extent to which Eusebius' universe was fully split between the cosmic forces of good and those of evil.

That Eusebius should have considered these two groups of spiritual beings to be so fundamentally divided is all the more striking because of the similar origins which he appears to have envisaged for both angels and demons. Eusebius suggests in the *PE* that demons were originally angels when he informs the reader that the demons and wicked spirits have apostatized from 'the choruses of the better',[23] and have in the process 'taken darkness over light'.[24] Moreover, demons and angels seem to have remained ontologically similar beings for Eusebius, since, in the *Theophania* (*Theoph.*), he groups both beneficent and maleficent spiritual beings together as 'incorporeal and invisible powers'.[25] Yet despite this, Eusebius places demons and angels at different positions on a clear spiritual hierarchy: the 'refined and good powers' are far below 'the unoriginated God, their own maker',[26] but they are also significantly above the 'depraved race of the demons',[27] occupying a position somewhere between the two. Despite their similar origins, it seems that the moral differences between angels and demons were enough to require that they be seen as different kinds of spiritual beings.[28] Eusebius' categorization of angels and demons is thus based primarily on moral criteria.

At the heart of this distinction between Eusebius' angels and demons there lies the crucial issue of choice: that is, the original decision of the demons to depart from the company of 'the better'.[29] Explaining why he feels that demons and angels should not be given the same name, Eusebius asserts that 'it would be most unreasonable of all that one and the same name should be fitting for things which

[22] Cline, *Ancient Angels*, 6, citing Orig. *Cels.* 8.25.
[23] *PE* 7.16.2. See also: *PE* 7.16.3.
[24] *PE* 7.16.2. See also: *PE* 13.15.1.
[25] *Theoph.* 1.38, trans. S. Lee.
[26] *PE* 4.5.4.
[27] *PE* 4.5.4.
[28] *PE* 4.5.5.
[29] *PE* 7.16.2.

are similar neither in their choice (*τὴν προαίρεσιν*) nor in the nature from their behaviour (*τὴν ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου φύσιν*)'.[30] Eusebius' use of the word *προαίρεσις* here is significant, for, as I will demonstrate in chapter 4, Eusebius considered the concept of *προαίρεσις* to be closely linked to issues of moral responsibility. In this, Eusebius was not alone among early Christian writers. In Tatian's *Oratio Ad Graecos*, it was *προαίρεσις*, and specifically 'freedom of *προαίρεσις*' (*τῇ δὲ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῆς προαιρέσεως*), that allowed punishments and rewards to be justly meted out to humankind.[31] Thus, *προαίρεσις* carried with it, at least among early Christian writers, the sense of responsibility for one's actions. Eusebius' remark about the different 'nature from their [the demons'] behaviour' is also worthy of note, for it suggests that their wicked nature is not innate, but is rather the product of their behaviour and actions. Since these actions would stem from the demons' *προαίρεσις*, this phrase emphasizes once again that demons are to be held responsible for their own wickedness.

This idea that the demons were ultimately responsible for their own separation from the angels is reflected throughout the *PE*. The fall of the demons' diabolical leader is described as 'self-determined' (*αὐθεκούσιος*),[32] and, similarly, it is the demons' 'own wickedness' (*δι' οἰκείαν φαυλότητα*) that leads them to follow him.[33] It is this fundamental moral choice—to follow God, or to oppose him—that ultimately separates Eusebius' angels and demons. In his method of distinguishing between good and bad spiritual beings, Eusebius therefore differed significantly even from those earlier Greek writers who had allowed for the possibility of maliciously inclined demons. While Plutarch's bad demons may have been acting under the influence of the passions, there was no sense that they had deliberately chosen evil.[34] By contrast, Eusebius' demons, having voluntarily embraced evil, appear far more threatening. The line was drawn at the moment

[30] *PE* 4.5.5. For further discussion of this passage, see: H. A. Johannessen, 'The *Genos* of Demons and "Ethnic" Identity in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica*', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 66 (2015), 1–18.

[31] Tat. *Orat.* 7. [32] *PE* 7.16.3. [33] *PE* 7.16.2.

[34] Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 217–18. In Dillon's view, while Plutarch did suggest that some demons were capable of wicked actions, he did not believe in '*primally* evil [demons], such as one finds in Zoroastrian or Gnostic systems', 218. However, Dillon notes a possible anomaly in Plutarch's *De Iside et Osiride*, which 'tends far more towards the postulation of inherently evil daemons' than Plutarch's other works, 218. This, however, appears to be an exception, based perhaps on the fact that Plutarch was attempting in this work to explain the nature of the giants and Titans, 218.

of the demons' fall between those spiritual beings that chose God, and those that chose the devil. Again, there is a clear polarization within Eusebius' cosmology between good and bad spiritual beings.

FURTHER POLARITIES

This basic opposition between benevolent and malevolent spiritual forces in the universe can be seen to extend into a series of further polar opposites associated with these two groups. One of the most important of these is the distinction which Eusebius makes between rationality (*λογικός*) and intellectual reasoning (*νοερός*) on the one hand,[35] and irrationality (*ἀλογός*) and madness (*μανία*) on the other. Throughout Eusebius' works, the activity of demons and the devil is frequently associated with the spread of irrationality—people he considers to be in the power of demons are described as mad or irrational,[36] while at the time of their fall, the wicked powers are themselves considered to be acting in a way that was mad.[37] Importantly, however, despite the irrationality of their behaviour, Eusebius does not present demons as, in essence, irrational beings. Instead he directly asserts that 'the demons are rational' (*λογικοὶ οἱ δαίμονες*) as part of his criticism of older Greek philosophical explanations of demonic origins.[38] That Eusebius' demons possessed the capacity for rational thought but failed to act accordingly is significant, since, as rational beings, they would have been able to exercise *προαίρεσις*, reinforcing the sense that they were responsible for their own fall and subsequent actions.[39]

This association between demons and irrational behaviour is further reflected in Eusebius' frequent portrayal of demons, and those in

[35] As Frede has pointed out, there was considerable overlap in ancient texts between a variety of words such as these, which might loosely be translated into English as signifying the concept of 'rationality' or 'reason'. Frede writes of 'a certain wavering in terminology between *logos, to logikon, nous, hegemonikon, mens, ratio*, and other terms': M. Frede, 'Introduction', in M. Frede and G. Striker, eds., *Rationality in Greek Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 3.

[36] For example: *HE* 7.31.1, 10.8.9–10; *VC* 1.45.2–3; *LC* 7.7, 9.13; *SC* 13.6; *Theoph.* 1.78, 2.1.

[37] *PE* 7.16.3–4. See also: *DE* 4.9.12.

[38] *PE* 13.15.6.

[39] On rationality as essential to *προαίρεσις* for Eusebius, see Chapter 4.

their power, as 'wild beasts'.[40] In a vivid passage from his panegyric on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius likens the 'good-hating envy and the evil-loving demon' to a 'rabid dog' (κυνὸς λυττῶντος), which had turned its 'savage madness' (τὴν θηριώδη μανίαν) towards the persecution of the Christian church.[41] The combination here of an adjective drawn from the word for 'beast' (θήρ), with the word for 'madness' (μανία), and the image of a 'rabid' dog, emphasizes the close connection which Eusebius saw between demons and irrationality. The idea that animals lacked rationality was reasonably common in antiquity, although by no means universal.[42] Aristotle and the Stoics had considered that only humans possessed the ability to reason, although their view was challenged by many within the Platonist tradition.[43] Even among early Christians there was considerable disagreement on this point: Origen had considered animals to lack reason,[44] yet Eusebius' Latin contemporary Lactantius took the opposite view.[45]

On this topic, it is evident that Eusebius shared Origen's view. According to Eusebius, animals were most emphatically not rational: in the *PE* he states clearly that beasts were 'irrational according to nature',[46] and animals or beasts are often referred to as ἄλογα throughout Eusebius' works.[47] As such, by associating demons and those he considered to be in their power with wild animals, Eusebius was drawing attention to their intellectual shortcomings. Moreover, Eusebius' portrayal of demons as beasts serves as a regular reminder

[40] For example: demons as beasts: *PE* 4.17.9, *VC* 1.49.1; *HE* 10.4.14; *DE* 10.8.73; *Theoph.* 3.13, 3.55; people as beasts: *PE* 7.2.6; *DE* 3.3.7, 4.10.2; *LC* 9.13.

[41] *HE* 10.4.14. See also: *LC* 9.13 on the enemies of God, although not specifically demons, as behaving like dogs.

[42] On which, see: R. Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate* (London: Duckworth, 1993), 1–2.

[43] On Aristotle, see Sorabji, *Animal Minds*, 12–16; on the Stoics, Sorabji, *Animal Minds*, 20; on various Platonists, including Plutarch and Porphyry, Sorabji, *Animal Minds*, 178–9, 182.

[44] Sorabji, *Animal Minds*, 200, citing Orig. *Cels.* 4.74.

[45] Sorabji, *Animal Minds*, 90, citing Lact. *Div. Inst*. 3.10 and 7.9.10.

[46] *PE* 3.5.3. See also: *PE* 7.18.3; *DE* 1.10.1–13, where Eusebius explicitly challenges those Greek philosophers who had suggested that animals shared the human capacity for reason, and therefore ought not to be sacrificed. He stresses that the Old Testament does not condemn animal sacrifice, and presents animals as more akin to plants than to humans.

[47] See, for example: *PE* 1.4.9, 2.5.4, 4.15.5, 4.15.9, 7.4.2, 13.3.44; *DE* 1.1.15, 3.2.42, 3.3.8, 3.3.16, 5.*Praef*.19, 5.*Praef*.30, 5.3.14.

of the kind of threat that Eusebius considered the demons to pose to humans. It was a threat that consisted, above all, in drawing people away from the true God and thus away from the better part of themselves.

In Eusebius' view, God, in contrast to the demons, was pre-eminently associated with the spread of rationality. Eusebius describes Christ as 'intellectual light' (*φῶς νοερόν*), combining this attribute of rationality with his common association of the divinity with light.[48] Eusebius also presents Christ as rescuing people from a prior state of irrationality by offering them improved understanding through his teaching.[49] Moreover, for Eusebius, it was the rational human soul that brought humankind closest to God, since he interpreted the reference in Genesis to God making man in his own image as describing, not the human body, but the soul:[50]

> And so it seems to me that, in the nature of man, the rational and immortal soul and the passionless mind are well said to keep safe an icon and resemblance of God, insofar as in their substance they are both immaterial and incorporeal, and intellectual and rational . . . [51]

Thus, in associating the demons with irrationality, Eusebius was not only highlighting their opposition to God, but was also suggesting that they could deprive people of access to the best part of themselves, the part that was nearest to God. It is striking that Eusebius, claiming to follow the teaching of Moses, regards the 'true man' as that located in the soul and sharing in 'intellectual, incorporeal, and rational substance'.[52] Therefore, by drawing people into irrationality, demons were not only drawing them away from God, but were also robbing them of their full humanity.

In the light of this, it is surely also significant that Eusebius described those who practised polytheistic or astral worship as being 'like children in their souls',[53] once again implying that they were in a less intellectually developed state. There was a widespread sense both in Greek philosophy and in Roman law that children were,

[48] *DE* 5.*Praef*.33. See also: *PE* 2.5.2.

[49] See, for example: *PE* 1.4.12–13; *DE* 7.3.34.

[50] Gen. 1:26–7. Eusebius was by no means the only early Christian writer to adopt a non-physical interpretation of this idea that humankind was the image of God. See, for example: Orig. *de Princ.* 1.1.7; Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* 10.98.4.

[51] *PE* 3.10.16. See also: *PE* 7.4.3, 7.10.9, 7.18.3, 13.3.44; *DE* 4.6.6.

[52] *PE* 7.10.9.

[53] *PE* 1.6.3. See also: *Theoph.* 1.26.

if not entirely without reason, at least not as rational as adults.[54] Plato had denied that children possessed reason, while the Stoics held that children only became rational as they grew older.[55] Eusebius' use of the childhood simile does, however, convey the impression—missing from the imagery of irrational animals—that this state of irrationality might not be permanent, and that it might, with the correct education, be possible to escape from the power of demons. This is reflected elsewhere in the *PE*, where recent converts are described as being 'like children in their souls', in contrast to those who have progressed further in their understanding of the scriptures.[56] A similar idea is found in some of Paul's epistles, where the metaphor of childhood could similarly imply the possibility of progress, particularly progress towards God.[57] In Galatians, Paul compared Christians before the coming of Christ to slaves, who, through Christ's teaching, have been converted from slaves to children, 'and if a child then also an heir, through God'.[58] In suggesting at *PE* 1.6.3 that the earlier generations of humans who worshipped the stars rather than the true God were 'like children', Eusebius perhaps had in mind the idea found in Galatians that such children might, with the coming of Christ, be able to progress to a state of greater knowledge and understanding.

This distinction between rationality and irrationality appears to have been fundamental to Eusebius' understanding of the difference between the forces of good and evil in the universe, and it is also a polarity that underpins the whole of the combined apologetic of the *PE* and *DE*. It is a central aim of these works to demonstrate that Christians have chosen their new beliefs, not irrationally and out of blind faith, but as a result of 'judgement and temperate calculation'.[59] This was in part a response to accusations previously levelled against Christians that their beliefs were based on 'irrational and unexamined belief'.[60] As many scholars have noted, Eusebius'

[54] On which, see: Sorabji, *Animal Minds*, 70, 127; P. Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 181–2.

[55] Sorabji, *Animal Minds*, 70, citing Plato, *Republic* 441a–b and 127, citing Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 7.55.

[56] *PE* 12.1.4.

[57] Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 181–2.

[58] Gal. 4:7, NRSV trans., cited in Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 181. On Paul's use of the term *νήπιος*, see also the relevant entry in: G. Kittel and G. Friedrich, ed., *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, vol. 4: *Λ–N* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1942), 918–22.

[59] *DE* 1.1.17. See also: *PE* 15.1.12.

[60] *PE* 1.1.11.

apologetic technique throughout these works consists of attempts to 'prove' the validity of Christian doctrine by drawing on the 'evidence' both of historical events and of non-Christian writers.[61] The association which Eusebius saw between the demons and irrationality therefore not only suited, but arguably influenced, his broader apologetic stance in these works.

As well as irrationality, Eusebius also associated demons with another concept that was traditionally viewed in a negative light by his society: the idea of tyranny.[62] For Eusebius, demons were tyrannical rulers, who enslaved and oppressed those in their power. At times, Eusebius makes this association between demons and tyranny perfectly obvious, as when he describes how, in the past, 'the demons ruled all the nations as tyrants' (*τῶν ἐθνῶν ἁπάντων κατετυράννουν οἱ δαίμονες*).[63] The use of the verb *κατατυραννεύω* draws attention to what Eusebius evidently considered to be the oppressive nature of demonic power. Likewise, at *PE* 4.21.2, Eusebius describes how people have been saved by Christ from their 'ancestral slavery' to demons, again showing the demons as oppressive. This association between demons and tyrannical power also permeates Eusebius' works at a less obvious level, reflected in the similar language which Eusebius uses to characterize both tyrants and demons, and in the verbs which he uses to describe their actions.

At times, some of the figures whom Eusebius portrays as tyrants in works like the *Historia ecclesiastica* (*HE*) are also, like demons, described as 'good-hating' (*μισόκαλος*);[64] likewise, both demons and human tyrants can be found characterized by madness (*μανία*).[65] Significant parallels also occur in the verbs that Eusebius uses to describe the actions of demons and tyrants. Demons, like tyrants, are said to 'enslave' (*δουλόω*) their subjects,[66] and even where Eusebius does not use exactly the same word to describe the manner in which demons and tyrants act, his choice of vocabulary nevertheless represents them behaving in similar ways and is generally suggestive of oppression. Verbs such as *καταδυναστεύω*, *καταδουλόω*, and

[61] See, for example: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', 61–6; Johnson, 'Literary Experiment', 71.
[62] On this, see further, Chapter 6.
[63] *PE* 1.4.5. See also: *Ecl. Proph.* 190.13–14; *Fr. Luc.*, *PG* 24.553.26–8, 24.553.42–6.
[64] See, for example: *HE* 9.2.1, 9.6.4.
[65] See: *HE* 9.9.1, 9.9.12, 9.10.2, 10.4.14, 10.8.9.
[66] See, for example: *HE* 8.12.3, 8.14.6; *VC* 1.13.3; *PE* 4.17.4; *DE* 3.6.34, 4.9.8.

κατατρῦχόω are used of demons,[67] while tyrants are described in similar terms with the verbs *κατατυραννεύω* and *καταπονέω*.[68] Not only are most of these verbs linked by a shared sense of power or oppression, they are also connected by the repeated use of the prefix '*κατα-*', meaning 'down' or 'below'. In some cases, this serves to intensify the already negative meaning of the verb, as with *τυραννεύω*; in others, it turns an otherwise relatively neutral verb like *κρατέω*, which could have either a positive or a negative meaning, into an unquestionably negative verb. Either way, the regular use of this prefix helps to associate demons firmly with ideas of tyranny and subjugation. By drawing such parallels between demons and concepts that were already viewed in a negative light by much of his audience, Eusebius was once again reinforcing his argument that demons were to be viewed as unremittingly negative figures. In contrast, Eusebius associates the Christian God with freedom (*ἐλευθερία*), presenting Christ as offering people the chance of liberation from the demonic tyranny to which they had been subject.[69] Christ, we are told, 'called the entire race of men out from impious and Egyptian idolatry under wicked demons into freedom'.[70] Thus, once again, we find God and the demons associated with contrasting concepts, this time of liberty and tyranny, further reinforcing the sense that Eusebius held these powers to be separated by a great gulf.

This idea that both non-Christians and people in the pre-Christian era were in some way enslaved was by no means original to Eusebius—it first occurs in the Pauline notion of 'slavery to sin', according to which Christian converts, having previously been enslaved to sin, have, through the teaching of Christ, 'been set free from sin, [and] have become slaves of righteousness'.[71] For Eusebius, Pauline slavery to sin appears to have been replaced by a more tangible form of slavery to demons.[72] Nevertheless, sin and demons remained closely connected for Eusebius, since he in turn linked the oppressive influence of the demons to the spread of immorality.[73]

[67] *DE* 4.10.13; *DE* 6.20.11; *PE* 1.5.1.
[68] *HE* 10.9.3; *VC* 1.12.2. See also: *HE* 10.2.1.
[69] See, for example: *PE* 1.4.2, 7.16.11; *DE* 3.1.2, 3.2.9, 9.10.7.
[70] *DE* 3.2.9.
[71] Rom. 6:18, NRSV trans., cited in Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 183. On this, see Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 183–6.
[72] See the discussion in Chapter 6.
[73] As, for instance, at *DE* 4.10.1–4; *PE* 1.4.5–6, 7.2.3–6.

This was then contrasted with the moral benefits which Eusebius suggested had been brought about by Christianity.[74] In making his argument that demons were associated with immoral practices, Eusebius selected examples of activities and behaviours that would have been widely regarded as reprehensible within his society. These included 'sexual impurity' (πορνεία) and indulgence in 'shameful and intemperate pleasure' (τῆς αἴσχρας καὶ ἀκολάστου ἡδονῆς),[75] with Eusebius suggesting that the demons had caused people to submit to 'the impassioned portion of their soul'.[76] Under the influence of demons, we are told, Greeks and 'barbarians' alike were 'instructed in and executing the orgies and unholy mysteries only of shameful and intemperate pleasure'.[77] In addition, Eusebius mentions incest and cannibalism as practices encouraged by demons,[78] but it is the practice of human sacrifice to which he returns most often in his search for examples of demonically inspired immorality.[79]

In part, Eusebius' choice of human sacrifice as his main example of such immorality may have been based on the fact that he was able to find several texts by non-Christian writers which described reported instances of human sacrifice.[80] As such, Eusebius had plenty of supposedly objective proof that the practice had been widespread. Yet, still more importantly, the example of human sacrifice also enabled him to reiterate his point that the pagan 'gods' were, in reality, wicked demons. After citing a story of human sacrifice found in Diodorus Siculus, Eusebius concludes:

> For by these things I think it has been plainly shown that the oldest and first establishment of images was demonic, and all the idolatrous

[74] For example at *PE* 1.4.6, 5.1.8.

[75] *PE* 7.2.4. Referring to πορνεία, Eusebius quotes Wisd. 14:12 (Ἀρχὴ γὰρ πορνείας ἐπίνοια εἰδώλων), thereby emphasizing the idea of a direct connection between polytheistic worship and immorality.

[76] *PE* 7.2.2. On the idea of enslavement to passion, see also the discussion in the section 'Demonic Slavery' in Chapter 6.

[77] *PE* 7.2.4.

[78] As, for example, at *DE* 5.*Praef.*14, and *PE* 1.4.6.

[79] See, for example: *PE* 1.4.6, 4.10.4, 4.15.4–5, 4.15.8–9, 4.16.21–7, 4.17.3–6, 4.17.9, 4.19.5–6, 4.21.1, 5.1.8, 5.4.6, 5.26.6.

[80] Eusebius' citations include: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities* 1.23.1–24.4, 1.38.2–3 (*PE* 4.16.15–18); Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca Historica* 20.14.4–6 (*PE* 4.16.19); Porph. *Abst.* 2.54.1–56.9, 2.27.2 (*PE* 4.16.1–10); and a fragment of Philo Byblius' *Phoenecian History* (*PE* 4.16.11). He also quotes examples from the Christian writer Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* 3.42.1–43.1 (*PE* 4.16.12–13).

> making of gods was the work of demons that are, not good, but entirely depraved and wicked.[81]

Eusebius is making the point that no truly divine being would have required such an abhorrent form of worship. Indeed, he even questions why, if there had been any good demons, they had not ordered people to put a stop to such practices, thereby reinforcing once again his claim that no demon was ever good.[82] It is important to note that, in focusing on the immorality of such practices, Eusebius was not attempting to impose new moral categories on his audience. Human sacrifice had long been used by Greek and Roman writers to define 'the other', and to distinguish between 'civilization' and 'barbarism'.[83] Indeed, Christians had themselves been accused by their opponents of practising human sacrifice, and even cannibalism.[84] Instead, Eusebius was simply redrawing an existing boundary between 'civilization' and 'barbarism', such that Christianity, rather than Hellenism, now represented the civilizing force.[85]

This can be seen most clearly from a passage in the first book of the *PE*, in which Eusebius credits the teaching of Christ with bringing to an end the practices of cannibalism and incest which he claims had been common among the traditional enemies of the Roman Empire, such as the Persians:

> [B]ut, from only his speech and his teaching, which is spread across the entire inhabited world, the customs of all the nations, including those which were previously wild and barbarian, are well laid down, such that the Persians who are his pupils do not any longer marry their mothers, nor do the Scythians practise cannibalism on account of the word of Christ, which has even come as far as them . . . [86]

[81] *PE* 4.16.20. See also: *DE* 4.10.3.

[82] *PE* 4.16.21. See also: *PE* 4.5.4, 4.14.10–4.15.4, 5.4.4.

[83] On which, see: J. Rives, 'Human Sacrifice among Pagans and Christians', *JRS* 85 (1995), 68.

[84] Such accusations are mainly reported by the Christian apologists who sought to refute them, although Pliny, in his famous letter to Trajan about the treatment of Christians, also remarked that the Christians only ate 'harmless' food, perhaps suggesting that reports of such behaviour were widely known: R. L. Wilken, *The Christians as the Romans Saw Them* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 17–21, citing Pliny, *Epistula*10.96; Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, 9.5; Athenagoras, *Legatio* 3.1. See also: *Martyrs of Lyons* 1.14; Orig. *Cels.* 6.27. A reference by Eusebius to rumours that Christians partook of 'unholy food' demonstrates that these accusations continued to concern Christian writers even in the early fourth century: *HE* 4.7.11.

[85] As Johnson also noted: *Ethnicity and Argument*, 217.

[86] *PE* 1.4.6.

Christianity is here represented as the force of morality. Later in the *PE*, Eusebius raises the question of why supposedly 'good' demons did not intervene to prevent such practices.[87] By contrast, in this passage from the very beginning of the work, Eusebius makes it clear that he considers Christ to have acted where other supposed deities had not. Christianity, he suggests, has successfully brought about moral improvement. Eusebius does not allow his audience to lose sight of this association between Christianity and morality, more than once linking the teaching of Christ and his disciples with the decline of practices like human sacrifice in the *PE*.[88] As a result, while Eusebius ties the demons to a range of behaviours that were considered alien and abhorrent, he associates Christianity with the spread of a moral code that would have been highly valued in Hellenic society.

However, in order to suggest that Christianity alone represented the force of civilizing morality, while other religions were connected with barbarism, Eusebius effectively had to collapse any distinction between different forms of pagan worship.[89] The idea that 'paganism' was in any way a monolithic or co-ordinated system of beliefs is, as modern historians have increasingly come to recognize, highly inaccurate; rather, the very idea of 'paganism' was a creation of Christian apologists like Eusebius.[90] Eusebius presents polytheistic worship in the *PE* not merely as inspired by demons, but as being originally alien to Greek society. The myths about the gods and the rituals of polytheistic worship, Eusebius suggests, initially came to Greece from the Phoenicians and Egyptians.[91] It is these nations, he tells us, which 'first began the error'.[92] This allowed Eusebius to present all polytheistic worship as being essentially the same and therefore correspondingly all equally flawed. Moreover, it suggested that polytheistic worship, with its associated myths and rituals, was not necessarily to be associated with the 'civilizing' values of Hellenic society, since its origins were 'barbarian'. Reflecting this association

[87] *PE* 4.16.21.

[88] As at *PE* 4.15.6, 4.17.4. On Christ's teaching as bringing about a decline of other immoral practices, see, for example: *PE* 1.4.11; *DE* 3.3.1, 3.6.32.

[89] A technique in the *PE* previously noted by: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', 50; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 99.

[90] P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede, 'Introduction', in P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede, eds., *Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 5.

[91] *PE* 1.6.1–4, 1.9.19, 3.4.5.

[92] *PE* 1.6.4.

between 'barbarism' and the polytheistic worship that he saw as demon-inspired, Eusebius even described demons as 'those other barbarians' (ἄλλων τουτωνὶ βαρβάρων) in the *De laudibus Constantini* (*LC*).[93] Here, Eusebius suggests that the physical attacks of earthly barbarians were paralleled in the invisible attacks of these demonic barbarians against human souls, through the spread of polytheism.[94] As such, in turning away from traditional Greek religion, Christians need not be seen as simultaneously rejecting either Greek morality, or, indeed, Greek culture.

In associating demons with a series of other negative concepts, from irrationality, through tyranny and darkness, to immorality, Eusebius was amply demonstrating how he could reach the conclusion that all demons were bad. Eusebius' demons are unambiguously wicked, malevolent not by creation, but—far worse—by choice. That Eusebius' demons should so completely lack any form of redeeming feature is striking, but hardly unusual among early Christian writers. What is, however, particularly noteworthy about his presentation of the demonic is the way in which his demons appear to form an essential part of a cosmos that is completely polarized between the hostile opposing forces of good and evil. Not only are demons portrayed as wicked, they are consistently contrasted with, and shown as hostile to, everything that is good in the universe. This division between good and evil provided in turn the basic structure that underpinned Eusebius' broader thought. Throughout Eusebius' works, we find every negative concept repeatedly tied to the demonic realm, while everything good and every benefit to humankind is associated with God. Recognizing that Eusebius' thought is dominated in this way by his perception of a complete division, even a battle, between the forces of good and evil in the universe can help us towards a better understanding of other areas of Eusebius' thought.

A 'DUALISTIC' VIEW?

The sharp divisions that recur throughout Eusebius' thought in a variety of forms raise the question of whether his view of the universe

[93] *LC* 6.21. [94] *LC* 7.1–2.

may reasonably be seen as 'dualistic'. A note of caution is needed at the outset over the use of the term 'dualism', since this was not coined until the early eighteenth century, initially to describe ancient Persian religion.[95] It is therefore not a term that Eusebius would have applied either to his own thought, or to anyone else's. Nevertheless, more recent scholarship has adopted a much broader view of 'dualism' and it can be a useful term for describing particularly polarized systems of thought. A dualistic religious or philosophical system is usually considered to consist of two irreconcilably opposed groups or powers, one good and one evil, with no middle ground and no possibility of compromise between them.[96] Yet, even within this broad definition, dualistic beliefs may take a variety of forms, as scholars of dualism have been keen to emphasize.[97] Moreover, dualistic views may also appear beyond the fields of theological and philosophical speculation, with S. Laeuchli also identifying forms of 'social', 'psychological', and 'ethical' dualism.[98]

Dualistic belief systems were not uncommon in the ancient world, and, even among early Christians, Eusebius would not have been alone in displaying a tendency towards dualism. Several, although by no means all, of the texts discovered at Nag Hammadi display clearly dualistic elements,[99] while the views of some early Christian groups later deemed heretical, such as the Marcionites and the Valentinians, were condemned by their 'orthodox' opponents for

[95] P. F. M. Fontaine, *The Light and the Dark: A Cultural History of Dualism*, vols 1–14 (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1986), vol. 6, xxii.

[96] Fontaine, in his multi-volume survey of dualism in the ancient world, offers the following definition of 'dualism': 'two systems or concepts or principles or groups of people that are utterly opposed and cannot be reduced to one another; they exist alongside each other, without any intermediary term; one of the two is always thought to be of a much higher quality than the other': *Light and Dark*, vol. 1, 263. See also: S. Laeuchli, 'Mithraic Dualism', in S. Laeuchli, ed., *Mithraism in Ostia: Mystery Religion and Christianity in the Ancient Port of Rome* (Evanston, Il: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 61, who nevertheless considers such a definition of dualism to be unnecessarily restrictive.

[97] Laeuchli, for instance, noted the differences between the 'dualistic elements' present in the thought of Plato and Valentinius, and the 'ultimate dualism' of the Manichaean system: 'Mithraic Dualism', 61.

[98] Laeuchli, 'Mithraic Dualism', 61–2.

[99] E. Pagels points to the *Hypostasis of the Archons, On the Origin of the World*, and *The Secret Book of John* as examples: *Gnostic Gospels* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979), 29.

positing more than one god.[100] Yet, even within the canonical Gospels, there are passages, such as those dealing with Christ's struggles with Satan in the wilderness, or his exorcisms of demons,[101] that could lend themselves to dualistic interpretations.[102]

Nevertheless, we should be extremely cautious about seeing some form of absolute, cosmic dualism, with two equal and opposed divine powers, in Eusebius' thought. Eusebius, after all, strongly condemned dualistic groups like the Manichaeans,[103] and considered himself part of the 'orthodox' tradition, which proclaimed a faith in one, benevolent creator-God.[104] Furthermore, Eusebius repeatedly emphasizes not only the moral inferiority of the demons, but also his belief that their power and insight were not equal to those of the true Christian God. As such, Eusebius avoids outright cosmic dualism, despite the wide polarities which he sees in the universe.

Of all the conceptual divisions within Eusebius' thought, the most obvious is surely the moral divide between good and evil, manifested in a range of further distinctions between light and darkness, morality and immorality. Consequently, one might perhaps be justified in speaking of a 'moral dualism' within Eusebius' thought. Despite this stark moral divide, Eusebius does not consider the representatives of these two moral poles—on the one hand God, and on the other the devil and his demons—to be entirely independent of each other. In fact, according to the logic of Eusebius' account of the demons' origins, not only demons, but also the devil, must have been part of God's creation. For Eusebius, as we have seen, demons were originally angels, who had fallen from their blessed state into a state of wickedness.[105] Eusebius also makes it clear that God was the 'maker' (ποιητής) of the angels.[106] As such, God must also be the 'maker' of the demons and their leader, the devil.

[100] Pagels, *Origin of Satan*, 169; Pagels, *Gnostic Gospels*, 28–9. Such claims were, however, not necessarily accurate, at least in the case of the Valentinians, since Valentinian texts discovered at Nag Hammadi, such as the *Gospel of Philip*, display no evidence of dualism: Pagels, *Origin of Satan*, 171–7.

[101] For example: Matt. 4:1–11, 8:28–34; Mark 5:1–13; Luke 4:1–13, 8:26–33.

[102] Pagels has suggested that a form of 'modified dualism . . . characterizes the great majority of Christian teachings, based . . . on the conviction that God's spirit constantly contends against Satan': *Origin of Satan*, 177.

[103] *HE* 7.31.1–2.

[104] On which tradition, see: Pagels, *Gnostic Gospels*, 28–9.

[105] *PE* 7.16.1–11.

[106] *PE* 4.5.4. See also: *PE* 13.15.9–10.

Nevertheless, this leaves unasked the somewhat problematic question of why an omniscient and benevolent deity would knowingly create beings capable of bringing suffering into the world. After all, as we saw in the section 'Demons and Angels', Eusebius elsewhere uses the same term, *ποιητής*, to describe the relationship between darkness and the diabolical leader of the demons.[107] This wicked power may be the immediate 'maker' of darkness, but if God is, in turn, the 'maker' of the demons and their leader, then one might wonder what this means for the relationship between God and darkness. Given the primarily apologetic aims of the majority of Eusebius' works, it is perhaps unsurprising that he fails to address this question directly. Yet in spite of his reticence, there are some tantalizing hints in his works as to how he may have been able to reconcile his belief in the continuing presence of such wicked creatures in the universe with a belief in a just and merciful God.

One such hint occurs in Eusebius' discussion of the origin of the demons in book 7 of the *PE*. Here, after describing how some of the fallen angels were confined to Tartarus by 'the just decision and sentence of the great God',[108] Eusebius asserts that:

> Of these, a petty and small remnant, left behind (*καταλειφθέν*) around the earth and the air below the moon for the sake of (*χάριν*) training the athletes of piety, became jointly responsible for the error of polytheism, which is in no way different from atheism, among men.[109]

In its suggestion that different groups of fallen angels had different fates, this account is somewhat reminiscent of the Enochic story of the Watcher angels, in which, while the fallen angels themselves were imprisoned in darkness at God's command, the spirits of their offspring, the giants, remained free on earth to torment humankind.[110] This passage therefore shows the influence on Eusebius' thought of just one of the many accounts of demonic origins that were in circulation at the time. The crucial point here, however, is the implication that above these wicked demons stands a greater power, which is capable of restraining them, but which for whatever reason has chosen not to do so. By using the passive of the verb *καταλείπω*,

[107] *PE* 7.16.3. [108] *PE* 7.16.7. [109] *PE* 7.16.8.

[110] P. S. Alexander, 'The Demonology of the Dead Sea Scrolls', in P. W. Flint and J. C. VanderKam, eds., *The Dead Sea Scrolls after Fifty Years: A Comprehensive Assessment*, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 338–9. 1 Enoch 10.1–22, 15.1–16.1.

Eusebius manages to avoid naming the power responsible, but following on from the previous sentence, in which it was God who had confined some of the fallen angels to Tartarus, we must infer the unnamed subject of the verb to be God. Eusebius' use of the passive suggests that he was perhaps not entirely comfortable with the notion that his benevolent God might effectively be licensing the demons' behaviour on earth, as it allows him to avoid making such an accusation explicit.

Nevertheless, there is also some indication here of how Eusebius may have been able to see such an action as corresponding to God's benevolence, when we are told that the reason some demons 'were left behind' was 'for the sake of training the athletes of piety'. This is clearly a reference to the Christian martyrs of the persecutions. The portrayal of martyrs as victorious 'athletes' and contestants in the Greek athletic contest, or *ἀγῶν*, was common in much early Christian martyr literature,[111] including Eusebius' own. Throughout the *De martyribus Palaestinae* (*Mart. Pal.*), as well as in the accounts of persecutions in the *HE*, Eusebius regularly applied such terminology to the martyrs.[112] In using the phrase 'the athletes of piety', it is therefore evident that he had in mind the events of the persecutions. Moreover, as N. Kelley has pointed out, the use of such language represented martyrdom not only as a spiritual victory, but as 'an enterprise which required training'.[113] In suggesting that the role of the demons was in part to 'train' these 'athletes of piety', Eusebius is therefore perhaps suggesting that the struggle against these hostile figures might in some way serve a morally improving purpose. By contributing to the moral exercises of these Christian athletes, the

[111] See, for example: *Martyrdom of Polycarp* 18–19; *Acts of Carpus, Papylus and Agathonice* [Greek] 35; *Martyrs of Lyons* 1.17, 1.36; *Martyrdom of Apollonius* 47; *Martyrdom of Dasius* 9.2. On Christian martyr discourse, see: N. Kelley, 'Philosophy as Training for Death: Reading the Ancient Christian Martyr Acts as Spiritual Exercises', *Church History* 75 (2006), 723–47; L. L. Thompson, 'The Martyrdom of Polycarp: Death in the Roman Games', *Journal of Religion* 82 (2002), 27–52; Z. Stewart, 'Greek Crowns and Christian Martyrs', in E. Lucchesi and H. D. Saffrey, eds., *Mémorial André-Jean Festugière: Antiquité Paienne et Chrétienne* (Geneva: Cramer, 1984), 119–24. This language is also found in 4 Maccabees: J. Corke-Webster, 'Mothers and Martyrdom: Familial Piety and the Model of the Maccabees in Eusebius of Caesarea's *Ecclesiastical History*', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 64. See, for example: 4 Macc. 6:10, 17:15.

[112] See, for example: *Mart. Pal.* [SR] 3.1, 4.4, 6.6, 9.3, 11.4, 11.18, 11.22, 11.23, 13.1, 13.11; *HE* 1.1.2, 7.12.1, 8.3.1, 8.6.5, 8.7.1, 8.8.1.

[113] Kelley, 'Philosophy as Training for Death', 727.

demons would unwittingly be helping to prepare them for the ultimate spiritual fulfilment—the victory—of martyrdom. This sense that the role of the demons might in this case ultimately be beneficial is further reinforced by Eusebius' use of the word *χάριν* here, since this word had generally positive connotations, conveying a sense of goodwill or favour.[114] As such, the implication is that, in supplying the demons as a means of moral training for the pious, God is in fact demonstrating his benevolence, helping people towards salvation. It is important to note, however, that it would only be by successfully resisting the hostile actions of the demons that this beneficial effect might be achieved.

There is, of course, no suggestion that the demons might consciously be working for the benefit of humankind; rather, they would at best be the unwitting agents of God's greater plan for human salvation. Moreover, the structure of this sentence leaves intriguingly open the question of God's role in permitting the demons to encourage polytheistic worship. The reason they are permitted to remain on earth is given as 'training the athletes of piety'; however, once they have been allowed to remain, Eusebius suggests that they then proceed to encourage the development of polytheism. Eusebius seems willing to allow that persecutions and martyrdoms might have had a potentially corrective or improving aspect, without being able to see any similar benefit in the existence of polytheism. He does not make it clear whether he believed that the demons, once they had been allowed to remain for one, ultimately benevolent, purpose, had then effectively exceeded their mandate and begun to work other kinds of evil, or whether he felt that all demonic activity must, in some obscure way, be serving God's greater plan. Either way, this one brief phrase demonstrates that, however polarized Eusebius' cosmos, he avoided outright dualism by placing the demons ultimately under God's power.

Although this suggestion that God might at times use the demons to serve his own ends is rare in Eusebius, this is not the only place where we find him allowing for the possibility that God might sometimes permit human suffering in order to achieve an ultimately positive goal. Once again, it is only in the context of the persecutions that Eusebius seems prepared to entertain this possibility. Describing an abortive attempt by the emperor Aurelian to persecute the church,

[114] *LSJ, s.v. χάρις*. Compare: *PGL s.v. χάρις*.

Eusebius suggests at *HE* 7.30.20–1 that he was prevented by God, demonstrating, in Eusebius' view:

> [T]hat at no point would it be easy for the rulers of this life (τοῖς τοῦ βίου ἄρχουσιν) to come down against the assemblies of Christ, unless the hand fighting on our behalf, in godly and heavenly judgement for the sake of education (παιδείας) and correction . . . should order this to happen.[115]

While the phrase 'the rulers of this life' is ostensibly a reference to earthly emperors such as Aurelian, it is also reminiscent of Paul's famous remark that 'our struggle is not against enemies of blood and flesh, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness'.[116] As such, it could equally refer to spiritual 'rulers of this life'. Thus, we once again find Eusebius implying that the enemies of the virtuous, be they earthly or demonic, might take action against the church only when God allowed.[117] In this case, Eusebius suggests that God in fact intervened to prevent the persecutions, by bringing about Aurelian's death; however, slightly later, we find God permitting persecutions to go ahead, by removing his protection from the church.[118] Eusebius leaves us in no doubt that he considers this to be entirely justified by the growing dissentions and conflicts within the church at that time: he sees it as a 'godly judgement' (ἡ θεία κρίσις), and considers that God was simply 'conducting his supervision' (τὴν αὐτῆς ἐπισκοπὴν ἀνακίνει).[119] Quoting from Psalm 88(89):42, Eusebius goes even further, claiming that, during these persecutions, God not only removed his protection from the church, but even 'exalted the right hand of his foes'.[120] Eusebius is thus offering a slightly different interpretation of the persecutions here, in which they are not simply the work of hostile and malevolent demons, inflicted on an innocent population, but rather an instrument of God's justice. Their purpose, however, is not simply punitive; instead, Eusebius suggests that God might have allowed this suffering for the essentially merciful purpose of correcting human error, thus leading people back to the path of virtue and salvation.

[115] *HE* 7.30.21. [116] Eph. 6:12, NRSV trans.
[117] Compare *HE* 8.1.6, where Eusebius asserts that God's protection prevents a 'wicked demon' from undermining the prosperity of the church.
[118] *HE* 8.1.7–9. [119] *HE* 8.1.7. [120] *HE* 8.1.9, NRSV trans.

Eusebius' use of the word παιδείας at *HE* 7.30.21 is suggestive: God wishes to 'educate' people, to help them to improve themselves. Even his punishments might thus, in Eusebius' view, ultimately be seen as evidence of his benevolence.

CONCLUSIONS

It therefore seems that, for Eusebius, there was ultimately only one power in true control of events in the universe, and that power was the benevolent Christian God. Thus, while we must see demons in Eusebius as a powerful force, capable of disrupting human salvation, enslaving the gullible, and drawing people away from God, there was clearly no doubt in Eusebius' mind about who the eventual victor in this greater cosmic conflict would be. The power of the Christian God far outweighed that of the demons, who were, ultimately, only part of God's creation. Of course, Eusebius' presentation of the demonic leaves certain questions tantalizingly unanswered. For instance, while Eusebius appears tentatively to find possible benefits lying behind the persecutions, he does not offer a similar explanation of why his benevolent God might have permitted the demons to encourage polytheism, with its attendant suffering and immorality. Eusebius' unmistakable view of demons as a hostile and terrifying force to be feared, combatted, and condemned seems at times to sit rather uncomfortably with his faith in the supreme power and benevolence of God.

In view of Eusebius' primarily apologetic aims, we should not expect to find a solution to all such questions in his works, since at no point was his purpose principally to outline or explain the function of demons within the universe. Nevertheless, the basic shape of Eusebius' cosmology is consistent and unmistakable. Eusebius envisaged a universe structured and energized by a fundamental division between the cosmic forces of good and evil. Ideas about demons, as the representatives of one of these poles, cannot be neatly excised from other areas of Eusebius' thought, any more than his ideas about God or Christ can be set aside by scholars who wish to understand his views. Thus, in order to appreciate Eusebius' thought on any topic, including his political thought, we must remain constantly alert to the presence of demons in his work, remembering to see them as a hostile

and consistently threatening force, against which the virtuous must constantly struggle. By recognizing the importance of demons for Eusebius, I will show in future chapters that we can gain valuable new insights into key areas of his thought—his ideas of moral responsibility, his understanding of history, and his view of Constantine.

4

Demonic Influence and Human Responsibility

Although they have rarely received the attention they deserve in studies of Eusebius' works, questions of human morality, of virtue and vice, and the responsibility for evil lie at the heart of many of Eusebius' most pressing concerns as a writer. As an apologist and church leader in a period when Christians were adjusting to a new position of imperial favour, he was able to offer instruction in what he felt it meant to be a true and virtuous Christian, and how such virtue might be achieved. As an historian, he faced the challenge of explaining the apparent injustice of earlier persecutions in a manner consistent with a belief in a just and omnipotent God. Writing of Constantine's career, there was the issue of Licinius' transformation from virtuous Christian hero to vicious persecutor to address, and finally, as the champion of his own doctrinal views, he had to engage with those 'heretics' he considered to have strayed from the route to virtue and salvation. Issues of human moral responsibility therefore had both a theological and a practical significance for Eusebius, occupying a central place both in his understanding of salvation and divine justice, and also in his vision of Christian identity.

Few scholars, however, have chosen to examine these issues in much detail. Although a number of scholars have previously recognized the significance of ideas of 'free will' for Eusebius, their analysis has tended to focus on the longer discussions of moral responsibility found in the *Praeparatio Evangelica* (*PE*), *Demonstratio Evangelica* (*DE*), and *Theophania* (*Theoph.*).[1] While the *PE* undoubtedly

[1] See, for example: Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 359; Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté*, 355; Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology*, 102.

contains Eusebius' most comprehensive discussion of many of the issues surrounding human responsibility and accountability, most of Eusebius' statements on the subject, particularly in book 6, occur in the context of a broader rebuttal of the doctrine of an all-powerful fate. As a result, they do not provide a complete picture of Eusebius' understanding of these issues. Eusebius' statements on the subject in his more philosophical and theological works need to be considered alongside the examples of human virtue and vice presented in works such as the *Historia ecclesiastica* (*HE*) and *Vita Constantini* (*VC*) in order to achieve a full picture of his views on such a complex topic.

In particular, it is essential to explore how Eusebius presents the relationship between demons and humans when assessing his views on human responsibility. Eusebius' works provide countless examples of interaction between demonic and human agents, notably in the commission of wicked acts and vicious behaviour, which have been ignored in previous scholarship. These examples can provide a fresh perspective on Eusebius' understanding of human freedom of action and moral accountability. They take us beyond the more theoretical discussions of the *PE* and allow us to observe his views 'in action', bringing to the fore questions about the balance between external influence and human free choice. They show how people might succumb to wickedness and thus, conversely, provide an insight into how Eusebius felt people might avoid evil. Moreover, observing how Eusebius presents the relationship between humans and demons can also help to shed light on how he pictured the opposite relationship, between humans and the divine. Above all, the role of the demonic in encouraging human wickedness ought to be examined simply because a threatening demonic presence was central to Eusebius' understanding of the universe. As David Brakke has noted, early Christian 'ethical life . . . took place within the context of cosmic struggle' against the devil and the forces of evil.[2] For Eusebius, questions about how and why humans might be drawn to sin cannot be separated from questions about precisely how demons, as part of their battle against God, act with or upon their human victims. The issue of human moral responsibility is inseparably connected in Eusebius' works with questions about demonic responsibility for wickedness.

[2] Brakke, *Demons and the Making of the Monk*, 10.

It is important to note at the outset, however, that even when approaching Eusebius' understanding of human responsibility from this new perspective, there will be aspects of his thought that remain frustratingly obscure. At times, Eusebius' ideas might appear somewhat vague or circular—Sirinelli considered Eusebius' discussion of the relationship between human 'free will' and divine providence to be 'fragile' and 'inadequate'.[3] Moreover, the challenges involved in dealing with subjects as complex as human freedom of action and moral responsibility are not small. Ancient and modern terminologies rarely correspond in this area. For instance, as with many ancient thinkers, the issue of moral responsibility is discussed by Eusebius mainly in terms of praise and blame, or reward and punishment,[4] and we should therefore not expect to find a clear and consistent term for 'moral responsibility' in Eusebius' works. Similarly, a term such as 'free will' has become so heavily burdened with the concerns of centuries of later philosophers as to pose particular problems for anyone attempting to understand earlier debates. As a result, any attempt to understand Eusebius' thought in this area must begin, not with modern terms and later concerns, but with close attention both to the expressions which Eusebius favoured and to the debates of his own time with which he was engaging.

It is therefore only by treating Eusebius' thought on its own terms, and paying attention to a wide range of his works, that we can hope to reach a proper understanding of his views on human agency and moral responsibility. This approach makes it clear that, for Eusebius, as for many early Christians, maintaining human accountability was of central importance to his conception of salvation. The belief that people were responsible and therefore answerable for their decisions, both good and bad, allowed for the administration of justice, particularly divine justice, and meant that the reward of salvation could be seen as fairly bestowed. Yet it also reveals that, despite the heavy

[3] Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 362: '. . . la fragilité ou plutôt l'insuffisance de la thèse soutenue par Eusèbe'.

[4] Bobzien has noted that the Stoics similarly discussed moral responsibility in terms of praise and blame: S. Bobzien, 'Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and their Relation to Ethics', in R. Sorabji, ed., *Aristotle and After* (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1997), 73. Sorabji likewise takes the allocation of praise and blame as indicative of moral responsibility in Aristotle and Epictetus: R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 326, n.55, 332.

emphasis on human responsibility in his works, Eusebius did not believe that people always acted entirely independently. His understanding of human behaviour allowed considerable room for external influence, for better or worse, without, however, removing people's ultimate responsibility for their actions. In Eusebius' view, human virtue and vice were each a partnership between humans and an external spiritual power. Such a view may be characterized as simultaneously empowering and dispiriting—Eusebius' understanding of human responsibility allowed people a role in securing their own salvation, but at the same time placed considerable obstacles in their path, most notably in the form of threatening and hostile demons.

BACKGROUND

Discussions of the issues of human agency and moral responsibility—particularly among early Christian writers like Eusebius—are frequently approached by scholars in terms of a question of 'free will'.[5] There are, however, considerable risks involved in applying this term to ideas expressed in the early fourth century. Although for many years scholars assumed that free will was such a basic and fundamental concept that all people, including those in the ancient world, must have shared it, recent scholarship has come to recognize instead that 'free will' is in fact a 'technical, philosophical notion': one that was developed by philosophers and gradually changed over time.[6] As a

[5] See, for example: Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology*, 6, 161; H. Crouzel, 'Theological Construction and Research: Origen on Free-Will', trans. B. Drewery, in R. Bauckham and B. Drewery, eds., *Scripture, Tradition and Reason: A Study in the Criteria of Christian Doctrine. Studies in Honour of R. P. C. Hanson* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 239–65; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 358–9; G. F. Chesnut, 'Fate, Fortune, Free Will and Nature in Eusebius of Caesarea', *Church History* 42 (1973), 165–82; C. J. Eppling, 'A Study of the Patristic Doctrine of Free Will', Master's thesis, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Wake Forest, North Carolina, 2009. This is not exclusively a problem for early Christian authors—similar concerns have been raised about scholarship on ideas of agency in Plotinus: E. Eliasson, *The Notion of* That Which Depends On Us *in Plotinus and Its Background* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 2.

[6] M. Frede, *A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought*, ed. A. A. Long (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 2. Moreover, as Frede pointed out, the concept of 'free will' is dependent on having an understanding not only of 'will', but also of 'freedom', and 'a notion of a will is not necessarily a notion of a will which is free': *A Free Will*, 7. See also: R. Sorabji, 'The Concept of the Will from Plato

result, scholars have pointed out that early Greek philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and the early Stoics make no reference to a concept of free will,[7] and have tried instead to determine when the notion was first articulated, by tracing its gradual development through the debates of classical, Hellenistic, and early Christian philosophy.[8] Although some have detected elements of a notion of will as early as the Stoic Epictetus in the second century CE,[9] others feel we must wait until Augustine in the late fourth and early fifth century to find the concept expressed in anything even approaching its modern form.[10] Moreover, even if Augustine found a means of expressing an idea of 'free will' in Latin, it does not necessarily follow that the concept was similarly available in Greek,[11] and some scholars have indeed suggested that it was not until Maximus the Confessor in the seventh century that a standard Greek term for will (θέλησις) appeared.[12] Wherever one chooses to locate the origin of the concept of 'free will', however, the problem with applying the term to a writer like Eusebius is clear. Since 'free will' is not a fixed, universal notion, but rather a shifting, invented concept, gradually changing and developing over time, applying it to Eusebius' works risks imposing an alien, anachronistic idea on his thought.

The difficulty with using the concept of free will to approach ancient thought is further exacerbated by considerable terminological confusion. A wide range of Greek words and phrases, including,

to Maximus the Confessor', in T. Pink and M. W. F. Stone, eds., *The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day* (London: Routledge, 2004), 6.

[7] Frede, *A Free Will*, 19; Bobzien, 'Stoic Conceptions of Freedom', 73.

[8] See, in particular: Frede, *A Free Will*; A. Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); Sorabji, 'The Concept of the Will'.

[9] Frede, *A Free Will*, 46.

[10] Sorabji, *Emotion*, 319. Sorabji does, however, trace the gradual development of the notion back much further. See also: Sorabji, 'The Concept of the Will', 6. Kahn, by contrast, suggests that Augustine only 'begins but does not complete the task of working out a Christian theory of will': C. H. Kahn, 'Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine', in J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long, eds., *The Question of 'Eclecticism': Studies in Later Greek Philosophy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 237.

[11] As Dihle noted: *Theory of Will*, 143.

[12] J. D. Madden, 'The Authenticity of Early Definitions of Will (*thelesis*)', in F. Heinzer and C. Schonnorn, eds., *Maximus Confessor: Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2–5 Septembre 1980* (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1982), 61–2.

among others, ἡ προαίρεσις, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, ἡ βούλησις, and ἡ θέλησις, have all been translated as 'will' or 'free will', yet it is clear that such a variety of expressions must each have had particular connotations, if not entirely different meanings, which might easily be lost in haphazard translation.[13] Scholars who try to find just one word for 'free will' therefore face falling into the trap of implying that there was one set concept which people would generally have understood by that particular word. The fact that scholars have come to completely different conclusions about the appropriate Greek term for 'free will' serves only to illustrate the confusion which might arise from such an approach.[14] Thus, rather than trying to find an expression for 'free will' in Eusebius' works, and thereby perhaps distorting his ideas, it will be far more helpful to try to consider his thought on its own terms, by paying careful attention to the vocabulary which Eusebius actually employed. Since the purpose of this chapter is not to determine how far Eusebius may have shared a modern notion of free will—if such a notion even exists[15]—but rather to gain greater insight into his understanding of human responsibility and morality, both the concept and the terminology of 'free will' will be best avoided here.[16]

However, acknowledging that it can be inappropriate to apply the concept of 'free will' to ancient writers does not mean denying that these writers were interested in questions of moral responsibility and the attribution of praise and blame, which might, to a modern reader, seem to fall within the scope of a 'free will problem'.[17] Michael Frede

[13] As Frede noted: *A Free Will*, 102. Eliasson's work on Plotinus similarly highlights the need to 'avoid translating different terms relating to different issues by one and the same modern term': That Which Depends On Us, 15.

[14] For instance, Kahn considered *to autexousion* to be the best Greek 'technical expression for free will', yet, according to Frede, 'the standard Greek term for the will is *prohairesis*': Kahn, 'Discovering the Will', 250; Frede, *A Free Will*, 8.

[15] As Kahn has noted, even today 'there is no *single* concept designated by *the will*': 'Discovering the Will', 235. See also: Frede, *A Free Will*, 5; T. Pink and M. W. F. Stone, 'Introduction', in Pink and Stone, eds., *The Will and Human Action*, 1; Sorabji, 'The Concept of the Will', 7.

[16] Compare: Eliasson, That Which Depends On Us, which similarly rejects the unhelpful terminology of 'free will' for the study of τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν in Plotinus.

[17] Huby identified two historical 'free will problems': firstly the relationship between free will and predestination, which she saw as 'mainly theological', and secondly, the relationship between free will and determinism, which might raise questions of human moral responsibility: P. Huby, 'The First Discovery of the Freewill Problem', *Philosophy* 42 (1967), 353.

insisted on the importance of distinguishing between 'the belief in a free will and the ordinary belief that at least sometimes we are responsible for what we are doing', arguing that the latter belief could exist without the former.[18] Certainly when we look at the works of ancient and early Christian authors, we find that many of them were greatly exercised by issues of moral responsibility and accountability.[19] Particularly from the second century CE onwards, the desire of philosophers of other schools to oppose what they saw as the universal determinism of the Stoic doctrine of fate (εἱμαρμένη) brought to the fore the question of the relationship between external forces and human freedom of action.[20] Although, as C. Stough has pointed out, the Stoic position was frequently misrepresented, or misunderstood by its critics, the Stoic notion of fate appeared, to many of its opponents, to undermine the basis of morality and systems of justice.[21] The Aristotelian commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias, in the second century CE, criticized the deterministic notion of fate partly on the grounds that the idea 'offers nothing apart from an advocate for those who are bad'.[22] For Alexander, maintaining human freedom of action was a matter of considerable ethical importance.

However, Robert Wilken has suggested that, while the issue of human freedom of action was seen by classical philosophers primarily as a matter of ethics, for early Christians it became, above all, a 'theological problem'.[23] Although this distinction is rather too stark, since ethical considerations remained central to many early Christian

[18] Frede, *A Free Will*, 4.

[19] Dihle, *Theory of Will*, 107–13. For example: Orig. *de Princ*. 3.1.1–6; Tatian, *Orat.* 7; Justin, *1 Apol*. 43.7–8; Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogue*, 1.8.69.1; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato*, 19.190.1–5.

[20] S. Bobzien, 'The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free Will Problem', *Phronesis* 43 (1998), 173–5. On non-Christian critiques of the Stoic doctrine of fate, see Frede, *A Free Will*, 89–101.

[21] C. Stough, 'Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility', in J. M. Rist, ed., *The Stoics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 207. Indeed, the Stoics themselves maintained that their determinist system was entirely compatible with a belief in human moral responsibility, and Frede has even suggested that the Stoic approach to this issue provided the basis for Christian ideas about free will: *A Free Will*, 89.

[22] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato*, 16.187.27–8.

[23] R. L. Wilken, 'Free Choice and the Divine Will in Greek Christian Commentaries on Paul', in W. S. Babcock, ed., *Paul and the Legacies of Paul* (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1990), 127.

discussions of the issue,[24] including those of Eusebius,[25] it is nevertheless true that Christians faced the additional problem of theodicy when addressing this question. For Christians, the need to reconcile their belief in a benevolent divine providence with undeniable examples of human wickedness and suffering in the world made questions of the origin of evil and human responsibility matters of pressing theological significance.[26] Moreover, as a result of their belief in divine providence, early Christians also found themselves accused of determinism by their opponents.[27] The *Octavius* of Minucius Felix records the accusation that Christians simply replaced a belief in fate with a belief in God.[28] This was immediately followed by the further criticism that, as a result, the notion of a final judgement was inherently unjust, since it would punish people for actions over which they had no control.[29] Perhaps partly in order to rebut such accusations, many early Christian writers argued strongly against a determinist view of the universe.[30] Opposing the idea of 'fated necessity' (εἱμαρμένης ἀναγκην), Justin Martyr argued instead that people possessed 'free choice' (ἐλευθέρᾳ προαιρέσει) over their actions.[31] The only kind of 'fate' which Justin was prepared to admit was that both the good and the wicked would inevitably receive the reward or punishment which their actions merited.[32] Tatian likewise argued that people possessed freedom of action, which allowed for the distribution of both praise and blame.[33] For both Tatian and Justin, defending human freedom of action was linked both to a defence of divine justice and simultaneously to the maintenance of a system of ethics. Human freedom and moral responsibility were thus subjects of discussion for both Christian and non-Christian writers in the centuries before Eusebius was writing, and were approached both from an ethical and a theological standpoint.

[24] See, for example: Justin, *1 Apol.* 43.1–5; Orig. *de Princ.* 3.1.5–6; Tatian, *Orat.* 7.

[25] See, for example: *CH* 45.1–2.

[26] S. Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 411. Bobzien notes that Platonists also faced a similar problem within their philosophical system, unlike Stoics and Peripatetics, whose systems were 'internally coherent' and who thus avoided this particular 'free will problem', 411.

[27] Wilken, 'Free Choice and Divine Will', 126.

[28] Min. Felix, *Oct.* 11.6, cited in Wilken, 'Free Choice and Divine Will', 126.

[29] Min. Felix, *Oct.* 11.6.

[30] Wilken, 'Free Choice and Divine Will', 126.

[31] Justin, *1 Apol.* 43.1–4. Compare: *2 Apol.* 6 (7).4–5, in which Justin explicitly names the Stoics as his opponents.

[32] Justin, *1 Apol.* 43.7.

[33] Tatian, *Orat.* 7.

Eusebius was clearly both aware of, and deeply engaged by, these debates, and his most extensive discussions of the issue of human responsibility, which are to be found in book 6 of the *PE*, occur as part of a broader refutation of a determinist doctrine of fate or necessity.[34] Eusebius' arguments contain echoes of non-Christian as well as Christian approaches to the topic. He cites Alexander of Aphrodisias' treatise at length in the *PE*,[35] while his claim that a determinist view of fate or necessity would remove all basis for praise and blame is also reminiscent of the arguments of Tatian and Justin.[36] For a writer like Eusebius, who frequently uses examples of divine punishment and reward as evidence of the power of the Christian God, maintaining the justice of such divine interventions would have been of paramount importance. Yet it is also clear from his suggestion that belief in an all-powerful fate would lead to indolence and undermine the need for such valuable pursuits as philosophy and piety, that this was not only a question of theodicy for Eusebius.[37] In his view, asserting human responsibility over external necessity or compulsion was also a matter of practical ethics and earthly justice.

As a result, it is hardly surprising that Eusebius should argue so strongly in favour of human responsibility in works such as the *PE*. However, it is essential to bear in mind the broader context of this debate when examining Eusebius' statements in this work. The polemical nature of these sections provides little scope for a nuanced or complex exposition of his views on human freedom of action. Instead, we find mainly forthright assertions of the responsibility of rational creatures for their behaviour.[38] Although it is, of course, undeniable that Eusebius consistently sought to maintain human responsibility, looking beyond these sections of the *PE* to the examples of human virtue and vice that appear in some of his more historical works suggests that there was rather more to his views than his straightforward assertions of human responsibility might imply.

At *VC* 3.26.1, for instance, Eusebius states that 'at one time impious men, or rather, the whole race of demons through them, eagerly

[34] Particularly *PE* 6.6, which is headed: 'Refutation of the argument concerning fate'. Chapters 45–8 of the *CH* also discuss questions of human responsibility.

[35] *PE* 6.9, paraphrasing Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato*, 3.166.22–5.169.6, 6.170.12–18, 6.171.12–16, 8.172.25–173.10, 8.174.20–5, 9.176.13, 12.180.29–181.5, 18.188.17–19.189.12.

[36] *CH* 45.1–2. [37] *CH* 48.1; *PE* 6.6.5–6, 6.6.17.

[38] For example: *CH* 48.1; *PE* 6.6.20–1, 6.6.72.

brought about the transmission to darkness and a forgotten place' of Christ's tomb. Similarly, in the *HE*, Eusebius suggests that accusations of magical practices levelled against Christians were ultimately the work of the devil, asserting that 'it was through the activity of the devil that such magicians took on the name of the Christians to slander zealously the great mystery of piety with magic and, through these means, to disparage the doctrines of the church'.[39] In both of these cases, Eusebius appears to suggest that responsibility for the wicked act in question might not lie exclusively with the human beings who carried it out. These examples bring the question of the relationship between personal responsibility and external influence intriguingly to the fore. Examining such cases of interaction between humans and demons can therefore help to shed more light on Eusebius' understanding of human moral responsibility, by showing if, where, and how Eusebius set any limits to human responsibility.

RESPONSIBILITY AND *ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ*

Clearly it is unhelpful, if not inappropriate, to apply the concept of 'free will' to Eusebius' thought. Rather than restricting our discussion of Eusebius' views by imposing on his works a concept which there is no evidence to suggest he possessed, it will be more helpful to consider what Eusebius may have meant by some of the terms he did use. Although translators of his works have, in the past, turned a range of words and phrases, such as *τὸ αὐτεξούσιον*, *ἡ προαίρεσις*, and *τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, into 'free will',[40] a careful examination of Eusebius' use of

[39] *HE* 3.26.4. The fact that one of the activities of these magicians was 'to slander' (*διαβαλεῖν*) the church further connects them and their actions to the devil, since the Greek word for the devil (*διάβολος*) was derived from the verb *διαβάλλω*. On the etymology of this word, see: Riley, 'Devil', 463. Here, Eusebius is picking up on an idea expressed by Justin, who had suggested that Menander was driven to practise magical arts by demons. Eusebius cites the relevant passage of Justin (*1 Apol.* 26) at *HE* 3.26.3.

[40] Gifford's translation of the *PE* is particularly generous in its use of 'free will', using it to translate a variety of expressions. *The Preparation for the Gospel*, trans. with intro. E. H. Gifford, 2 vols. (1903; repr. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981): *προαιρετικὴν* (*PE* 5.9.12), i.214; *τὸ ἐφ' ἡμιν* (*PE* 6.6.29), i.265; *τὸ αὐθεκούσιον* (*PE* 6.6.33), i.265; *τὸ τῆς ἐφ' ἡμῖν προαιρέσεως* (*PE* 6.6.34), i.266; *προαιρέσεως ἐλευθέρας* (*PE* 6.6.72), i.274. See also: *The Proof of the Gospel*, trans. W. J. Ferrar (1920; repr. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981): *τῆς αὐθεκουσίου . . . αἱρεσεως* (*DE* 4.1.4),

these terms reveals the most important concept in his understanding of moral responsibility to be προαίρεσις, which might loosely be translated 'deliberate choice'. Frequency of appearance alone suggests that, of these terms, προαίρεσις was the most significant for Eusebius. Eusebius uses forms of the word προαίρεσις almost forty times in the *PE* alone, with a further eighteen appearances in quotations. By contrast, forms of αὐτεξούσιος and αὐθεκούσιος appear only thirty-one times in total in the *PE*, of which ten are in quotations.[41] Setting aside quotations, then, in the *PE* Eusebius uses προαίρεσις almost twice as much as αὐτεξούσιος and αὐθεκούσιος combined. In Eusebius' view it was προαίρεσις, the capacity for people to choose between right and wrong, which allowed praise and blame to be assigned. As a result, discovering what Eusebius considered the conditions of προαίρεσις to be is essential to understanding how and where he felt moral responsibility could be attributed.

It is in book 6 of the *PE* that we find Eusebius' clearest statements of the significance of προαίρεσις—for him, it is προαίρεσις that leads a person into either virtue or vice. At *PE* 6.6.48, Eusebius writes that, by God's gift, people are ultimately responsible for themselves, describing humankind as 'free and self-ruling' (ἐλευθέρα καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ). He does not suggest, however, that this responsibility is without limit. Rather, Eusebius identifies three types of causation—there are 'things which are up to us' (τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν), things which occur 'according to nature' (κατὰ φύσιν), and things which are 'accidental' (κατὰ συμβεβηκός).[42] It is these 'things which are up to us' that most concern Eusebius in this passage. He dismisses the idea that evil stems either from nature or from accidental events, which leaves it as one of those 'things which are up to us'. Moreover, Eusebius makes it clear that these 'things which are up to us' are governed by προαίρεσις, arguing that evil results only from 'the self-chosen (αὐτοπροαιρέτῳ) movement of the soul'.[43] This is reinforced a few lines later, when Eusebius

i.163; τῇ αὐτεξουσιότητι (*DE* 4.6.8), i.175; Philostratus, *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana, The Epistles of Apollonius and the Treatise of Eusebius*, ed. and trans. F. C. Conybeare, LCL (London: Heinemann, 1912): αὐτοκρατορικὸν (*CH* 6.4), 501.

[41] *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* search for προαιρε–, αὐτεξουσ–, and αὐθεκουσ–.

[42] *PE* 6.6.46.

[43] *PE* 6.6.47. The term αὐτοπροαιρετός is unusual. Although not invented by Eusebius, it does appear far more frequently in his works than in the surviving texts of earlier writers. A *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* search for αὐτοπροαιρετ- revealed that it appears in earlier texts such as the *Historia Alexandri Magni* and Pseudo-Plutarch,

remarks that wickedness 'is a work of choice (προαιρέσεως) but not of nature'.[44] Similar arguments are made in the *CH*, which, if it is indeed a work of Eusebius, demonstrates a consistent determination to defend human moral responsibility across multiple apologetic works. In the *CH*, the human soul is described as 'self-governor and judge, leader and lord of itself'.[45] Likewise, the 'things which are up to us' are again linked firmly to προαίρεσις, being defined as 'those things which happen according to choice (προαίρεσίν) and action'.[46]

In associating προαίρεσις with that which is 'up to us', Eusebius was conforming to a long philosophical tradition reaching back to Aristotle.[47] Aristotle had argued that, while we might wish (βούλησις) for impossible things,[48] choice (προαίρεσις) was not concerned with things that were impossible (τῶν ἀδυνάτων).[49] As a result, Aristotle concludes that 'it seems that προαίρεσις is about the things which are up to us (τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν)'.[50] Moreover, for Aristotle, προαίρεσις was closely connected with the attainment of virtue.[51] Similarly, the *CH* makes it clear that the things which are 'up to us' include matters of virtue and vice, asserting that 'out of the things which are up to us, each person acquires by choice itself an impulse towards one or the other of virtue or wickedness'.[52] For Eusebius, as for Aristotle, the concept of προαίρεσις was inseparable from questions of virtue and vice, and thus from moral responsibility. People were, in his view, responsible for the things that were in their power to control, including the choice between good and bad.

Vitae Homeri, as well as twice in Origen's *Exhortatio ad martyrium* and once in his *Scholia in Matthaeum*. Eusebius uses the term far more often than these earlier writers—the same *TLG* search returned eight results for Eusebius' works. This surely reflects the importance of προαίρεσις to Eusebius' thought. Slightly later, this term appears to have been popular with Cyril of Jerusalem, as it appears several times in his *Catecheses ad illuminandos*.

[44] *PE* 6.6.51. In this, Eusebius was echoing the opinion of Origen, who had similarly blamed προαίρεσις rather than nature for the generation of evil: Origen, *Commentary on Matthew* 10.11.38–40.

[45] *CH* 47.1. [46] *CH* 47.2.

[47] See: Frede, *A Free Will*, 19–30, on the significance of choice in Aristotle. Προαίρεσις also occupied a particularly prominent place in the thought of the second-century CE Stoic Epictetus, who also associated it with τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and the issue of responsibility: Sorabji, *Emotion*, 332–3, citing Epictetus, *Discourses*, 1.22.10.

[48] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3, 1111b23–4.

[49] Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 3, 1111b21–2.

[50] Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 3, 1111b30–1. See also: Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 3, 1113a9–12.

[51] Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 3, 1111b6. [52] *CH* 47.2.

The significance of προαίρεσις in determining whether a person was virtuous or wicked is evident in Eusebius' description of the demons' initial fall from heaven in the *PE*. Here, as we have seen, the key distinction drawn between the demons and their angelic counterparts is one of προαίρεσις. Demons and angels should not, in Eusebius' view, bear the same name as each other—even though ontologically they are essentially the same—primarily because they are different 'in their choice' (τὴν προαίρεσιν).[53] It is, above all, their προαίρεσις of good or evil that defines each of these groups. Thus, it seems that Eusebius felt προαίρεσις to lie at the heart of the responsibility not just of humans, but of all rational creatures, be they human, angelic, or demonic.[54] This means not only that Eusebius' discussions of demonic responsibility can help to shed light on his views of the responsibility of other rational beings, but also that any situation in which the προαίρεσεις of different rational creatures interact to produce either vice or virtue must raise questions about where he believed moral responsibility principally to lie.

Crucially, Eusebius suggests that it was, above all, their προαίρεσις that made people vulnerable to the attacks of demons. The devil, Eusebius informs us, rapidly discovered that people could 'fall into evil with ease from their own thoughts through their self-determined choice (προαίρεσιν)'.[55] This is in spite of the fact that Eusebius also held that the soul—the home of προαίρεσις—was by nature inclined to follow a virtuous path.[56] Such a view would surely have meant that Eusebius considered any person who went against this natural inclination to be even more deserving of condemnation.[57] Nevertheless, for Eusebius it was this very ability of the soul to choose the worse as well as the better path that made possible the attribution of either praise or blame, as appropriate.[58] Προαίρεσις was therefore at the heart of Eusebius' ethical thought; it also served an important role in his theodicy, helping to absolve God of responsibility for evil. By declaring that 'the source of wickedness' (τῆς κακίας πηγή) is to be found 'only in the self-chosen movement of the soul' (ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς

[53] *PE* 4.5.5.

[54] It is essential to remember that, in spite of the heavy emphasis which Eusebius placed on the irrationality of demonic behaviour, he nevertheless considered them to be rational creatures: *PE* 13.15.6.

[55] *DE* 4.9.5. Conversely, in the *De eccl. theol.*, Eusebius suggests that obedience to God also comes ἐξ αὐθεκουσίου προαιρέσως: 3.15.5.3.

[56] *PE* 6.6.47–9. [57] *PE* 6.6.51. [58] *PE* 6.6.49.

αὐτοπροαιρέτῳ κινήσει), Eusebius is able to pin the blame for evil on God's creatures, rather than on God himself.[59] In the light of this, it would be difficult to overstate the significance of προαίρεσις in Eusebius' thought. For him, it was what determined virtue or vice, praise or blame and, thus, ultimately, reward or punishment.

Προαίρεσις, however, was not a capacity shared by the whole of creation; rather, Eusebius held that it was exclusive to rational beings and linked it repeatedly to the reasoning powers of the soul. For Eusebius, the human soul was characterized above all by its rationality, which was not only a gift from God, but also the means by which humankind could be said to bear the image of God.[60] By locating προαίρεσις within the soul, Eusebius was therefore associating it closely with rationality. Indeed, Eusebius went so far as to combine 'reason (λογισμὸν) and the choice (προαίρεσιν) which is up to us', declaring them to be 'by nature of the soul'.[61] Likewise in the *Contra Hieroclem* (*CH*), those 'things not up to us' (τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν)—things unconnected with προαίρεσις—are said to be 'without soul and irrational' (ἄψυχά τε ὄντα καὶ ἄλογα).[62]

This sense that rationality was a key condition of προαίρεσις for Eusebius is further strengthened by the striking distinction which he draws between the soul and the human body, even describing them at one point as 'opposites' (ἐναντίων).[63] Although Eusebius explicitly denies that the material body is evil,[64] he presents it as distinctly inferior to the soul. Where the soul is rational and immortal, the body is irrational and subject to death and decay.[65] When, in the *CH*, προαίρεσις and the 'things which are up to us' are connected to the soul, the 'things not up to us' are said to be those which 'concern the body and external things' (περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτός).[66] The irrational body thus lies outside the realm of rational προαίρεσις. Indeed, Eusebius even suggests that it might be necessary for προαίρεσις, characterized by reason, to act directly counter to the body, arguing that '*προαίρεσις*, persuaded by wise arguments ... strikes away the nature of the body'.[67] This opposition between προαίρεσις and the irrational body reinforces the idea that rationality

[59] *PE* 6.6.47.
[60] For example: *PE* 3.10.6. See also: *PE* 7.4.3; 7.10.9; 13.3.44, and the discussion in Chapter 3.
[61] *PE* 6.6.29. [62] *CH* 47.2. [63] *PE* 6.6.26. [64] *PE* 6.6.47.
[65] *PE* 6.6.26. [66] *CH* 47.2. [67] *PE* 6.6.35.

was central to Eusebius' understanding of προαίρεσις and thus of responsibility. Yet in associating προαίρεσις so closely with the capacity for reasoning, Eusebius leaves open the question of where responsibility might lie in cases where rationality is lacking.

A second key condition of προαίρεσις for Eusebius was that it should be free and unconstrained.[68] Eusebius describes humankind's 'more divine part' (τῇ θειοτέρᾳ μοίρᾳ)—the soul, and home of προαίρεσις—as possessing its 'own freedom' (τὴν οἰκείαν ἐλευθερίαν).[69] This is in contrast to the 'nature of the body' (φύσει σώματος) to which it seems people are enslaved. Eusebius suggests that people must 'be slaves to' (δουλεῦον) the body, and further describes people as 'both slave and free' (καὶ δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐλεύθερον) in relation to their body and soul respectively.[70] For Eusebius, it seems that this human freedom consisted of two main kinds: freedom *from* external constraint, and freedom *to* make an alternative choice. The idea that προαίρεσις must be free from external constraint is emphasized by the contrast which Eusebius draws between προαίρεσις and 'external necessity' (τῆς ἔξωθεν ἀνάγκης).[71] For him, the two stood in opposition to each other, as acting under the constraint of necessity or fate would, in his view, remove any grounds for praise or blame.[72]

This is further reflected in Eusebius' frequent use of words such as αὐτεξούσιος, αὐθεκούσιος, and ἐλεύθερος to describe either προαίρεσις, or related words for choice, such as αἵρεσις.[73] At *DE* 4.1.4, for instance, Eusebius asserts that God created 'the souls of men supplied by nature with unconstrained freedom (ἐλεύθερον) of self-determined choice (τῆς αὐθεκουσίου αἱρεσεως) between the good and the opposite'. Although in modern translations of Christian authors, including Eusebius, the term αὐτεξούσιος is sometimes rendered as 'free will',[74] its original meaning among Greek philosophers was simply 'in one's

[68] For example, see: *CH* 47.2. [69] *PE* 6.6.26. [70] *PE* 6.6.26.
[71] *PE* 6.6.11. See also: *PE* 5.5.13. [72] *PE* 6.6.5–6.
[73] For example: *PE* 6.6.41, 6.6.63, 6.6.72, 7.18.8; *HE* 10.4.57; *DE* 4.1.4, 4.9.5, 4.10.1; *De eccl. theol.* 3.15.
[74] See, for example: Origen, *Traité des principes*, vol. iii, ed. and trans. H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti, Sources Chrétiennes 268 (Paris: Éditions du cerf, 1980), 19 (Orig. *de Princ.* 3.1.1); *The Proof of the Gospel*, trans. W. J. Ferrar, i.175 (*DE* 4.6.8); Clement of Alexandria, *Les Stromates: Stromate V*, vol. 1, ed. with intro. A. Le Boulluec and trans. P. Voulet, Sources Chrétiennes 278 (Paris: Éditions du cerf, 1981), 29 (Clem. *Stro.* 5.1.3.2), 163 (Clem. *Stro.* 5.13.83.1). See also the definitions offered in *PGL, s.v.* αὐτεξούσιος, αὐτεξουσίως.

own power'.[75] This meaning reflects the connection between προαίρεσις and τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, those 'things which are up to us', further reinforcing the sense that προαίρεσις in Eusebius is possible only for things lying within a person's control, and thus must be free from external compulsion. For Eusebius, what this freedom from external constraint means, it seems, is that people should have the opportunity to make an alternative choice. Eusebius argues that because of 'self-determined freedom' (τῆς αὐτεξουσίου ἐλευθερίας) it is possible to praise someone for their 'choice of the better' (τὴν τῶν κρειττόνων αἵρεσιν), since they also possess the freedom to choose 'the opposite' (τὴν ἐναντίαν).[76] Thus, in Eusebius' view, προαίρεσις, and consequently moral responsibility, are dependent not only on a person's rationality, but also on their freedom to choose between at least two alternative courses of action.

Yet, while Eusebius believed freedom to be a necessary condition of προαίρεσις, he also suggests that this freedom could, at times, be compromised or challenged. One source of these challenges was the human body, subject as it was to passions and desires. This, however, was not the main challenge, for Eusebius argues that it ought to be possible for προαίρεσις to overcome the weaknesses of the body.[77] More intriguing is Eusebius' suggestion that a person's προαίρεσις might be influenced, for better or worse, by other, external προαίρεσεις. Eusebius argues that, while the body is affected by external needs and desires,

> so sometimes also προαίρεσις, troubled by numberless external προαίρεσεις, is persuaded by its self-determined opinion to deliver itself up to external things and sometimes it ends up better and sometimes worse. For just as being with the wicked makes one bad, so again on the other hand the company of the good makes for improvement.[78]

[75] See: Frede, *A Free Will*, 75; Kahn, 'Discovering the Will', 250.

[76] *PE* 6.6.49. See also: *PE* 6.6.51; *DE* 4.1.4. This notion that προαίρεσις must be a choice of alternatives was a comparatively recent development. As Frede has shown, it is found in Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De fato*, in which praise and blame are connected with the ability to choose the better or worse of two options (Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato*, 12; Frede, *A Free Will*, 100), but for earlier philosophers, such as Aristotle, this had not necessarily been the case. Frede suggests that 'the choice one makes in Aristotle is not, at least necessarily, a choice between doing X and not doing X . . . It is a matter of choosing to do X, or failing to choose to do X, such that X does not get done': Frede, *A Free Will*, 28–9.

[77] *PE* 6.6.34–5.

[78] *PE* 6.6.42.

In the past, this passage has been read as referring simply to the influence of 'a general and pervasive social pressure'.[79] However, it is unlikely, given Eusebius' strong belief in the threat posed by demons, that he would have been thinking solely of other human προαίρεσεις here. Indeed, in the *LC*, Eusebius suggests that while human enemies direct their attacks against the body, invisible, spiritual enemies focus their attention on attacking the invisible soul, where προαίρεσις was located.[80] This suggests that we should see this reference to external προαίρεσεις as referring as much to spiritual as to other human προαίρεσεις. It therefore seems that, in Eusebius' view, it was possible for demons to compromise the independence of human προαίρεσις, raising the question of where responsibility for wickedness might lie in such cases.

DEMONIC INFLUENCE

For Eusebius, then, any discussion of the issue of responsibility must be approached primarily in terms of προαίρεσις. It was προαίρεσις—a choice which must be both free and made by a rational being—that in his view determined between virtue and vice, and thus whether a person deserved punishment or reward. Yet this close association between προαίρεσις, rationality, and freedom leads inevitably to questions about how and if Eusebius believed responsibility should be assigned in situations where one, or both, of the conditions of προαίρεσις were not met—in other words, where either rationality or freedom was compromised. This issue is of particular relevance for Eusebius' discussions of the relationship between demons and humans, since he so often presents those humans he believed to be in the power of demons as irrational,[81] and even, at times, as enslaved to demons.[82] We must therefore ask whether Eusebius believed that

[79] Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 82, and compare: Chesnut, 'Fate, Fortune, Free Will and Nature', 178. See also Berkhoff, who suggested, presumably on the basis of this passage, that Eusebius believed a person's free action could be compromised by 'the free will of other people' ('durch den freien Willen anderer Menschen'): *Die Theologie*, 104.

[80] *LC* 7.1.

[81] For example: *HE* 7.31.1, 10.8.9–10; *VC* 1.45.2–3; *LC* 7.7, 9.13; *Theoph.* 1.78, 2.1; *PE* 4.17.3.

[82] For example: *LC* 5.3; *PE* 4.17.4; *DE* 4.9.8; *VC* 1.13.3.

this demonic influence in any way lessened people's responsibility for their sins.

In spite of Eusebius' insistence in the *PE* that people must bear responsibility for their own actions, there is nevertheless some suggestion in his other works that those acting at the instigation of demons might merit sympathy as much as condemnation. In the *VC*, Eusebius suggests that Constantine's response to the behaviour of schismatic congregations in Africa—congregations which Eusebius believed to lie under demonic influence[83]—was less one of anger than of pity, reporting that the emperor 'grieved excessively (ὑπεραλγοῦντα) at the senselessness of the mentally injured'.[84] Similarly, Eusebius claims that Constantine believed the Donatists 'should be pitied rather than chastised', because they were 'either entirely deranged or stung into madness by the wicked demon'.[85] The suggestion seems to be that, deprived of their rationality by demons, the human agents in this case were no longer responsible for their crimes.

However, in spite of Eusebius' attempts in the *VC* to tie Constantine's religious views to his own, there are several hints in this work that the two were not in complete agreement on theological matters.[86] In particular, Eusebius appears to have felt that Constantine was too lenient in the standards of piety and ethical behaviour required of new Christian converts. At *VC* 4.54.2–3, for instance, Eusebius comes closer than at almost any other point in the *VC* to criticizing Constantine directly. Here, Eusebius refers to people who 'crept into the church and falsely assumed the name of Christians',[87] clearly describing those who had converted since Christianity had found imperial favour. He suggests, however, that Constantine was too trusting of these people's 'outer form' (τῷ σχήματι),[88] implying that he thought Constantine ought to have required more of those wishing to convert than simple profession of the Christian name. This apparent

[83] Eusebius repeatedly suggests in the *VC* that divisions within the church, including the Donatist schism, were the work either of a 'wicked demon' or of 'envy', which, as we have seen, often characterized demonic activity in Eusebius' works: *VC* 1.45.2–3, 2.61.3–4, 3.4.1, 3.59.1–2.

[84] *VC* 3.4.1.

[85] *VC* 1.45.3. Compare: *HE* 7.17.1, in which the Christian senator Astyrius is reported to have felt pity for the non-Christian citizens of Caesarea Philippi when he observed one of their festivals, since he believed that they were deluded and under the influence of demons.

[86] As Drake has shown: 'What Eusebius Knew', 34–5.

[87] *VC* 4.54.2.

[88] *VC* 4.54.3.

discrepancy between the attitudes of Eusebius and Constantine also illustrates that, in his concern with virtue and justice, Eusebius was not thinking only on a cosmic scale, but was motivated by the practical challenges facing the church as it greeted a new wave of converts. It thus seems that Eusebius and Constantine may have differed in where they chose to set the parameters of virtue and vice. Moreover, Eusebius' use of the verb ὑπεραλγύνω at *VC* 3.4.1, with its suggestion of excessive grief, implies that he believed the emperor to have taken his sympathy rather too far. We should therefore be cautious about reading these references to Constantine's reaction as representative of Eusebius' own views. Nevertheless, it does suggest that there was more than one acceptable response to the issue of human transgression in this period.

The idea that those committing wicked acts might not be entirely culpable for their actions, but might instead merit sympathy did have some precedent in earlier Greek thought. In the *Timaeus*, Plato had made the striking claim that it was wrong to blame the wicked for their actions,[89] since wickedness arose, not voluntarily, but rather 'the one who is bad becomes bad through some wicked habit of the body and uneducated rearing'.[90] Thus wickedness might be seen to have, in part, a physical cause, but also to arise from a failure of education—that is, arguably, from unsuitable external influence. In consequence, Plato suggests that 'the parents are always more responsible than the children, and the ones doing the educating more than those educated'.[91] In other words, it seems that Plato is suggesting that those who encourage, or at least fail to check, wickedness in others are more at fault than those actually committing wicked deeds. At the very least, he is challenging the view that a wicked person is entirely responsible for their crimes.

Although such a view was certainly not representative of Greek philosophy more broadly, and was not even much repeated in Platonic thought, Plato's further claim in the *Timaeus* that 'no one does wrong voluntarily' was much more widely shared.[92] Plato made

[89] See: C. Gill, 'The Body's Fault? Plato's *Timaeus* on Psychic Illness', in M. R. Wright, ed., *Reason and Necessity: Essays on Plato's Timaeus* (London: Duckworth, 2000), 59–84, discussing Plat. *Tim.* 86b–87b.

[90] Plat. *Tim.* 86e. [91] Plat. *Tim.* 87b.

[92] Gill, 'The Body's Fault?', 61–2; Plat. *Tim.* 86d.

similar statements throughout a range of his works,[93] and this view became characteristic of much Greek thinking about human action and responsibility.[94] In essence, this idea seems to have been that, since moral failings were as harmful to the wicked person as to others, such a person must be acting in ignorance of his or her true interests, and therefore involuntarily.[95] This person ought therefore to be pitied rather than blamed.[96] Although Eusebius does not directly quote this section of the *Timaeus*, the widespread currency of this idea in Greek thought makes it highly unlikely that he would have been unaware of it. Indeed, the notion that wickedness must be involuntary posed considerable problems for early Christian writers who, like Eusebius, were also steeped in the traditions of Greek philosophy, since it was flatly contradicted by scripture.[97] As a result, the question of how human sin might occur was a pressing one for Christian writers. Moreover, it is clear that, within the philosophical tradition, outright condemnation was far from being the only possible reaction to those perceived to be acting in an immoral way.

It is significant, therefore, that the emphasis throughout Eusebius' works remains very heavily on the punishment of wrongdoers, including those he presents as acting at the instigation of demons. For instance, Eusebius suggests in the *VC* and *De laudibus Constantini* (*LC*) that those of Constantine's imperial predecessors who persecuted Christians were in some way enslaved to demons,[98] surely implying that they must lack the freedom necessary for προαίρεσις. Similarly, he frequently presents these figures, and others he felt to be in the power of demons, as acting irrationally, or as in the grip of a form of madness,[99] again apparently denying them one of the necessary conditions of προαίρεσις. Yet this did not prevent him describing in graphic detail some of the punishments supposedly inflicted on these people as a consequence of their actions.[100] Since Eusebius held

[93] Gill, 'The Body's Fault?', 62, citing Plato, *Protagoras* 345d–e; *Gorgias*, 509e; *Laws* 731c, 734b.

[94] T. D. J. Chappell, *Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), 177.

[95] See: M. M. Mackenzie, *Plato on Punishment* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 141, 156.

[96] Mackenzie, *Plato on Punishment*, 156.

[97] Chappell, *Aristotle and Augustine*, 177–8.

[98] *LC* 5.3; *VC* 1.13.3.

[99] *HE* 7.31.1, 10.8.9–10; *VC* 1.45.2–3; *LC* 7.7, 9.13; *SC* 13.6; *Theoph.* 1.78, 2.1; *PE* 4.17.3.

[100] *VC* 1.57.2, 1.58.4–59.1; *HE* 8.16.3–5.

that these punishments came directly from God, he presumably felt them to be entirely justified, meaning that he must still have considered these people to be, to a large degree, responsible for their actions. It therefore seems that, for Eusebius, if not necessarily for Constantine, the suggestion of external demonic influence was not enough to remove responsibility from the human wrongdoer. We must therefore ask how Eusebius was able to reconcile his evident belief in the culpability of his human sinners with the suggestion that they were not acting entirely independently.

First, it is essential to note that, for Eusebius, the demonic threat to humankind did not consist solely or even primarily in the kind of demonic possession which he believed could be cured through exorcism. The Gospels famously contain various accounts of Jesus performing an exorcism to free a man from the control of demons.[101] Here the possessed man is not presented as being to blame for his predicament; he is not punished or held to account for his actions whilst under demonic control. Rather, on being released from the demons he appears to have returned to his true state, and his reaction is one of gratitude. This kind of demonic attack therefore involves causing immediate harm to a person, who is depicted as a victim of the demons. This idea that bad demons might bring physical harm in the form of sickness or natural disasters was also shared with non-Christians.[102] Eusebius was undoubtedly familiar with this view of demons, and we can find echoes of the Gospel exorcism stories in his own works.[103] Eusebius even suggests that exorcisms using Jesus' name to drive out demons continued to be effective in his own time.[104]

Similarly, in his discussion of oracles in the *DE*, Eusebius appears to suggest that some of those making oracular predictions may have fallen so completely under the influence of demons that they were 'like a corpse' (*οἷα νεκρὸν*) and were no longer capable of acting for themselves.[105] Such cases, however, are extremely unusual in Eusebius. Even in this example, Eusebius was making a point about the fallibility of pagan oracles, rather than about the nature of the demonic threat in general. Moreover, Eusebius suggests that the name

[101] Matt. 8:28–34; Mark 5:1–20; Luke 8:26–33.
[102] For example: Porph. *Abst.* 2.40.1.
[103] For example: *PE* 5.17.13; *CI* 95.18–19.
[104] *CH* 4.2. [105] *DE* 5.*Praef*.26.

of μαντεία given by the Greeks to this state indicates that it was 'like a madness' (ὥσπερ τινὰ μανίαν).[106] In the suggestion that μαντεία may be comparable to, but is not identical with μανία, it is clear that Eusebius believed that madness could also take other forms. Thus, when Eusebius describes those he believed to be in the power of demons as mad or irrational, he would not necessarily have had in mind the kind of complete demonic possession outlined here or in the Gospel exorcism stories. In fact, overall, Eusebius' concern about the demonic threat appears to have focused less on this kind of complete possession than on a more insidious form of attack, which, in leaving human responsibility intact, posed a threat not only to the present well-being of humankind, but also to its future salvation.

Eusebius rarely presents demons as in any way coercing their human victims. Demons, as we saw in the section 'Deceptive Demons' in Chapter 2,[107] are associated with trickery and deceit, but there is little suggestion of force—an omission which is of considerable importance in maintaining human responsibility. Demons are not shown as forcing people to worship them. Instead, they adopt subtler tactics, using their limited powers to create the false impression that they could predict the future, or cure diseases—thereby tricking people into worshipping them.[108] In fact, Eusebius is so far from suggesting that demons compel people to act that he even argues that some humans might at times be capable of coercing demons. Discussing the practice of magic, Eusebius claims that some demons may be 'dragged down and constrained by vulgar men'.[109] When this happens, the demons are said to be acting 'by force and necessity' (βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ).[110] Eusebius raises this point in order to argue that such demons are not truly divine,[111] rather than as part of a broader discussion of responsibility, and he therefore does not elaborate on how blame for any wickedness might be apportioned in such a case. Nonetheless, this suggests that, for Eusebius, in spite of humans' ontological inferiority, the demons did not necessarily have the power to coerce people into sin. Yet this should not be seen as decreasing the severity of the demonic threat; rather, it is surely their failure to compel humans that makes demons so dangerous. External compulsion would have removed one of the necessary conditions of προαίρεσις, and thus have removed human responsibility for sin.

[106] *DE* 5.*Praef*.26.
[107] See Chapter 2.
[108] *PE* 5.2.1; *VC* 3.56.1.
[109] *PE* 5.9.10.
[110] *PE* 5.9.13.
[111] *PE* 5.9.12.

With that human responsibility intact, on the other hand, demons could not only torment people in this life, but might also lead them to act in a manner that would jeopardize their ultimate salvation.

Rather than compelling people to serve them, it seems that Eusebius believed that demons acted on existing human weaknesses in order to lure people into sin. In the *PE*, Eusebius agrees with Porphyry's suggestion that wicked demons 'excite the desires of men' (*τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκκαίειν*), in order to encourage people to follow them.[112] Rather than implanting into people a wickedness which is not already there, it would seem that demons take advantage of natural human weaknesses, such as the inclination of the inferior body towards passion, in order to incite people to sin.[113] This idea is reflected in one of Eusebius' most detailed descriptions of how a soul might fall into the power of demons, where the emphasis is again very strongly on the role of passions in leading to wickedness. In his speech on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius describes how, 'by the envy and jealousy of the evil-loving demon, it [the soul] became of its self-determined choice (*ἐξ αὐτεξουσίου αἱρέσεως*) a lover of passion (*φιλοπαθὴς*) and a lover of evil'.[114] Immediately below, Eusebius shows how this fallen soul was then subjected to still more demonic attacks, as 'a destructive demon and savage mental beasts (*θῆρες ἄγριοι νοητοί*) . . . light a fire beneath it with their passions, as if burning it with the missiles of their own wickedness'.[115] Demons have a role to play in encouraging wickedness and vice, but Eusebius is careful to stress that this encouragement does not remove human responsibility, by pointing out that the choice remains 'self-determined' (*αὐτεξούσιος*). For Eusebius, the demonic threat therefore seems to involve exploiting a person's existing weaknesses in order to lead them to make a flawed choice for which they must then bear responsibility.

This is reflected in Eusebius' description of the 'savage beasts' which attack the fallen soul in his speech on the Church at Tyre as *νοητός*.[116] Eusebius' frequent association of demons with wild beasts makes it clear that, by 'savage beasts', he is again referring to demons.[117] His use of the word *νοητός* suggests that he may have held a view of demonic influence similar to that found earlier in the

[112] *PE* 4.21.6. Compare: Porph. *Abst.* 2.40.3.
[113] *PE* 6.6.35.
[114] *HE* 10.4.57.
[115] *HE* 10.4.58.
[116] *HE* 10.4.57.
[117] As, for instance, at *VC* 1.49.1; *HE* 10.4.14; *Theoph.* 3.13, 3.55. On Eusebius' association of demons with wild beasts, see Chapter 3, section 'Further Polarities'.

works of Origen. For Eusebius, things which were νοητός were incorporeal and rational, associated with the mind rather than with the physical senses.[118] This therefore corresponds to Eusebius' claim that demons mount 'invisible' attacks,[119] and further fixes these attacks in a mental or intellectual, rather than a physical, sphere.

This is reminiscent of Origen's suggestion that demons generate wicked thoughts to encourage people into sin.[120] Yet Origen is clear that this external influence does not remove human responsibility. Drawing on the Stoic idea of 'first movements', in which it was held that a person must choose to assent to an initial impression from outside before it could become a full internal emotion or passion,[121] Origen insists that such thoughts are only 'an inducement, provoking us either to good or to evil'.[122] According to Origen, it is quite possible for people to 'throw the vicious suggestions away from us'.[123] Although Eusebius does not explore this issue in the same depth as Origen, given his familiarity with Origen's works he would undoubtedly have been aware of this idea. In his suggestion that the demonic threat is concentrated mainly in mental, rather than physical, attacks, Eusebius appears to be echoing this idea. Temptation and trickery, rather than compulsion, lie at the heart of Eusebius' understanding of the demonic threat, thus leaving human responsibility intact. Nevertheless, the process that Eusebius is describing in these passages from the speech on the Church at Tyre still refers to a soul in which the conditions for προαίρεσις are met: the soul is both rational,[124] and it is able to act independently. It is only once this initial choice has been made that the soul then falls more fully under the power of demons.[125] As a result, this description tells us little about how Eusebius felt human responsibility might be maintained even in those cases where a soul is said to be entirely in the power of demons.

[118] *PE* 11.7.1, 11.9.3. More widely, νοητός was used to describe the opposite of the literal interpretation in biblical exegesis—*PGL s.v.* νοητός.

[119] *LC* 7.1–2.

[120] On Origen, see: Sorabji, *Emotion*, 346–7, citing Orig. *de Princ.* 3.2.4.

[121] On Stoic 'first movements', see Sorabji, *Emotion*, 66–75; on the adaptation of these ideas by early Christian thinkers, particularly Origen and Evagrius Ponticus, see Sorabji, *Emotion*, 343–71.

[122] Orig. *de Princ.* 3.2.4. This passage survives only in Rufinus' Latin translation.

[123] Orig. *de Princ.* 3.2.4. [124] *HE* 10.4.55–6. [125] *HE* 10.4.57.

It was due in large part to the significance which he attached to this initial προαίρεσις of wickedness that Eusebius was able to maintain the responsibility even of those people he saw as enslaved to, or acting irrationally under, the influence of demons. This emerges most clearly from some of Eusebius' comments in the *VC* and *LC*. Even while describing Constantine's non-Christian predecessors as the slaves of demons, Eusebius is in fact subtly presenting them as partners in their own enslavement. At *LC* 5.3, Eusebius suggests that a non-Christian ruler would have 'stamped (τετυπωμένος) on his soul (τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ) numberless falsely drawn icons of demons', and thereby have 'attached himself to numberless embittered masters' (ὁ μυρίους καθ' ἑαυτοῦ πικροὺς δεσπότας ἐφειλκυσμένος). Here, the participles used—τετυπωμένος from τυπόω, 'to stamp, form, or engrave', and ἐφειλκυσμένος from ἕλκω, 'to draw or drag'—are both given in the middle voice.[126] Since the middle voice generally carried the sense of a reflexive action—that is, of an action performed on or for oneself—the use of this voice here gives greater agency in this process to the unnamed rulers than the use of the plain active participle would have done. The implication is that these rulers were actively involved in bringing about their own enslavement to demons—they have effectively handed themselves over to the demons. In the case of ἐφειλκυσμένος, this is further reinforced by the use of the reflexive pronoun ἑαυτοῦ (himself).

Similarly, when describing Constantine's predecessors in the *VC*, Eusebius claims that 'by means of the mix-up of the evils of lawless idolatry, they first enslaved themselves and afterwards all of their subjects to the errors of wicked demons' (καὶ οἱ μὲν συγχύσει κακῶν εἰδωλολατρείας ἐκθέσμου σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πρότερον κἄπειτα τοὺς ὑπηκόους ἅπαντας πονηρῶν δαιμόνων πλάναις κατεδουλοῦντο . . .).[127] Once again, the verb—κατεδουλοῦντο—is given in the middle voice, providing the same sense of an action performed to or upon oneself. These emperors are thus also shown as participating in their own enslavement; they are not passive victims of the demons. It would seem, therefore, that even those humans who were enslaved to demons must bear some of the responsibility for their situation, and

[126] Lunn-Rockliffe has highlighted the need to pay greater attention to grammatical agency in early Christian discussions of agency and sin, particularly in relation to the devil's fall: 'Diabolical Problem'.

[127] *VC* 1.13.3.

thus for their subsequent actions, since their enslavement was not involuntary or imposed on them from outside. Rather, Eusebius stresses that they made an initial choice to put themselves into the power of demons. Whether or not their freedom to act, and even their rationality, was compromised thereafter, their initial choice of wickedness had met the conditions of responsible προαίρεσις.

Thus, even in cases where Eusebius presents his human wrongdoers as having fallen entirely under the influence of demons, he is not removing their responsibility, but presenting almost a partnership of wickedness, in which the human as much as the demonic agents have chosen to participate. Whether or not Eusebius would have agreed that such people deserved pity, he certainly felt that they also merited punishment, since, in his opinion, responsibility occurred at the moment of the initial προαίρεσις of wickedness. In this way, Eusebius was able to maintain the justice of divine punishments directed even against those he held to be under the influence of demons.

ESCAPING DEMONIC INFLUENCE

For Eusebius, the fact that human moral responsibility was maintained, even among those acting under the influence of demons, was key to the nature of the demonic threat. Rather than simply causing harm in the present life, demons were also able to lead people to act in a way that, because of human προαίρεσις, would jeopardize their salvation in the next life. As a result, from Eusebius' perspective, it would have been crucial for people to secure themselves against this demonic threat. As scholars have recognized, many early Christians believed that their faith provided them with protection from the attacks of hostile demons.[128] Indeed, this belief is said to have formed part of the new faith's appeal.[129]

To an extent, Eusebius clearly shared this view. There is no doubt that he held the power of the Christian God to be much greater than that of the demons.[130] In the *CH* it is said that invoking the name of

[128] Ferguson, *Demonology*, 129; Martin, *Inventing Superstition*, 238.
[129] Ferguson, *Demonology*, 129.
[130] See, for example: *PE* 5.17.13.

Christ could be used to drive out and destroy demons in cases of demonic possession.[131] However, when it came to the more insidious and ultimately more harmful demonic challenge to human salvation, Eusebius' works suggest that simple, passive acceptance of the Christian faith was not, on its own, enough to ensure a person's safety. While Eusebius was adamant that God would support and protect his followers, he also implied that people must somehow earn this protection. For Eusebius, ensuring security from demonic influence required active engagement on the part of humankind, largely through the cultivation of virtue.

There remains, of course, a strong sense in Eusebius' works that God could, and frequently would, intervene in earthly affairs in order to protect his followers from harm. After all, as several scholars have already observed, the active involvement of God in the affairs of humankind was of considerable importance to Eusebius' understanding of history.[132] While this involvement is often seen in Eusebius' works in the form of divine punishment of human wrongdoers,[133] at times Eusebius also shows God acting in advance to protect the church and promote Christianity. In the *HE*, Eusebius suggests that the emperor Aurelian, on the point of initiating a persecution of the Christians, was prevented from doing so by 'godly justice' (*θεία δίκη*).[134] Hence, it seems, Christians could expect their God to offer them some protection from their enemies.

Nevertheless, Eusebius makes it clear that this protection was conditional and could be removed at any point.[135] In particular, it seems that it was only by maintaining high standards of virtue that people could hope to secure God's protection. Describing the soul's fall into wickedness and sin as part of his speech on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius notes how, once the soul had embraced passion and wickedness, 'God withdrew from it such that it was deprived of a guardian'.[136] At this point, deprived of the support of God, the soul is said to have fallen easily and completely under the influence of demons.[137] By abandoning virtue, the soul had also lost God's protection. This sense that divine protection was conditional upon the

[131] *CH* 4.2.

[132] For example: Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology*, 83; Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 67; Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 168–89.

[133] For example: *Mart. Pal.* [SR] 7.7–8; *HE* 8.*App*.1–6; *VC* 1.57.1–3.

[134] *HE* 7.30.21.

[135] *HE* 7.30.21.

[136] *HE* 10.4.57.

[137] *HE* 10.4.57–8.

maintenance of high standards of behaviour is further reflected in Eusebius' presentation of the persecution of the church. For a while, Eusebius suggests that the church was able to grow and prosper, since 'no envy held it back, nor did some wicked demon malign it or hinder it with the plots of men, as long as a divine and heavenly hand protected and watched over its own people, as a thing that was indeed worthy'.[138] However, when the standards of piety within the church began to slip and Christians turned to 'weakness and indolence',[139] Eusebius declares that God removed his protection and permitted the demonic and human enemies of the church to begin the persecutions.[140] For Eusebius, then, we can see that, both at the level of the individual soul and on a broader scale for the entire church community, divine protection was available only where it was merited. Simply to be a member of the Christian church was not enough, unless one also abandoned such vices as passion, laziness, and complacency.

It was therefore not sufficient, in Eusebius' opinion, simply to rely on the protection of God in order to secure oneself against the demonic threat. In order both to earn this protection in the present life, and, just as importantly, to ensure one's salvation in the next life, a person needed to play an active role in resisting demonic attacks. For Eusebius, these attacks took two main forms, each focusing on a different way of straying from the path of salvation. In the *DE*, Eusebius identifies two principal ways in which a person might put their salvation at risk: either by embracing false doctrine, be it heresy or polytheism, or by adopting a vicious lifestyle. Eusebius interprets the prophecy concerning the division of the Mount of Olives at Zacharias 14:4, in which it was warned that the mountain would split in four directions, as representing 'the cracks and heresies and ethical falling away in life which have happened and are still happening now within the church of Christ'.[141] Two of these divisions, Eusebius suggests, represent 'two types of behaviour in turn among those who fall off from the church—one which is mistaken in ethics and another which drops off from healthy and correct knowledge'.[142] Later on, Eusebius reiterates this division of wickedness into two identifiable kinds, when he describes 'two groups of unseen enemies and wicked demonic foes, waging war in various ways against the

[138] *HE* 8.1.6. [139] *HE* 8.1.7. [140] *HE* 8.1.7–9.
[141] *DE* 6.18.28. [142] *DE* 6.18.31.

whole race of men, one of them always and in every place encouraging among men idolatry and false teachings in our doctrines, while the other is working towards the destruction of souls in their ethics'.[143] In order to obtain salvation people would therefore need to combat demonic attacks on two fronts, by avoiding both moral and doctrinal error. While embracing the 'orthodox' Christian faith would surely have been enough in Eusebius' view to avoid the latter fault, the equally important question of how virtue was to be achieved in the face of demonic encouragement of vice was considerably more difficult.

For Eusebius, it appears that the key to escaping demonic influence was the condition of a person's soul. As we saw in the section 'Responsibility and προαίρεσις', Eusebius believed demons to direct their attacks primarily against the rational human soul and he also suggested that it was the quality of a person's soul that determined the kind of spiritual being that might be able to gain access to it. According to Eusebius, 'it is not possible for them [the demons] to draw near to a pure soul on account of the dissimilarity between them'.[144] By contrast, a soul which has been 'cleansed of every mark and all defilement, and ordered both by moderation and justice and by other virtues',[145] would be ready to receive a 'godly spirit'.[146] As a result, the best defence against the temptations and deceits of the demons was a pure soul.

In outlining how a person might set about achieving purity of soul, Eusebius' dichotomy between the body and the soul is once again very much in evidence. Eusebius argues that, while the body 'rejoices according to nature in all pleasures', the προαίρεσις, 'out of a desire for virtue, is glad of a life of hard work and roughness'.[147] Bodily nature is thus shown as incompatible with the attainment of virtue, which belongs to the προαίρεσις of the soul. In order to achieve virtue then, the soul must overcome 'the nature of the body', with its desires for sex, food, and drink.[148] Once again, this is a matter of προαίρεσις—a person must independently (αὐθεκουσίως) choose to heed 'ascetic exhortations' towards 'abstinence from food' and 'steadfastness', ignoring the needs and temptations of the body.[149] For Eusebius, then, attaining virtue was the concern of προαίρεσις, and, as such, a matter of personal

[143] *DE* 7.1.103.
[144] *PE* 4.21.4. Compare: Porph. *Abst.* 2.43.
[145] *PE* 5.15.4.
[146] *PE* 5.15.5.
[147] *PE* 6.6.36.
[148] *PE* 6.6.35.
[149] *PE* 6.6.35.

responsibility. A virtuous lifestyle began with controlling the body, and evidently necessitated self-discipline and moderation.

Resisting the temptations of the body was, however, only one of the challenges facing those who wished to achieve virtue; there was also the problem of malign external influence with which to contend. As we have seen, Eusebius felt this too could tempt people away from a life of virtue.[150] In order to combat this, Eusebius advocates practising 'philosophy' (φιλοσοφεῖν).[151] Eusebius does not immediately offer any explanation here of what such a practice might involve; however, by taking account of a range of statements from elsewhere in the *PE*, we can see that Eusebius regarded the practice of philosophy as a combination of pious contemplation of the divine with ascetic self-discipline. Later in the *PE*, Eusebius notes that some rational souls—those of the demons—succumbed to 'the opposite of the good' because of their 'neglect' (ὀλιγωρίᾳ) of their 'study of the greatest one'.[152] Since Eusebius had earlier grouped together 'philosophy' (φιλοσοφία) and 'piety' (εὐσέβεια) as two of the valuable pursuits which would have no place in a universe governed by fate,[153] we may conclude that he considered philosophy to include in large measure the contemplation of the divine.

It would, however, be wrong to suggest that Eusebius considered philosophy to be simply an intellectual pursuit. Towards the end of *PE* 6.6, Eusebius notes that Christian converts value a philosophy that is not comprised of doctrines (λόγοις), but of actions (ἔργων).[154] When taken together with his statements earlier in the same chapter about the need for people to heed 'ascetic exhortations' in order to resist bodily temptation,[155] this statement suggests that, for Eusebius, passive acknowledgement of the supremacy of the Christian God was not, on its own, enough to provide effective protection from malign influence. Rather, a combination of active contemplation of the divine with self-discipline and personal moderation was required.

This sense that an active and engaged form of piety was particularly to be valued can be seen in Eusebius' presentation of Constantine. Eusebius' pious emperor prays regularly,[156] consults theological advisers,[157] and takes a lively interest in matters of theological significance.[158] By contrast, Eusebius has a low opinion of those recent

[150] *PE* 6.6.42. [151] *PE* 6.6.43. [152] *PE* 13.15.10.
[153] *PE* 6.6.5. [154] *PE* 6.6.71. [155] *PE* 6.6.35.
[156] *VC* 4.22.1. [157] *VC* 3.1.5.
[158] For example: *VC* 2.63.1, 4.29.1–5, 4.41.2–4.

converts at Constantine's court who appear to him to be less sincere in their faith.[159] Moreover, we know from the *DE* that Eusebius considered the ascetic lifestyle to be of considerable merit. At *DE* 1.8, Eusebius describes how Christians have been instructed in two distinct forms of piety—a more advanced form, in which all worldly ties are renounced, and a slightly lower form, in which involvement in worldly pursuits such as marriage and politics is permitted, as long as some time is still set aside for the study of the divine.[160] For Eusebius, it seems that the maintenance of virtue was an active process, requiring, at the very least, considered engagement with Christian teaching and, as far as possible on top of this, the self-moderation of an ascetic lifestyle.

For Eusebius, then, resisting the attacks of demons was an ongoing task, calling for constant vigilance. Indeed, he even warns his readers that 'it is necessary throughout everything to be watchful against the fraudulent wicked arts' of demons and the devil.[161] In combating this threat, Eusebius evidently felt that the cultivation of virtue had a large part to play. For this, however, people largely had to take responsibility themselves. They could not rest complacent in the assumption of God's protection. Moreover, it is notable that Eusebius' understanding of how virtue might be attained appears to involve more than one rather circular process. For Eusebius, virtue and purity of soul are the best defence against demons. Yet, in order to build this defence, it is first necessary to resist the attacks of demons by living virtuously. Similarly, God can offer protection from demons, but will do so only for those who have already successfully resisted demonic attempts to draw them into wickedness. As a result, it seems as though virtue for Eusebius must be almost a self-sustaining state. The same would appear to be true of vice: the fallen soul of *HE* 10.4.57–8 loses the protection of God because it has chosen wickedness over virtue. This then leaves it fully under the influence of the demons, thereby encouraging further wickedness.

This sense that virtue and vice could be self-perpetuating might appear to suggest that Eusebius held the view that a person's moral disposition was essentially fixed and unchanging.[162] Such a position would also reflect a view common to many schools of ancient

[159] *VC* 4.54.2. [160] *DE* 1.8.1–4. [161] *PE* 7.10.15.

[162] This is certainly how Drake reads Eusebius' presentation of character in the *VC*: Drake, 'What Eusebius Knew', 34.

philosophy, in which a state, at least of true virtue, once achieved could not then be lost.[163] However, the events of Eusebius' lifetime would surely have made a static view of moral character difficult to maintain. The persecutions alone would have provided numerous examples of people renouncing their faith, thereby, in Eusebius' view, moving from a virtuous state to one of wickedness and jeopardizing their salvation in the process.[164] Sure enough, the overall impression created by a range of examples in Eusebius' historical and biographical works contradicts the notion that the human character must remain permanently set in either virtue or vice. In the *HE* in particular, we find examples of people turning, not merely from vice to virtue, which non-Christian philosophy had been prepared to accept,[165] but crucially also from virtue to vice.[166] In bringing about these transformations, Eusebius implies that external influence, either divine or demonic, was heavily involved. Despite his ideas about how virtue might be maintained, it therefore seems that Eusebius did not in fact believe virtue to be a secure or a permanent state.

As Christopher Gill has shown, the idea that ancient writers had an entirely static view of character is misleading, and stems from a misunderstanding of the nature of ancient biography.[167] Gill suggests that, while many ancient biographies are largely silent on the process by which a personality might develop, the notion that character was constantly being formed, even throughout adulthood, was in fact central to their purpose.[168] For Plutarch, for instance, one reason to write biography was to provide examples, either to emulate or to avoid, in order that the reader might improve their own character.[169] Rather than reflecting the view that character was fixed, Gill suggests that the failure of ancient biographers to engage with questions of character development was a result instead of the desire of these writers to present their audience with fully formed exemplars on

[163] Frede, *A Free Will*, 29.

[164] See, for example: *HE* 8.2.3. Here, although he refuses to dwell on them, Eusebius does make passing reference to those who had 'completely shipwrecked their salvation' in the persecutions, showing that he was fully aware of this difficulty.

[165] C. Gill, 'The Question of Character-Development: Plutarch and Tacitus', *CQ* 33 (1983), 470, 478–82.

[166] For example: vice to virtue: *HE* 8.17.1–2, describing Galerius' decision to end the persecution; virtue to vice: *HE* 10.8.1–19, describing Licinius.

[167] Gill, 'Character-Development', 469–87.

[168] Gill, 'Character-Development', 476.

[169] Plutarch, *Life of Aemilius*, 1, cited in Gill, 'Character-Development', 472.

which moral judgements might then be passed.[170] Moreover, as Gill points out, the idea that people in the ancient world had little idea that character might be subject to change is at odds with the concerns of much philosophical writing, in which considerable attention is paid to questions of moral and ethical improvement.[171] Ancient writers were thus quite comfortable with the idea that a character might develop from a state of vice to one of virtue.

However, the notion that a person who had truly achieved virtue might have been capable of falling back into vice was undoubtedly considerably more problematic for ancient thinkers. Many schools of philosophy maintained that a virtuous person could only act virtuously.[172] Hence once a person had achieved virtue, it was no longer possible for them to return to a state of wickedness or ignorance. As a result, Gill acknowledges that some—although by no means all—ancient biographers, most notably Plutarch, were troubled by examples of 'degeneration of character in adult life', because this conflicted with their understanding of what it meant to be good, rather than because they considered character to be permanently fixed.[173]

Of course, by far the fullest portrait of a character provided by Eusebius is that of Constantine in the *VC*. In this case, it is true that Eusebius presents a largely static picture—Constantine is shown as consistently virtuous throughout his life. However, as has been widely recognized, Eusebius was not seeking to provide an accurate representation of what he saw as Constantine's personality in the *VC*, but rather to produce a paradigm of a virtuous Christian ruler.[174] There

[170] Gill, 'Character-Development', 472–3.

[171] Gill, 'Character-Development', 469. Alexander of Aphrodisias in fact criticizes his determinist opponents for writing works designed to bring about improvement in their readers, since if a person's actions were predetermined by fate then there would be no point in trying to change their character: *De fato*, 18. Alexander clearly expected his audience to agree that the purpose of such works was to bring about change through persuasion, suggesting that a belief that people were capable at least of change for the better must have been fairly widespread.

[172] Frede, *A Free Will*, 29; Gill, 'Character-Development', 479–80.

[173] Gill, 'Character-Development', 479–82, quotation at 482.

[174] For example: Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 195; Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 12; Cameron, 'Construction', 164. Averil Cameron has further demonstrated how Eusebius was prepared to distort his account of events in order to present Constantine in the most sympathetic light: Averil Cameron, 'Constantius and Constantine: An Exercise in Publicity', in E. Hartley, J. Hawkes, M. Henig, and F. Mee, eds., *Constantine the Great: York's Roman Emperor* (York: York Museums Trust, 2006), 18–30.

was therefore good reason for Eusebius to present Constantine as consistently virtuous, regardless of his views on whether or not personalities might change. A focus on the *VC* is therefore hardly conducive to drawing a balanced picture of Eusebius' views on character and we must look further than the example of Constantine in order properly to appreciate Eusebius' understanding of character. Moving beyond the *VC*, it becomes clear that Eusebius did acknowledge the possibility of a character changing from a state of virtue to one of vice.

The career of Licinius, outlined in the *HE* and *VC*, provides Eusebius' most striking example of a character perceived to have turned from virtue to wickedness. Here we see a figure, initially lauded by Eusebius in book 9 of the *HE* as the virtuous partner of Constantine and pious champion of God,[175] transformed into a demon-worshipping persecutor.[176] Of course, Licinius' complex portrayal in the *HE* owes much to the changing circumstances in which this work was written—Licinius' defeat by Constantine made it politically inexpedient for positive references to Licinius to remain unaltered.[177] Similar political concerns also clearly influenced the negative presentation of Licinius in the *VC*.[178] Yet what is interesting about Eusebius' presentation of Licinius in the *HE* and *VC* is not that it is distorted—just as the portrayal of Constantine is distorted in the opposite direction—but that Eusebius finds a way to make an extreme, negative change of character credible. This owes much to the prominence of demons in Eusebius' cosmology. In both the *HE* and *VC*, Licinius' turn towards wickedness is characterized above all as a descent into madness and irrationality,[179] thereby associating him with demons, who are also frequently characterized in this way. Moreover, in the *VC*, Eusebius presents the conflict between Constantine and Licinius almost as a conflict between their rival deities—with Constantine's Christian God triumphing over Licinius'

[175] *HE* 9.10.1–3; 9.11.8. [176] *HE* 10.8.2–19.

[177] On the composition of this work, see Chapter 1, section 'Questions of Dating and Composition', subsection '*Historia Ecclesiastica*'.

[178] Indeed, Stuart Hall has demonstrated that elements of the presentation of Licinius in the *VC* were recycled by Eusebius from his earlier descriptions of Maximinus in the *HE*: S. G. Hall, 'The Use of Earlier Eusebian Material in the *Vita Constantini*, 1.57–59', *Studia Patristica* 24 (1993), 98. See also: S. G. Hall, 'Eusebian and Other Sources in *Vita Constantini* I', in H. C. Brennecke, E. L. Grasmuck, and C. Markschies, eds., *Logos. Festschrift fur Luise Abramowski* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993), 239–63.

[179] *HE* 9.9.1, 9.9.12, 10.8.2, 10.8.9, 10.9.2; *VC* 1.50.2, 1.56.1–2.

demonic spirits.[180] Eusebius thus explains Licinius' change of character as the result of Licinius exchanging the beneficial influence of God for the harmful influence of demons.

Of course it could be argued that, rather than representing a dramatic change of character, this was simply an example of a consistently wicked character finally being revealed. Such a theme was not unknown to ancient biography and can be found in both Suetonius' and Tacitus' treatment of Tiberius.[181] Eusebius does in fact suggest that Licinius was capable of deception in his dealings with Constantine, in an attempt to disguise his true intentions.[182] However, the idea of previously hidden wickedness does not fit with Eusebius' earlier suggestion that God had supported Licinius to his military victories.[183] Eusebius might have been prepared to suggest that a person could conceal his or her vicious character from other people, but surely not from God. Indeed, according to Eusebius it was God who had revealed Licinius' deception to Constantine.[184] Moreover, when describing Licinius' transformation, Eusebius states that he 'left off the imitation of the good and pursued instead the depravity and wicked ways of the impious tyrants'.[185] This not only indicates a definite change, but also suggests that this change occurred as a result of swapping the influence of virtuous external προαίρεσεις for wicked external influence, in a manner consistent with that outlined by Eusebius at *PE* 6.6.42. This sense that Licinius underwent a definite change of character is echoed at *VC* 2.1.1, where Eusebius describes how Licinius 'threw himself down (κατεκρημνίζετο) to the depth of those who fight against God'. This phrase, with its idea of movement, similarly suggests an unmistakable change. In the case of Licinius, Eusebius therefore presents an example of a character changing from virtue to vice, largely as a result of a change in the external forces influencing it.

Thus it seems that, for Eusebius, even the most dramatic change of character could be explained. Crucially, it appears that by allowing a role for external influence, particularly demonic influence, in shaping people's choices, Eusebius was able to provide an explanation for a

[180] *VC* 2.4.1–2.10.2. As M. S. Williams has also previously noted: *Authorised Lives in Early Christian Biography: Between Eusebius and Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 39.

[181] Gill, 'Character-Development', 482, citing Suetonius, *Tiberius*, 42.1, 57.1, 61.1, and Tacitus, *Annales*, 1.4.3, 5.3, 6.51.3.

[182] *HE* 10.8.5. [183] *HE* 9.10.3.

[184] *HE* 10.8.5–6. [185] *HE* 10.8.2.

phenomenon that classical philosophers had struggled to understand—the transformation of a previously good character into a state of wickedness. While this was something of a departure from classical views of virtue, Eusebius was not alone among early Christian writers in suggesting that goodness was not a permanent state, at least for humans. Tatian had insisted that only God was unchangeably good, while the humans, angels, and demons he had created, possessing a changeable nature, were left free to choose between good and evil.[186] Origen had similarly insisted that people were not permanently set by nature in a state of either goodness or wickedness.[187] Thus, for Origen, as for Eusebius, even a soul which had reached the peak of virtue was still at risk of falling back into wickedness.[188]

The implications of this are significant. For Eusebius, no one, even the most virtuous, could ever secure complete immunity from the attacks of the demons. At no point was salvation guaranteed. However, while this might seem a rather pessimistic view, other examples in Eusebius' works present a more optimistic picture. While the malign external influence of the demons provided a constant challenge to the virtuous, Eusebius also suggests that the beneficent influence of God might guide people towards virtue. As a result, a person need not be trapped, even in a state of the deepest sin, forever.

This emerges most clearly from Eusebius' presentation of the deaths of some of the persecuting emperors in the *HE*. In Eusebius' more historical works, particularly the *HE*, there is a strong connection drawn between a person's end and the standard of their behaviour.[189] Constantine's father Constantius, an emperor who, in Eusebius' reports, favoured the Christians, is the only member of the imperial college permitted a peaceful and pain-free death in the *HE*.[190] The deaths of his imperial colleagues who are said to have persecuted Christians are, by contrast, preceded by extreme physical suffering.[191] Yet in dwelling on the obvious, graphic punishments of the

[186] Frede, *A Free Will*, 120, citing Tatian, *Orat.* 7.1.

[187] Origen, *Comm. in Matt.* 10.11.57–62. See also: Justin, *1 Apol.* 43.1–5.

[188] Origen, *Comm. in Matt.* 10.11.67–78. See: Frede, *A Free Will*, 121–2.

[189] *HE* 8.*App*.1–6; *VC* 1.17.1. A similar concern famously informs Lactantius' *De mortibus persecutorum*, written mostly likely in 314–15 and therefore roughly contemporary with the *HE*. See Lact. *DMP* 30, 33–5, 49. On the dating of this work, see: J. L. Creed, 'Introduction', in Lactantius, *De mortibus persecutorum*, ed. and trans. J. L. Creed, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), xxxiii–xxxv.

[190] *HE* 8.*App*.4.

[191] *HE* 8.*App*.1–4.

persecutors, it is easy to overlook the fact that, in at least two cases, the emperors involved are said to have ended the persecutions before their deaths. Both Galerius and Maximinus are said to have issued edicts in favour of Christians shortly before their deaths. In both cases, this final change of heart is reported to have resulted in an immediate reward. Maximinus, we are told, 'suffered less than he should have suffered', in spite of the considerable physical pain he is supposed to have endured.[192] Meanwhile Galerius, whose divinely sent punishment is said to have encouraged his change of heart, was 'at once, although not for long, delivered from his sufferings'.[193] His reward was to be relieved of his pain, albeit through death. For these two figures, it appears that a single, virtuous προαίρεσις has been rewarded, although it is not enough to cancel out completely the punishment for their many, earlier wicked προαίρεσεις. Each and every choice, whether good or bad, mattered. Each would be recognized and duly rewarded or punished by God. By changing their προαίρεσεις, a person might thus free themselves from sin.

Eusebius' belief in the value of every choice for determining a person's path is further reflected in his attitude towards those Christians he would have considered to have 'lapsed' from the faith. In the light of his insistence on the punishment of wrongdoers, it might appear surprising that Eusebius is tolerant of Christians who had recanted their faith during the persecutions, but who had later repented. Discussing the Novatianist schism of the third century, in which the followers of Novatus had refused to admit such Christians back into the congregation, Eusebius is highly critical, calling this stance 'brother-hating and very anti-human'.[194] Instead he applauds those 'orthodox' bishops who excommunicated Novatus and declared that any lapsed Christians who repented should be welcomed back into the church. Eusebius was not, of course, condoning their sins, but he insisted that these people should be 'healed and treated by the medicines of repentance'.[195] For Eusebius, then, repentance could have healing properties, helping to undo the damage caused by previous sins. Since each individual decision mattered, a person could change at any point.

Moreover, the idea that people were capable of changing for the better appears to have been central to Eusebius' understanding of the

[192] *HE* 9.10.13.
[193] *HE* 8.*App*.1.
[194] *HE* 6.43.2.
[195] *HE* 6.43.2.

purpose of divine punishments. For Eusebius, the punishments sent by God to the wicked were not simply retributive, but, far more importantly, corrective. Eusebius insists that God cannot create any kind of evil, and that even his punishments, which might appear harmful, are in fact intended 'not for the harm of those being punished, but for their benefit and use'.[196] As a result, Eusebius likens God's punishments to a doctor's treatment of his patients—he may offer 'painful and sharp treatments' but these are ultimately intended to cure the patient.[197] This can be seen in the example of Galerius, whose divinely sent physical suffering is eventually said to have led him towards a more virtuous path, by causing him to end his persecution of the Christians.[198]

Perhaps even more significant for Eusebius, however, was the role that such punishments might play in deterring future wrongdoing by others. Eusebius suggests that the difference between the deaths of virtuous emperors like Constantine's father Constantius and those of the persecutors demonstrates the way in which God will reward virtue and vice.[199] More than once he criticizes Licinius for failing to take heed of the many examples of the punishment of persecutors.[200] It seems that, for Eusebius, Licinius' wickedness was compounded by the fact that God had supplied him with many examples to guide him towards making virtuous choices, leaving little excuse for his failure to do so. Eusebius' understanding of divine justice was thus underpinned by his belief that people were capable of moral improvement by changing the choices they made for the better. For those who chose to follow it, Eusebius believed that God would provide guidance to help people achieve virtue and salvation.

The boundary between virtue and vice was thus a porous one for Eusebius. People did not possess a fixed nature or predetermined character, but rather shaped their own path through the choices they made. Moreover, the significance of every single choice meant that, for Eusebius, virtue and vice were never permanently set. Yet in his understanding of how people might switch between these two opposing states, Eusebius not only had room for human freedom of choice. While this was undoubtedly crucial in his view to maintaining human moral responsibility, he also assigned a prominent place to external influence. If wickedness, for Eusebius, was a partnership between

[196] *PE* 13.3.39. [197] *PE* 13.3.39. [198] *HE* 8.17.1.
[199] *VC* 1.17.1. [200] *HE* 10.8.2, 10.8.9; *VC* 1.59.2.

humans and demons, then goodness was likewise a partnership between humans and the divine, whenever people welcomed God's guidance and correction. In Eusebius' understanding of salvation we therefore find a combination of God's grace with human freedom and responsibility. Salvation might be dependent on a person achieving virtue in their own right, but Eusebius did not believe that God left people without any guidance on how that virtue was to be achieved.

CONCLUSIONS

Recognizing the importance of προαίρεσις in Eusebius' thought is crucial to understanding his views on moral responsibility. It was this concept that enabled him to absolve God of responsibility for the evil of the persecutions, allowing him to place the blame squarely with humankind instead. Moreover, rather than a cruel and merciless punishment, the persecutions thus become a generous and merciful remedy, which, thanks to people's ability to change their προαίρεσεις, can lead people back to salvation. Similarly, the notion of προαίρεσις helped to explain the dramatic and troubling change of character seen in the figure of Licinius. For Eusebius, humankind's freedom to exercise προαίρεσις meant that people could slip between states of virtue and vice. Eusebius has previously been characterized as an optimist as a result of his belief in human progress,[201] and, to an extent, this assessment is justified. His message that, as a result of their free choice, even the most depraved sinners might attain redemption is certainly a positive one. Yet the associated idea that everyone, even the most virtuous, remains capable of falling back into sin as a result of this same free choice leaves little room for complacency or triumphalism.

For προαίρεσις was not only the key to salvation in Eusebius' thought, it also lay at the centre of his conception of the demonic threat. Eusebius' demonic threat did not focus primarily on physical or earthly harm, but rather on attempts to derail the progress of the church and undermine human salvation. For Eusebius, it was προαίρεσις that made this aspect of the demonic threat possible. By allowing

[201] Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology*, 123; Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 119.

humans to be held responsible for their sins, even those committed as a result of external temptation or under malign influence, human προαίρεσις gave demons the opportunity to lead people to jeopardize their own salvation. Clearly Eusebius saw salvation as the result of co-operation between divine grace and human free choice;[202] yet to focus only on this positive aspect of Eusebius' understanding of moral responsibility risks distorting his views. Eusebius believed his audience to live in a world populated by a variety of spiritual forces, many of which he saw as malevolent in intent. The risk of slipping into sin as a result of malign external influence was thus one that could not be ignored.

This understanding of the relationship between προαίρεσις and the demonic threat also helped to shape Eusebius' ideas about Christian identity, and about the standards of behaviour required of those who wished to be identified as virtuous Christians. Given the importance which Eusebius attached to correct belief in securing salvation, membership of the 'orthodox' church would have been the first of these requirements. However, whilst it is clear that, for Eusebius, salvation could not be secured outside the body of the church, passive and unthinking adherence, even to orthodox doctrine, was not by itself enough either to indicate or to ensure a person's virtue. In Eusebius' view, the pursuit of virtue and hence of freedom from demonic influence was a struggle that must be undertaken at the level of the individual soul. In this, people would receive help, both from their God-given inclination towards goodness, and from the guidance which God supplied in the visible world through the administration of divine justice. They would also, however, face the challenge of demonic temptation. Membership of the church had to be supplemented by the cultivation of a pious and virtuous lifestyle in order to ensure that people did not fall into the power of demons. Thus, Christian identity for Eusebius was tied not merely to membership of the church community, but to the continual struggle against the demons, in which each individual soul had an important role to play.

[202] As Lyman argued: *Christology and Cosmology*, 99.

5

Demonic Activity and Historical Progress

Eusebius' great value to later historians arguably lies, to a significant degree, in his position as a witness to the dramatic religious and political changes of the early fourth century. Eusebius lived through periods of uneasy toleration for the Christian church, of direct persecution, and, finally, of official recognition and imperial patronage, and he records many of these changes in his works. Yet Eusebius' presentation of these events is rarely straightforward. While the accusations of outright fraud levelled against Eusebius by earlier scholars like Jacob Burckhardt are somewhat unfair in seeking to judge Eusebius by the standards of later historiography,[1] there can be no doubt that, as many scholars have noted, Eusebius' attitude towards the developments of the period—particularly the political developments—was heavily shaped by his perception of how these events fitted into the broad sweep of history as a whole.[2] Eusebius' ideas about history also influenced his reading of the role of the church and its leaders and were closely linked to his understanding of how salvation might be achieved. Consequently, an understanding of Eusebius' views on the nature, purpose, and overall direction of history is essential to an accurate appreciation of his presentation of the events and leading figures of the Constantinian era.

Nonetheless, despite long-standing interest in Eusebius' ideas about history,[3] there remain several substantial problems with the existing interpretations of his views on the subject. First and most

[1] Burckhardt, *The Age of Constantine*, 283.

[2] See, for example: Hollerich, *Eusebius' Commentary on Isaiah*, 67; Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology*, 88; Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 168–89; Ruhbach, 'Politische Theologie', 236–58, 242.

[3] Important monographs include: Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*; Grant, *Eusebius as Church Historian*.

serious is the fact that scholars, almost without exception, present Eusebius as a triumphant optimist, so dazzled by the prosperity of the church in his later life that he was led to unrestrained celebration of contemporary political and religious circumstances.[4] There is therefore a tendency to suggest that Eusebius saw the events of his lifetime as falling at the very end of history, and representing both its climax and pinnacle.[5] However, this optimistic picture of Eusebius' thought is somewhat undermined by the repeated appearance of hostile and threatening demons throughout a range of his works. Demonic activity continues to feature even in some of Eusebius' latest and arguably most triumphalist works, such as the *Vita Constantini* (*VC*) and later books of the *Historia ecclesiastica* (*HE*),[6] yet scholars arguing for Eusebius' triumphalism have so far failed to engage with such references to the demonic threat. When demons are restored to their proper place in Eusebius' historical vision it becomes clear that this traditional portrayal of Eusebius as straightforwardly optimistic cannot be so easily maintained. As a result, our understanding of how he interprets the events of his own day also requires some refining.

Stemming from this first problem, there is a second, related difficulty, which is that some scholars have tended to try to distinguish between Eusebius' view of the 'Church' and that of the 'Empire'.[7] Yet, as Drake has argued, drawing such a clear division between the two in this period is 'dangerously and profoundly misleading'.[8] Having made this distinction, scholars have disagreed about which of these bodies Eusebius supposedly held to be more important. Believing that Eusebius saw his own time as falling at the very end of history, several

[4] See, for example: W. H. C. Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of a Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 544–5; Trompf, *Early Christian Historiography*, 124–5; Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology*, 123; Farina, *L'impero*, 83, 162; L. G. Patterson, *God and History in Early Christian Thought: A Study of Themes from Justin Martyr to Gregory the Great* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1967), 82; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 490; Johnson, 'Blackness of Ethiopians', 167, 186. However, for an alternative assessment, see: Johannessen, '*Genos* of Demons'.

[5] See, for example, Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 182; Ruhbach, 'Politische Theologie', 254; Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche', 97–115; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 482–3; Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', 61; Martin, *Inventing Superstition*, 223–4.

[6] For example: *VC* 1.13.3, 1.49.1, 2.73.1, 3.55.2–3; *HE* 8.1.6, 8.14.5, 10.8.2.

[7] Hollerich, for instance, distinguishes between the 'institutional church' and the empire: *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 201.

[8] H. A. Drake, 'Church and Empire', in Harvey and Hunter, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies*, 457.

scholars have argued that he held a form of 'realized eschatology'.[9] This phrase, which is, of course, a modern imposition with no parallel in the ancient sources, is used to describe the idea that Eusebius believed God's 'kingdom of promise' to have been already fulfilled—or 'realized'—in the present time.[10] This is felt to be in conflict with more 'traditional' or 'conventional' eschatology, in which the promised kingdom is said to await the virtuous after the second coming of Christ and the last judgement.[11]

Such a straightforward distinction between 'conventional' and 'realized' eschatology is, however, difficult to maintain, particularly for the early centuries of the current era. Daley's survey of eschatological thought in the first five centuries CE highlights such a variety of views that it is difficult to see how one can reasonably speak of a 'conventional' doctrine.[12] Moreover, Daley suggests that one of the few overarching features of early Christian eschatology was its 'realism', the sense of an intimate connection between this world and the promised kingdom.[13] This must lead us to question just how much more 'realized' Eusebius' eschatology was than that of other early Christian thinkers. Indeed, scholars seem to vary in their assessment of what was involved in Eusebius' 'realized' eschatology. While the older view suggests that Eusebius' eschatology involved largely downplaying ideas of a second coming and final judgement,[14] some more recent scholarship has found a continuing belief in such events to be completely compatible with a 'realized eschatology'.[15] A contrast

[9] The expression is used to describe Eusebius' thought by: Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 196–7, 201; by B. E. Daley, *The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 77; by Martin, *Inventing Superstition*, 224; and, in German ('realisierte Eschatologie'), by Ruhbach, 'Politische Theologie', 253. It is not, however, exclusively used of Eusebius. Daley also uses the expression to refer to elements of the thought of Cyprian and desert fathers including Antony: *The Hope*, 43, 71.

[10] Daley, *The Hope*, 78. This view of Eusebius' eschatology is widespread, even where the precise expression 'realized eschatology' is not used. See, for example: H. G. Opitz, 'Euseb von Caesarea als Theologe', *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 34 (1935), 14; Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche'; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 482–3; Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 173, 187; Farina, *L'impero*, 83; G. H. Williams, 'Christology and Church–State Relations in the Fourth-Century', *Church History* 20.3 (1951), 17; and the discussion in Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 196–201.

[11] For example: Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 188–9.

[12] Daley, *The Hope.*

[13] Daley, *The Hope*, 218.

[14] For example: Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 188; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 472, 481.

[15] Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 201.

between 'traditional' and 'realized' eschatology therefore has considerable potential to mislead and confuse.

Following the suggestion that Eusebius saw the eschatological kingdom realized in the present, scholars have sought to locate that kingdom more precisely in either the Christian church or the Roman Empire. The older view, put forward by scholars such as Eger, is that by the end of his life Eusebius had come to see God's prophetic promises as being fulfilled in the newly Christian empire under Constantine.[16] Such an interpretation clearly owes far more to Eusebius' later panegyrical works on Constantine, the *VC* and *De laudibus Constantini* (*LC*), than to some of his earlier apologetic and exegetical works.[17] More recently, however, this view has been challenged by scholars such as Hollerich and Johnson who have stressed by contrast the continuing significance of the church in Eusebius' works.[18] As a result, Hollerich suggested that it is the church, rather than the empire, that should be seen as the locus of Eusebius' 'realized eschatology'.[19]

However, while this work has been invaluable in challenging traditional assumptions about Eusebius' attitude towards the empire, it not only continues to perpetuate the idea that Eusebius' interest lay principally in either the church or the empire as separate and clearly identifiable bodies, but also suggests that the two must in some way have been in competition for him. Even if there is no suggestion of an outright tension between the two, some form of competition is implied by the idea that attributing greater importance to one must mean downplaying the significance of the other.[20] If, however, in recognizing the continuing role of demons in Eusebius' historical vision, we dismiss the idea that Eusebius ever regarded the kingdom

[16] Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche', 110–11. See also: Ruhbach, 'Politische Theologie', 254; Williams, 'Christology', 19; R. A. Markus, 'The Roman Empire in Early Christian Historiography', *The Downside Review* 81 (1963), 343.

[17] As Hollerich noted: *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 202.

[18] Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 201; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 184–5, 193. It is worth noting that Hollerich and Johnson focus on, respectively, the exegetical *CI*, and the apologetic *PE*, rather than on works like the *VC* and *LC*, which are more concerned with the figure of the emperor, perhaps explaining this difference of emphasis.

[19] Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 201.

[20] While denying that Eusebius saw the church as a 'rival' to the empire, Hollerich nevertheless suggests that, in comparison with the church, the empire was only 'a secondary phenomenon, a reality of a lesser order': *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 33.

of God as already fulfilled on earth, we no longer need to determine whether Eusebius believed that kingdom to be located in either the church or the empire. This leaves us free to explore instead how Eusebius viewed the events of his lifetime within the broad sweep of history as a whole. When we do this, we can see that Eusebius was less interested in either the church or the empire as impersonal 'institutions', than in their leaders as a united group of virtuous Christian exemplars, guiding their followers on their individual journeys away from demons and towards God.

The purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold. Firstly, by drawing attention to the continuing role of hostile demons in Eusebius' understanding of history, it will challenge traditional assumptions about Eusebius' triumphal interpretation of the events of his lifetime. Secondly, it will propose an alternative approach to Eusebius' understanding of these events, suggesting that he presents them, not as standing at the culmination of history, but rather as forming simply one stage in an ongoing process of salvation within history. Moreover, it will show that, since history had not yet reached its climax for Eusebius, any celebration of present prosperity was tempered in his works by warnings against complacency.

THE ROLE OF DEMONS IN HISTORY

For Eusebius, demonic activity was an inescapable feature of history, observable not only in the distant past, but also in more recent events, up to and including the events of his own lifetime. Although several scholars have already noted that, for Eusebius, history was not driven exclusively by human activity,[21] they have tended to focus on the role of the divine in directing events and have overlooked the important role also played by lesser spiritual beings, such as demons and angels, in Eusebius' historical scheme.[22] Even where scholars in the past have

[21] For example: Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 86–7; Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology*, 83; Hollerich, *Eusebius*' Commentary on Isaiah, 67; Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 168–89; Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', 62.

[22] For instance, J. R. Lyman outlined how Eusebius felt historical events to be the result of free human action working under the guidance of divine providence through a process of *synergeia*, or co-operation, yet did not give any consideration to the question of how demonic activity might also fit into this framework: Lyman, *Christology and*

noted the importance of demons within Eusebius' understanding of history,[23] they have rarely made more than passing reference to the subject, and have not attempted to explore in any detail what this might mean for our understanding of Eusebius' interpretation of the past.

Rather more seriously, some scholars have been led, largely on the basis of comments in the *Praeparatio Evangelica* (*PE*), to the erroneous conclusion that Eusebius believed demonic activity to have ceased altogether long before his lifetime. Thus, even if demons are seen to have had a role in Eusebius' understanding of some historical periods, their activity is held to be safely confined to the distant past. This only contributes further to the sense that Eusebius' attitude was one of gloating triumphalism, since it suggests that he believed a once-potent threat to have been effectively neutralized.[24] This picture, however, is based on only a partial reading of Eusebius' works and cannot be sustained when comments from some of his other works, like the *VC* and later books of the *HE*, which deal with events from his own lifetime, are also taken into consideration. What we see when we look at Eusebius' works as a whole is that, in his view, the struggle of pious humans to escape from demonic influence was an ongoing feature of all historical time, including his own time. It was, moreover, crucial to his understanding of salvation.

Early human history for Eusebius was the story of a rapid decline into ignorance and barbarism, followed by a slow and difficult progress back towards God.[25] These changes in the human condition were linked, moreover, to the waxing and waning of demonic influence among humankind, as demonic tyranny was gradually replaced by the beneficial instruction of the Logos.[26] In part, of course, human free choice was also responsible for the initial fall of humankind away

Cosmology, 99, 102. Lyman uses the term 'free will' without specifying to which Greek term she is referring, but it seems clear that she has in mind the kind of unconstrained choice which Eusebius saw as central to moral responsibility. Compare: Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 82, 84, 86–7; Chesnut, 'Fate, Fortune, Free Will and Nature', 180.

[23] See, for example: Momigliano, 'Pagan and Christian Historiography', 90; Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche', 102–3; Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 103; Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 149, 182; Trompf, *Early Christian Historiography*, 133.

[24] Even Coggan, who is prepared to admit that, in Eusebius' view, demons might still have a cosmological existence, argues that they were held to have been already defeated, suggesting that their power had been destroyed by Christian salvation: 'Pandaemonia', 198.

[25] For a summary of Eusebius' views, see: *HE* 1.2.17–23 and *DE* 8.*Praef*.5–11.

[26] *DE* 4.9–10.

from God—in the *PE*, Eusebius describes how humans lost their original place 'in a paradise of the good, among the divine choruses',[27] as a result of their 'self-determined choice' (αὐθεκουσίῳ αἱρέσει).[28] It appears that Eusebius is thinking here of the fall of Adam, which saw humankind descend into a state of mortality.[29] Overall, however, Eusebius shows remarkably little interest in this initial fall, devoting far more attention to what happened to humankind once it was in this mortal state.

It was following this initial fall that the detrimental influence of the demons became crucial for Eusebius. In the period immediately after the fall, human beings are still not said to have sunk to their lowest point. Instead, we are told that God, in his benevolence, 'established heavenly angels as their guardians and curators, like leaders of a herd and shepherds'.[30] Since they were unable to recognize the true God, these angels encouraged the humans under their protection to worship the stars, sun, and moon instead, as the best alternative.[31] That humans then sank still lower, into a state of complete wildness and irrationality, was, for Eusebius, the result of demonic and diabolical plotting. The devil and his demons, envious of God's care for humankind, succeeded in overthrowing the governance of the angels, as the devil,

> dragging down the cities from better places, and the souls of many to every kind of wickedness with the enticements of pleasure, and omitting no manner of contrivance, with shameful stories of the gods and licentious narratives, put before his captives pleasing things and pleasure, through the cunning deceit of the demons.[32]

This suggestion that demons used 'shameful stories of the gods' to draw people away from the true, Christian God would appear to be a reference to the argument, common among early Christian apologists and fully endorsed by Eusebius,[33] that demons lay behind and inspired pagan worship. It also recalls Eusebius' earlier dismissal of the 'widespread and more legendary' theology of the Greeks in the *PE*.[34] Here Eusebius criticizes the mythological stories of the traditional gods and heroes for associating the divine with actions that would be considered criminal if conducted by

[27] *PE* 7.18.7. [28] *PE* 7.18.8. See also: *HE* 1.2.19. [29] *PE* 7.18.7–8.
[30] *DE* 4.6.9. [31] *DE* 4.8.1. [32] *DE* 4.9.6.
[33] See Chapter 2, section 'Physical Demons'. [34] *PE* 2.5.1.

humans.[35] He notes that even some Greeks had felt so uncomfortable about these stories that they sought to explain them away with allegories.[36] Thus we find demons being associated with the spread of classical mythology, which had led, in Eusebius' mind, not only to impiety, but also to immorality.

For Eusebius, the moral and religious history of humankind was thus inextricably linked to the greater cosmic struggle taking place between God and his angels and the devil and his demons. Humankind's descent into barbarism was the consequence of demonic deceit; their salvation depended upon them freeing themselves from the influence of these tyrannical overlords. In this process, however, humankind was not alone. Their relentless fall was, in Eusebius' view, arrested only by the benevolent intervention of the Logos, who 'shone some short and faint rays of his personal light through the prophet Moses and through the god-beloved men who came before him and after him' in order to help people improve their condition.[37] These early seeds of virtue and understanding were spread at first through the Hebrew prophets,[38] only gradually filtering through to the other human nations.[39] It was only once enough progress had been made that the time became right for the incarnation.[40] At this point, humankind made a great leap forwards, as the Logos 'mastered with great and divine power' the demons who had been largely in control until that point.[41] The incarnation was thus clearly an important historical turning-point for Eusebius and a crucial event in the weakening of demonic power. However, this does not mean that it marked the end of the struggle with demons for Eusebius.

It is worth emphasizing this point, because some scholars have previously argued that the incarnation marked a fundamental change in Eusebius' view of the demonic. According to Johnson, the incarnation and the period immediately following it saw the complete 'destruction of demonic power' in Eusebius' view.[42] This argument

[35] *PE* 2.4.1–3.

[36] *PE* 2.4.4–6. Here Eusebius appears to have in mind earlier Greek philosophers, particularly Plato—see *PE* 2.6.21–4.

[37] *DE* 4.10.4. [38] *DE* 4.10.4. [39] *DE* 8.*Praef.*10–11.

[40] *DE* 8.*Praef.*9–12. [41] *DE* 4.10.13.

[42] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 168. Compare: A. J. Droge, *Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 184. Likewise, while Coggan accepts that Eusebius and other Christians of

is based mainly on Eusebius' discussions of demons in the *PE*, and on three passages of this work in particular. Two of these discuss the apparent ending of the practice of human sacrifice,[43] while one describes the 'death' of a demon.[44] At *PE* 4.15.6, Eusebius suggests that 'the filth of polytheistic deceit' (*ἡ τῆς πολυθέου πλάνης λύμη*), which he believed to have been encouraged by demons, was 'slackened and reduced at no other time than that of Hadrian, when in the manner of a light Christ's teaching was already shining on every place'. However, it is important to note that what Eusebius is describing here is, at most, a reduction in polytheistic worship, which was in fact only one of the various methods by which he believed demons might try to draw people away from God.

Moreover, when this claim is examined in the context of the passage as a whole, it becomes clear that Eusebius is discussing, not the end of all polytheistic worship but merely of what he felt to be one of its worst features—human sacrifice. Immediately before his remarks at *PE* 4.15.6, Eusebius asks how anyone could imagine that good demons, let alone true divinity, would require the 'most profane' (*ἀσεβεστάτη*) and 'most unholy' (*ἀνοσιωτάτη*) practice of human sacrifice.[45] He follows this by arguing that 'some offered their sons, others their daughters, and others even themselves to the sacrifices of the demons'.[46] Eusebius' remarks about the decline of polytheistic worship therefore occur in the context of a discussion of human sacrifice and refer only to the supposed elimination of this practice. A similar statement at *PE* 4.17.4, when considered in the context of the surrounding discussion, can likewise be seen to refer only to the ending of human sacrifice, rather than to the destruction of all demonic influence. Thus, while these passages can legitimately be taken to indicate a weakening, or at least a change, in demonic power in the wake of the incarnation, they do not suggest that demonic power had ended completely.

The second passage that has been taken by some scholars to indicate Eusebius' belief in the ending of demonic power is found at

his time did not believe all demonic activity to have ceased with the incarnation, she nevertheless suggests that the incarnation was believed to have fundamentally changed the way in which Christians interacted with the demonic: 'Pandaemonia', 194.

[43] *PE* 4.15.5–6, 4.17.4. [44] *PE* 5.17.1–14. [45] *PE* 4.15.5.
[46] *PE* 4.15.9.

PE 5.17.1–14.[47] Here, Eusebius cites a lengthy passage from Plutarch's *De defectu oraculorum*, in which Plutarch relates the story of the death of the god Pan.[48] Once again, however, it is essential to consider this passage in the broader context of the work as a whole. The *PE* had a strongly apologetic purpose and sought to demonstrate to its readers that Christianity was superior to pagan forms of worship.[49] It therefore served Eusebius' apologetic argument well to suggest that the power of the pagan demon-gods was no match for the truly divine power of the Christian God and his Logos.[50] By suggesting that demons could be subject to death, Eusebius was demonstrating that they were not fully divine.

Moreover, Eusebius glosses Plutarch's passage with the comment that this death took place during the reign of Tiberius, when Christ was 'undertaking his teachings among men'.[51] Eusebius thus directly links the death of this particular demon with the effects of Christ's work, thereby again demonstrating the greater power of Christian divinity. There can be no doubt that Eusebius wished to suggest here that demonic power was considerably weakened at the incarnation of Christ and even that some demons may have died. However, in view of the fact that this argument suited Eusebius' apologetic aims so well, we should be very cautious about suggesting that this passage on its own can provide a full and accurate picture of the effect Eusebius believed the incarnation to have had on demonic power. Whatever his feelings on the subject, Eusebius' argument would have been

[47] Johnson further supports his argument by citing Eusebius' brief references to demonic death at *PE* 5.5.4 and 5.16.4: *Ethnicity and Argument*, 168. However, the key passage is the one at *PE* 5.17.1–14, on Plutarch's story of the death of 'Great Pan', which has also been used to support the view that Eusebius believed demonic power to have ended or at least to have been drastically reduced by both Coggan and Peter Brown: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', iii, 194; P. R. L. Brown, 'Eusebius, Constantine and the Future of Christianity', Annual Nicolai Rubinstein Lecture, Queen Mary, University of London, 21 March 2013. Of the two additional passages which Johnson cites, one simply directs the reader forward to the discussion of the death of 'Great Pan', which follows immediately afterwards, while the other is a reference to a slightly different passage of the same work by Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum*. As a result, neither really adds any weight to Johnson's claim.

[48] *PE* 5.17.1–12, citing Plut. *De Defect. Orac.* 418e–420a.

[49] As Eusebius himself suggests: *PE* 1.5.11–12, and as both Coggan and Johnson recognize: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', 17–18; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 11.

[50] As Coggan noted, Eusebius used this story about the death of Pan as for 'apologetic' ends, in order to attack pagan religion: Coggan, 'Pandaemonia', iii.

[51] *PE* 5.17.13.

much less forceful if he had taken the time to explain at length that only some demons had died or suffered a reduction in their power. However, if we look elsewhere in his works, and even elsewhere in the *PE*, we find that this is exactly what Eusebius appears to have believed.

Even within the *PE* itself, we can find hints that Eusebius did not consider all demonic power to have ended at the incarnation. At *PE* 4.16.22, he points to certain supposedly demon-inspired cult practices that he claims are still occurring 'even now'—indeed he even claims that these practices are similar in nature to earlier human sacrifices.[52] Such statements suggest that Eusebius must have viewed any weakening of demonic power as fairly limited. Moreover, when we broaden our perspective beyond the *PE* to consider Eusebius' statements in some of his works which deal more thoroughly with the post-incarnation history of humankind, such as the *HE* and *VC*, we encounter unmistakable evidence that Eusebius felt demons continued to pose a significant threat well into his own lifetime. Throughout these works we find Eusebius suggesting that demons and the devil were responsible for attempts to undermine the progress of the Christian church, either by inciting persecutions or by encouraging the spread of alternative doctrines which Eusebius considered to be heretical.[53] In the *HE*, persecutions of the past are regularly tied directly to the malign influence of demons. Here, we are told that it was the 'envious' (*βασκάνῳ*) and 'good-hating demon' who encouraged accusations against Christians during the reign of Commodus,[54] while slightly later Origen is said to have received particularly brutal treatment under persecution at the instigation of the 'wicked demon', who 'drew up all his troops in contention with the man, and with every contrivance and power attacked him, falling especially upon him of all those against whom he was then making war'.[55] In this passage we can see the way in which Eusebius envisaged persecutions as being inspired principally by the devil, ably supported by the demonic 'troops' he commanded.

Moreover, this activity should not be seen as confined safely to the distant past, for Eusebius also shows demons at work in the persecutions of his own lifetime. In his panegyric on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius attributes the recent persecutions to the activity of the 'evil-loving demon'.[56] Similarly, in the *VC*, Licinius' measures against

[52] Compare: *De solemnitate Paschali*, *PG* 24.697.20.
[53] See, for example: *HE* 4.7.1–2, 6.39.5, 10.4.14; *VC* 1.49.1, 2.73.1.
[54] *HE* 5.21.2. [55] *HE* 6.39.5. [56] *HE* 10.4.14.

Christians in the eastern provinces—measures which Eusebius would have personally experienced—are said to have been encouraged by a 'wicked demon'.[57] This demonic activity is, moreover, directly linked to the growing prosperity of the church. The demon encourages Licinius to persecute the church partly at least because of resentment at the benefits being enjoyed by the church in the west under Constantine's patronage.[58] Thus, not only did Eusebius believe demonic activity to be continuing, it is clear that he did not consider the current prosperity of the church to provide any security from demonic attack. Indeed, it might even have had the opposite effect of driving the demons to redouble their efforts.

This sense that the earthly success of the church could not be depended upon is also seen in the *HE*, where Eusebius suggests that the persecutions were in fact permitted by God after the church fell into complacency and dissension as a result of its growing success.[59] For Eusebius, prosperity for the church in one period did not necessarily mean long-term security; it was certainly no excuse to relax one's guard against the potential attacks of the demons. Thus, success for the church did not mark the end of history for Eusebius; instead, it brought with it a new set of demonically inspired challenges, which needed to be fought in new ways.

That the demonic threat remained ever-present for Eusebius, even after the unification of the empire under Constantine, can further be seen from the way in which he attributes the spread of supposedly heretical doctrines to demonic and diabolical influence. In the *HE*, the heresies which Eusebius discusses are mainly those of previous centuries: Mani, the founder of Manichaeism, is described as the leader of a 'demonic heresy' or 'sect', and portrayed as the instrument used by demons and the devil to thwart human salvation.[60] Similar language is also used of Menander, a follower of Simon Magus, and his disciples.[61] The repeated association which Eusebius draws between heretics and demonic influence in the *HE* makes clear the strength of his belief that heresies were ultimately the work of the devil and his demonic associates.[62]

[57] *VC* 1.49.1.

[58] *VC* 1.49.2. Compare: *HE* 5.21.1–2, where the demon is likewise driven to incite persecution by the period of relative calm which the church had been experiencing.

[59] *HE* 8.1.7. [60] *HE* 7.31.1. [61] *HE* 3.26.1, 4.7.1–15.

[62] As Pagels has shown, the idea that 'heretics' were acting under the influence of demons or the devil was commonplace among early Christian writers. As early as

Moreover, as with his discussions of the persecutions, demonic encouragement of heretical beliefs is as much a feature of Eusebius' own lifetime as of the past. In the *VC*, we find similar language being applied to the spread of heresies throughout Constantine's reign: 'an evil demon', we are told, lies behind the Donatist schism in Africa.[63] Similarly, the Council of Tyre is said to have been called in an attempt to resolve disagreements that Eusebius considered to be inspired by the 'good-hating envy' (*μισόκαλος φθόνος*), which, as we saw in the section 'Envious Demons' in Chapter 2, was characteristic of demonic activity for Eusebius.[64] Even when imperial persecution had ceased, then, Eusebius continued to see demonic activity at work undermining the church. In fact, Eusebius even suggests that the ending of the persecutions, far from marking the end of demonic attacks against the church, might simply lead the devil and demons to adopt a new strategy. In the *HE*, Eusebius remarks that, when persecutions were not an option, the demons would turn to spreading false doctrine instead:

> [P]reviously he [the 'good-hating demon'] armed himself against it [the church] with persecutions from outside, but, being now shut out from this, using wicked men and sorcerers like ruinous instruments and messengers of destruction for souls, he waged war by other means, contriving in every way that sorcerers and cheats might insinuate themselves into the same name as our belief, and at the same time both lead into the depth of destruction those of the faithful caught by them, and turn away from the approach to the saving word those unaware of the faith, by the things which they did.[65]

For Eusebius, it seems that this alternative form of attack might pose even more of a threat than the persecutions had done, since it served the dual purpose both of discouraging new converts and of leading existing Christians away from what Eusebius felt to be a 'correct' understanding of the divine. The idea that any historical event—be it the incarnation, the ending of persecution, or Constantine's patronage of the church—had already brought humankind to a state of complete

Paul, those spreading alternative doctrines had been attacked as the 'ministers' (*διάκονοι*) of Satan (2 Cor. 11:13–15), while in the second century, Irenaeus of Lyons in his *Adversus Haereses* had frequently associated his opponents with the devil (for example: Iren. *Adv. Haer.* 1.27.4, 5.26.2): Pagels, *Origin of Satan*, 149–78.

[63] *VC* 1.45.2. [64] *VC* 4.41.1. [65] *HE* 4.7.1–2.

security, in which the demonic threat had been effectively neutralized, is therefore clearly foreign to Eusebius' thought.

Instead, Eusebius presents the threat posed by demons as continually evolving and adapting to changing circumstances. In works such as the *PE* and *Demonstratio Evangelica* (*DE*), which deal at length with the pre-incarnation history of humankind, the emphasis is principally on the role of demons in encouraging polytheism and its associated vices. This contrasts with the *HE* and *VC*, where the discussion focuses almost entirely on events following the incarnation, and the role of demons in encouraging either persecution or heresy is more heavily stressed.[66] This suggests that Eusebius may have considered the nature of the demonic threat to have changed following the incarnation, rather than ceasing altogether. As we saw in the section 'Escaping Demonic Influence' in Chapter 4, Eusebius held that there were two principal means by which demons might divert people from the road to salvation—either by encouraging vice or by encouraging false belief, be that polytheism or heresy.[67] For Eusebius, it seems that even as the influence of polytheism waned, the demons were finding new ways to encourage false belief. The encouragement of polytheism became the encouragement of 'heresy'. With the growing success of the church, the demons were adopting new tactics, rather than retreating from the battle. Eusebius' suggestion in the *PE* and *DE* that the pagan cults were in decline and that the demons of these cults were dying should therefore not be taken as an indication that he believed the demonic threat to lie safely in the past. Rather, as Eusebius saw it, the demons in his own time were simply

[66] Sirinelli suggested, by contrast, that 'Eusebius' demonology has no other function than to explain pagan error', *Les vues historiques*, 317. However, Sirinelli's focus on Eusebius' views in the period before the Council of Nicaea means that the *VC* is necessarily excluded from his study and, although the *HE* would qualify for consideration, in his treatment of Eusebius' views of demons Sirinelli focused almost exclusively on the *PE* and *DE*. As a result, the emphasis of Eusebius' discussion would certainly appear to be primarily the role of demons in encouraging polytheism. Coggan similarly felt that the defining feature of Eusebius' discussions of demons was their use in his anti-pagan polemic: 'Pandaemonia', 189. As with Sirinelli, Coggan's exclusive focus on the *PE* leads her to miss some of the broader applications of Eusebius' demonology which clearly appear in his other works. The conclusions of Coggan and Sirinelli on this point demonstrate the importance of looking at a range of Eusebius' works in order to achieve a balanced picture of his views.

[67] *DE* 7.1.103. See also: *DE* 6.18.31.

developing new and different challenges for the virtuous, most notably the spread of 'false' doctrine and dissension within the church.

For Eusebius, then, human history was characterized—driven even—by the struggle between the demons and the Christian God or his Logos for human souls, a struggle which Eusebius saw as continuing throughout his lifetime and doubtless beyond. This was not, however, a struggle in which human beings were merely passive pawns; rather it was a struggle for salvation in which humankind was actively involved. Eger identified two potential driving forces in Eusebius' understanding of history: one was the development of free human action, the other the struggle between divine and demonic power.[68] These he appears to have seen as incompatible, suggesting that Eusebius emphasizes each of these at different points in the *HE*.[69] However, as we saw in Chapter 4, human προαίρεσις meant that people were in fact drawn into this greater cosmic conflict and able to choose sides within it. It was partly by exploiting human προαίρεσις that demons maintained their struggle against God. Thus a distinction between these two historical forces is unnecessary and even misleading.

Moreover, from the human perspective, the choice of whom to follow in this cosmic struggle would directly affect their salvation: a person's damnation would result from their choice to associate with demons, while their salvation would be secured only by active co-operation with the divine.[70] In the *DE*, Eusebius notes how the Logos acted against demonic influence, 'setting loose and altering *those who placed their dependence on him* from a licentious to a moderate life, from impiety to piety, from unrighteousness to righteousness, indeed even from the power of embittered demons to godly apprehension of true piety'.[71] While the promise of salvation offered by the Logos was open to all, Eusebius suggests here that it remained a matter of individual human choice whether or not to take advantage of that offer. Similarly, in his discussion of fate and divine providence in the *PE*, Eusebius notes that providence directs everything that happens, including things that occur as a result of human action, not by

[68] Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche', 102–3.

[69] Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche', 102, n.34.

[70] Lyman has noted the importance of co-operation between human and divine 'will' to Eusebius' historical scheme, and particularly to his understanding of salvation: *Christology and Cosmology*, 99, 102–3. Compare: Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 86–7.

[71] *DE* 4.10.14 (my emphasis).

dominating or diminishing human free choice, but rather by 'working together and acting together with the things which are up to us'.[72] Thus, for Eusebius, human embodiment and participation in historical time were not to be seen as a punishment, but rather an opportunity.[73]

Earthly history, in Eusebius' view, was the sphere in which human beings might achieve salvation by striving to live a virtuous and pious life.[74] At *PE* 7.18.9, Eusebius writes that 'it is especially fitting to strive above all for piety and to correct the first mistake with the second opportunities, and to hurry towards the ascent and restitution (ἀποκατάστασιν) of what is right. For the end of the nature of man is not thus on earth, not turning downwards into destruction and perdition, but there from where the first man strayed.' This suggests that, in his understanding of what salvation entailed, Eusebius held a view very similar to that of Origen. For Origen, salvation meant the return of humankind to its original state with God.[75]

Eusebius' use of the term ἀποκατάστασις here should not be taken to imply the idea of the universal salvation of all creatures, including demons and the devil, such as is often associated with Origen.[76] The context of the passage at *PE* 7.18.9 makes it clear that Eusebius is referring only to humankind and it therefore seems that he is using the term in an older, less technical sense. Even by the time of Gregory of Nyssa, later in the fourth century, the term ἀποκατάστασις had not yet acquired the exclusive meaning of universal salvation, and retained a broader sense of 'restitution' or 'restoration'.[77] This is clearly how Eusebius is using the term here—to indicate the idea that salvation was a journey back to an original state that had been

[72] *PE* 6.6.45. [73] As, for example, at: *Theoph.* 1.69.

[74] *PE* 7.18.9–10. On this, see: Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology*, 100–2; Young, *Nicaea to Chalcedon*, 22–3.

[75] Daley, *The Hope*, 58, citing Orig. *de Princ.* 1.6.2, 3.6.1.

[76] As Daley points out, however, while the idea that all creatures, including the devil and his demons, would eventually be saved was often attributed to Origen both by his theological opponents and by later scholars, Origen was by no mean unequivocal in his adoption of the idea: *The Hope*, 58–9. Although Ilaria Ramelli has recently shown that Eusebius in many respects shared Origen's understanding of ἀποκατάστασις, her discussion focuses on the salvation of humans and notes that the destruction of evil was seen as an essential prerequisite for human ἀποκατάστασις by Eusebius: Ramelli, 'Origen, Eusebius, *Apokatastasis*, and Christology', 307–23, esp. 319. See also: Ramelli, *The Christian Doctrine of* Apokatastasis, 307–31; and, on the links between Origen and Eusebius' views of *apokatastasis*, see also: Berkhoff, *Die Theologie*, 161–2.

[77] As M. Ludlow has shown: *Universal Salvation: Eschatology in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 38.

lost. In this passage, Eusebius appears to have in mind a state prior to the fall of Adam—this, was, for Eusebius, a state of immortality, among the 'divine choruses' close to God.[78] Thus, for him, it seems that humankind was not meant to achieve fulfilment on earth, but rather to use its time there in order to strive for the greater, spiritual rewards that awaited the virtuous among the 'divine choruses' of heaven.

That this striving for virtue and hence salvation meant, for Eusebius, constantly fighting against the demons is evident from his description of the struggles of the martyrs in the *HE*. Here, Eusebius describes one of his aims as being to announce 'the resistance of the athletes of piety and their much-enduring courage, and the trophies taken against demons, and the victories over the invisible enemies and the crowns over all these things'.[79] For Eusebius, the victory of the martyrs is won over the demons—those demons, presumably, which were attacking the virtuous by means of the persecutions. However, persecution was simply one of several methods by which Eusebius thought the demons might try to derail human salvation. The martyrs might provide the most dramatic example of virtuous Christians achieving victory over the demons and thwarting their plans, but it seems logical that, for Eusebius, other pious humans, whether by maintaining a virtuous lifestyle in the face of the temptations of pleasure or by avoiding 'heretical' doctrines, were similarly fighting off the demons to secure the salvation that victory would bring them.

In this struggle against the demons, however, human beings were by no means alone. Instead, Eusebius repeatedly suggests that humankind was led away from demons and towards the life of virtue that would earn them salvation by divine guidance and instruction. As many scholars have noted, the idea of the Logos-Christ as a teacher appears to lie at the core of Eusebius' soteriology, and is particularly important in his understanding of the incarnation.[80] This is not to suggest, of course, that Eusebius felt teaching to have been the only purpose of the incarnation. More than once, Eusebius shows that he was familiar with some of the different theories of the incarnation and

[78] *PE* 7.18.7–8. [79] *HE* 5.*Praef*.4.

[80] For example: Hollerich, *Eusebius*' Commentary on Isaiah, 64; Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 102; Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology*, 83, 122; Young, *Nicaea to Chalcedon*, 18; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 185; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 279.

crucifixion that were widespread among early Christian writers.[81] These included the idea that the crucifixion represented a sacrifice to the devil to redeem humankind from his power,[82] as well as the—not entirely compatible—notion that the crucifixion was necessary to demonstrate to the demons that Christ was superior to death.[83] Yet, while Eusebius was happy to list these various theories, his references to them are little more than cursory, and he shows little interest in discriminating between them. Overall, the repeated references to the beneficial effect of Christ's teaching, found throughout a variety of Eusebius' works, leave a much stronger impression, and suggest that, in his view, this was by far the most important feature of the incarnation.[84]

In particular, Eusebius often links the spread of divine teaching to a decline in demonic influence. In the *PE*, Eusebius credits Christ's preaching with freeing people from their long-standing enslavement to demons.[85] Similarly, in the *DE*, we are told that

> when our saviour was brought bodily into the land of the Egyptians . . . the wicked powers living there before were likely not a little moved by his inexpressible power and agency, and especially (μάλιστα) when, through his teaching afterwards, a countless number of those living in Egypt, fleeing from the deceits of the demons, still even now agree that they know the one God of all.[86]

The use of μάλιστα here suggests that Eusebius may have seen Christ's teaching as being even more effective in undermining demonic influence in Egypt than his physical presence in the territory as a child had been.

For Eusebius, it seems that there were two principal aspects to this divine teaching. Firstly, it served to counter false belief—early in the *PE*, Eusebius notes that as a result of 'our saviour's teaching' people of various nations have abandoned their traditional belief in multiple gods and have instead come to recognize only the one, Christian

[81] See, for example: *SC* 15.9–11; *Theoph*. 3.57–60, 4.9; *DE* 4.12.6–9, 10.*Praef*.2–7, 10.8.37; *De solemnitate Paschali*, *PG* 24.696.23–7. As Lyman recognized: *Christology and Cosmology*, 122. On some of the various early Christian explanations for Christ's incarnation and passion, see: Burton Russell, *Satan*, 83–4.

[82] *Theoph.* 3.59. See also: *DE* 4.12.7.

[83] *Theoph*. 3.57.

[84] See, for example: *PE* 1.4.1, 1.4.6, 2.2.64, 2.4.1, 2.4.6, 3.5.5, 4.15.6, 4.17.4, 5.1.1, 6. *Praef*.1, 7.16.11; *DE* 1.1.8, 1.6.1, 1.10.35, 3.6.35; *Theoph.* 5.18; *Ecl. Proph.* 125.20–4, 225.27–8; *CI* 279.4–9; *SC* 14.5, 14.12, 16.10.

[85] *PE* 4.21.2, 6.*Praef*.1, 7.16.11.

[86] *DE* 9.2.6.

God.[87] Secondly, it also brought about a moral improvement. Eusebius claims that, as a result of divine instruction, people no longer practise such vices as cannibalism, incest, and human sacrifice.[88] Instead, those who have turned towards the Christian God have learnt to relinquish passion and to live according to a more exacting standard (ἀκριβῶς).[89] This apparent dual focus of divine teaching corresponds to Eusebius' belief, highlighted in the section 'Escaping Demonic Influence in Chapter 4, that demons had two main means of diverting people from salvation—the encouragement of vice and the instigation of false belief.[90]

Moreover, divine instruction for Eusebius did not begin and end with the incarnation. He also saw it in the improving influence of the Logos, which Eusebius felt had prepared humankind for the incarnation.[91] Crucially, however, it is clear that Eusebius also believed this teaching to have continued long after the incarnation, through the preaching of the apostles and those who came after them.[92] In the *HE*, we learn that people were also freed from demonically inspired polytheism 'by the power of Christ through the teaching of his disciples and their wonderful works'.[93] Thus, while the incarnation had a part to play in Eusebius' understanding of salvation, it was not, for him, a completely definitive event. For Eusebius, salvation and the defeat of the demons were gradual processes, in which the long-term instruction of humankind in virtue and piety, rather than any particular one-off event, was key.

As a result, Eusebius' interpretation of the events of his later life, however much he might have welcomed these developments, cannot be seen as quite so straightforwardly triumphalist as has often been the case in the past. This new focus on the role of the demonic in Eusebius' view of history thus supports the challenge to the traditional reading of Eusebius' attitude which was launched by Thielman in his 1987 article on Eusebius' eschatology,[94] but which has rarely been pursued in more recent scholarship.[95] Against the traditional argument that Eusebius was so delighted by the success of the church under Constantine that in

[87] *PE* 1.4.9. See also: *PE* 1.1.10. [88] *PE* 1.4.6. [89] *PE* 1.4.9.
[90] *DE* 6.18.31, 7.1.103. [91] *HE* 1.2.21–3.
[92] See, for example: *DE* 1.1.8, 1.8.1, 3.6.32, 4.12.9; *HE* 3.37.1.
[93] *HE* 2.3.2. [94] Thielman, 'Another Look', 226–37.
[95] Hollerich does, however, note that Thielman was right to 'stress the more conventional aspects of Eusebius' eschatology': *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 196, n.115. Johnson has also suggested that his reassessment of the date of Eusebius' *Fragments on Luke* would support Thielman's argument that Eusebius continued to

later life he lost interest in ideas of a second coming of Christ and a future, spiritual kingdom of God,[96] Thielman demonstrated that, throughout his works, Eusebius continues to emphasize the greater importance of spiritual over earthly concerns.[97]

Thielman therefore suggested that Eusebius continued throughout his life to anticipate a future spiritual fulfilment for the virtuous, and argued moreover that the idea of a second coming and associated final judgement served an important function in Eusebius' thought, allowing him to explain and to endure the evident deficiencies of earthly systems of justice.[98] The discussion in this chapter reinforces this view, by showing that, for Eusebius, salvation meant the restoration of a greater, spiritual state, while life in the earthly realm was merely a transitory stage in the process of achieving that salvation. Moreover, Eusebius' continuing concerns about the potency of the demonic threat show that he cannot have seen his own era as the triumphant climax of the human struggle for salvation. Consequently, we cannot continue to accept the suggestion that Eusebius saw either the church or the empire as the fully realized kingdom of God on earth and we must therefore consider afresh how Eusebius viewed the events and people of his time.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP

Clearly Eusebius did not consider himself to be standing triumphantly at the climax of history, but felt instead that humankind

maintain his interest in the second coming and last judgement far beyond his early works, although this is by no means the main purpose of A. P. Johnson's article: 'The Tenth Book of Eusebius' *General Elementary Introduction*: A Critique of the Wallace-Hadrill Thesis', *JTS* 62 (2011), 160. See also: more recently, Johnson, 'The Ends of Transfiguration', 201–2, where Johnson again briefly questions scholars' tendency to attribute a 'realized eschatology' to Eusebius.

[96] Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 173, 187; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 482–3. Thielman also, a little unfairly, attributes this view to T. D. Barnes: see Thielman, 'Another Look', 226. It is unclear precisely how Thielman drew the conclusion that Barnes felt Eusebius to have little interest in the second coming, since Barnes makes it very clear that at least some of Eusebius' works do contain discussion of the second coming: *C&E*, 172–3.

[97] Thielman, 'Another Look', 229, 231–2.

[98] Thielman, 'Another Look', 233–4.

remained caught up in a dangerous struggle to gain freedom from demonic influence. Achieving this freedom was, in Eusebius' view, greatly facilitated by the spread of divine teaching and instruction, whether that was carried out by the divine Logos, the incarnate Christ, or his disciples. Just as the struggle against the demons was not seen by Eusebius as lying in the distant past, so the divine instruction necessary to securing salvation was also held by him to continue into the present day, facilitated now, not by the apostles, but by a new generation of virtuous Christian leaders. For Eusebius, real significance therefore lay, not in either the church or the empire, but rather in the figures of their leaders, the bishops, and the Christian emperor.

He presents these figures as teachers, instructing their followers in 'correct' doctrine and a godly lifestyle in order to free them from the demons and increase their chances of achieving salvation. They are shown as continuing the teaching of Christ, modelling themselves on his example and thereby spreading the saving Christian message. The conversion of Constantine and his patronage of the church were undoubtedly significant for Eusebius, yet this significance lay, not in the fact that this marked the end of a historical struggle for salvation, but in the fact that, as part of this ongoing struggle, it greatly strengthened the position of the virtuous. For the first time, political and religious leadership were united in Christian virtue. No longer would citizens of the empire be pulled in two different directions—away from demons if they followed the Christian bishops, but towards them if they chose to imitate their emperor. This would both facilitate the salvation of greater numbers of people and hasten the further decline of the demons. However, in order for these benefits to be maintained, it was necessary for Christian leaders to adopt both a high standard of virtue and a united front against the demons. Thus, even in a work which on the surface appears unshakably triumphant, like the *VC*, we see Eusebius repeatedly emphasizing the importance of unity and the need to set high standards of virtue.

In order to understand Eusebius' attitude, it is important to note that, while some earlier discussions of Eusebius' thought have focused on a division between the 'Christian Church' and 'Roman Empire',[99]

[99] In particular: Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 15, 201.

thinking of Eusebius' concerns primarily in terms of such impersonal institutions or structures is actually somewhat misleading. Throughout Eusebius' works, the emphasis is often far more on the role of leaders, and particularly on their moral qualities, than on political or administrative structures and events.[100] For Eusebius, as the *HE* reveals, the Christian church may be largely identified with the episcopal hierarchy of which he was a part. The *HE* opens with a promise to record, among other things, 'the successions from the holy apostles',[101] which it does primarily by listing the successive bishops of various major sees,[102] attempting where possible to make a connection between the first bishop of each see and one of the apostles.[103] As Grant has highlighted, this idea of an unbroken succession from the apostles—and hence from Christ himself—serves to underscore, for Eusebius, the validity of the doctrine endorsed by the church, in opposition to both 'heretics' and pagans.[104]

Of course, Eusebius was not the first Christian writer to place such emphasis on this idea of 'apostolic succession'. Earlier writers, including Irenaeus of Lyons and Clement of Rome, had similarly argued that 'correct' Christian doctrine had been transmitted uninterrupted from the apostles by the succession of Christian bishops and teachers.[105] However, Eusebius' emphasis on the important role of church leaders is not confined solely to the *HE* or to the idea of 'apostolic succession'. Hollerich has drawn attention to the prominence accorded to bishops in the *CI*, to the extent that Eusebius even suggests that the hierarchical distinctions of the church will be replicated after the second coming in the heavenly kingdom.[106] Elsewhere, Eusebius repeatedly stresses—perhaps for somewhat

[100] As Eusebius himself claims at the opening of the *VC*, when he declares that he will not focus on Constantine's military activities, laws, or peacetime government, but only on the character of the emperor himself: *VC* 1.11.1.

[101] *HE* 1.1.1.

[102] See, for example: *HE* 3.13.1–15.1, 3.34.1–35.1, 4.1.1, 4.4.1–5.5, 4.19.1–20.1, 5.6.1–5, 5.9.1, 5.12.1–2, 5.22.1, 6.10.1–11.1, 7.2.1.

[103] For example: *HE* 3.2.1, 3.4.3, 3.36.1–2, 4.5.3–5. For discussion of Eusebius' attitude to the idea of 'apostolic succession' in the *HE*, see: Grant, *Eusebius as Church Historian*, 45–59.

[104] Grant, *Eusebius as Church Historian*, 46.

[105] On which, see: A. Brent, 'Diogenes Laertius and the Apostolic Succession', *JEH* 44 (1993), 367–89.

[106] Hollerich, *Eusebius*' Commentary on Isaiah, 169, 186–8, citing *CI* 405.25–9, 161.17–18, 161.32–6.

pragmatic personal reasons—the respect that Constantine accorded to the bishops.[107] For Eusebius, bishops are the indispensable heart of the church, preserving and promoting the 'true' doctrine that he held to be essential for salvation. Consequently, asking what Eusebius believed the role of the church to be is, to a large degree, to ask what he considered his own role, and that of his peers, to be.

In view of the heavy emphasis which Eusebius places on the role of Christian instruction and 'correct' doctrine in bringing people to salvation, it is important to remember that the role of the bishop within his community would have involved a large element of teaching. Through their preaching, the instruction of catechumens, and, it might be hoped, the example of their own lifestyle, bishops and other members of the clergy were in a position to demonstrate to their congregations how best to develop Christian virtue. Although Eusebius' homilies have been largely lost, it is clear from his surviving works that he took his role as a Christian teacher very seriously.[108] Many of his writings, such as the *Quaestiones Evangelicae*, or the now-lost treatise addressing the question of the large families fathered by the biblical patriarchs,[109] served an obviously explanatory purpose, responding to particular questions that either had been, or might be, raised about matters of doctrine or the interpretation of the scriptures. Some, like the *Generalis elementaria introductio* (*GEI*), demonstrate many of the features of a genre of pedagogical literature common to both pagan and Christian education—the εἰσαγωγή.[110] Others are more subtly instructive—the *PE* and *DE* seek to answer the question of who the Christians are, while the *HE* also helps to instruct Christians in how they should view themselves, by providing them with an understanding of their past as a community. In the *VC*, Eusebius expresses the hope that in this work 'the mention of tales beloved of God may furnish study not without benefit but of great use for life for those well prepared in their soul'.[111]

[107] See, for example, *VC* 1.42.1, 3.6.1, 3.15.1, 4.27.2, 4.46.1.

[108] On which, see the excellent recent discussion of Johnson: *Eusebius*, 51–83.

[109] Mentioned at *DE* 1.9.20 and *PE* 7.8.29.

[110] On the *GEI* as an εἰσαγωγή and its relationship to a similar work by Porphyry, *On the Philosophy from Oracles*, see: Johnson, 'Eusebius the Educator', 99–118. On the educational aims of Eusebius' works, see also the recent discussion of Johnson, *Eusebius*, 51–83.

[111] *VC* 1.10.4.

Moreover, in the *HE*, Eusebius often lists the writings left behind by the earlier church leaders whose lives he records, carefully assessing their value and praising or critiquing the ideas they expressed, as he felt appropriate.[112] Often, such documents appear to be the most significant contributions of the bishops Eusebius lists. By contrast, Eusebius shows little interest in the development of any administrative or institutional structures. This corresponds to Allen Brent's suggestion that, for earlier Christian writers, the idea of an episcopal 'apostolic succession' was drawn at least in part from the idea of teaching successions within Greek philosophical schools, such as those outlined by Diogenes Laertius in his *Successions of the Philosophers*.[113] For Irenaeus, Brent suggests, it was correct teaching, rather than any priestly or ritual significance, that was preserved by the succession from the apostles.[114] Similarly, it seems that, for Eusebius, the role of a bishop, as a successor to the apostles, was, if not exclusively then at least substantially, that of a teacher.

Likewise, Eusebius' interest, especially in the *VC* and *LC*—which have done so much to fuel the idea of his 'realized eschatology'—is not in the abstract notion of a Christian empire, but rather in the figure of Constantine himself, the Christian emperor. There is a crucial distinction to be drawn between Eusebius' view of the Roman Empire itself, particularly the pre-Constantinian empire, and his view of Constantine as a Christian leader who could, in his own way, be seen as fulfilling a role not unlike that of a bishop. That Eusebius, like Origen and Melito of Sardis before him,[115] held the Roman Empire to have had a providential role in God's historical design has long been recognized.[116] For Eusebius, the Roman Empire had facilitated the growth of Christianity by bringing peace between previously hostile nations, thereby making travel easier and enabling the spread of the Christian message.[117] To Eusebius, it was

[112] For example: *HE* 3.38.1–39.17, 4.21.1, 4.23.1–26.14, 5.26.1, 6.20.1–3, 7.20.1.

[113] Brent, 'Diogenes Laertius', 368. See also DeVore on the parallels between Eusebius' *HE* and the genre of philosophical biography: 'Eusebius' Un-Josephan History', 161–79.

[114] Brent, 'Diogenes Laertius', 380, citing Iren. *Adv. Haer.* 3.3.2–3.

[115] Melito of Sardis, cited at *HE* 4.26.7–11; Orig. *Cels.* 2.30.

[116] See, for example: Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 174–5; Sirinelli, *Les vues historiques*, 388; Cranz, 'Kingdom and Polity', 55–6; Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 99–101; Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah, 188–90; Verdoner, 'Transgeneric Crosses', 86; Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche', 98.

[117] *DE* 3.7.30–3.

no coincidence that Christ had been born at the same time as the empire was established by Augustus; rather, it was evidence of God's benevolent providence at work in history.[118]

However, as Johnson has noted, Eusebius' presentation of the Roman Empire, particularly in works written before Constantine's conquest of the east, is not unequivocally positive.[119] At times, Eusebius suggests that Christianity flourished in spite of the Roman Empire and its rulers, rather than because of them. In the *DE*, he argues that the persecutions made it clear that 'the confirmation of the word came not from the design of men, but from the power of God'.[120] Even when the persecutions are said to have fulfilled the ultimately beneficial purpose of correcting the errant church, Eusebius is quick to stress that this does not remove the need to punish the Roman persecutors.[121] In Johnson's view, references such as these allow Eusebius to draw a distinction between Christianity and the Roman Empire, and to highlight the primary importance of the church, rather than the empire, in facilitating the spread of Christianity.[122] However, they also demonstrate that, for Eusebius, the character of the empire was shaped largely by the character of its leaders. In spite of his evident sense that Christianity had benefited from the existence of the Roman Empire, Eusebius refused to celebrate the empire itself unreservedly as long as its leadership remained hostile to Christians.

This, of course, changed with Constantine's accession to sole rule—a development that led to the passing of legislation in favour of the Christian church, as well as to practical financial support enabling the building of new churches, and in some cases to the destruction of pagan shrines. These measures are famously celebrated in the *VC*.[123] However, Eusebius' emphasis in this work, as well as in the *LC*, is not exclusively on these official actions of the emperor. Just as, or even more, important were Constantine's personal qualities, which allowed him, in Eusebius' view, to fulfil the role of a Christian teacher.[124] Eusebius makes this point quite explicitly, suggesting in

[118] *DE* 3.7.30–3; *PE* 1.4.4.
[119] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 176–85.
[120] *DE* 3.7.36.
[121] *HE* 8.16.3.
[122] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 179, 193.
[123] See, for example: *VC* 1.42.2, 2.20.1–22.1, 2.44.1–45.1, 3.54.2–56.3, 3.58.1–4, 4.28.1.
[124] Constantine's personal piety and virtuous behaviour are stressed at, for example: *VC* 1.9.1, 2.14.1, 3.2.2, 4.15.1–18.1, 4.22.1–3, 4.29.1, 4.33.1–2, 4.48.1. On Constantine as a teacher, see, for example: *VC* 1.4.1, 1.5.2, 3.58.2, 3.59.3, 4.18.1, 4.29.5,

the *LC* that Constantine 'expounds to those ruled by him the godly knowledge of the greatest king, as though they were the students of a good schoolmaster'.[125] Similarly, in the *VC* Eusebius claims that Constantine's soldiers 'admitted the emperor as their teacher in the ways of piety'.[126] Throughout both the *VC* and the *LC*, Constantine is praised for his piety, his modesty, and his recognition of the greater importance of spiritual over earthly matters.[127] As a result of his exemplary lifestyle, Eusebius suggests that Constantine has become 'a lesson and example of piety to the mortal race'.[128] It seems that a virtuous Christian emperor can, simply by his existence, act as a teacher and help to spread the divine message by setting an example of good behaviour.

More than this, however, Constantine is also presented as actively seeking to instruct his subjects in the Christian faith. We are told in the *VC* how he would deliver sermons on religious and moral issues to his court,[129] while the *LC* suggests that soldiers in the army received similar instruction.[130] The importance which Eusebius attached to this aspect of Constantine's role is further indicated by the fact that he chose to attach what he claimed was one of the emperor's own speeches on Christian doctrine to the end of the *VC*.[131] In fact, Eusebius likewise suggests that Constantine's letters to his subjects on religious matters had the specific effect of 'keeping those he ruled away from the deceit of demons'.[132] Even Constantine's actions against paganism are said to have had an instructive function—when Constantine orders the destruction of pagan shrines and the statues of the gods are stripped of their precious metal

4.55.1. Averil Cameron has pointed to the presentation of Constantine as a teacher in the *VC* as 'one of the more striking features' of the work, suggesting that this is one of many thematic parallels between the *VC* and the slightly later *Vita Antonii* by Athanasius: 'Form and Meaning', 78.

[125] *LC* 5.8. [126] *VC* 4.18.1.

[127] For example: piety: *VC* 2.14.1, 3.2.2; *LC* 2.6; modesty: *VC* 1.39.1–3, 4.48.1; *LC* 5.6; spiritual concerns: *LC* 5.5, 5.8.

[128] *VC* 1.4.1. See also: *VC* 1.5.2. [129] *VC* 4.29.1–5.

[130] *LC* 9.10.

[131] *VC* 4.32.1. Although the authenticity of this speech has been questioned in the past, for our purposes the important point is that Eusebius felt it necessary to emphasize and, indeed, prove through the inclusion of this document that Constantine performed a role in instructing his subjects. Its inclusion thus reinforces Eusebius' presentation of Constantine as a teacher.

[132] *VC* 2.61.1.

exteriors, people are said to have realized the error of their previous religious practices and to have laughed at the demons they had once worshipped, rather than fearing them.[133] Thus it seems that, for Eusebius, Constantine's significance lay principally in his role as a teacher of Christian piety and virtue. Just like the bishops, by actively spreading the Christian message Constantine was working to undermine demonic influence and hence helping to forward the divine historical plan. As Christian teachers, both bishops and the emperor could be seen as performing a similarly crucial role in leading people to salvation.

This idea that Eusebius, or even Constantine himself, might have seen a parallel between the role of bishops and that of the Christian emperor is hardly new to Eusebian scholarship. Eusebius' report at *VC* 4.24.1 that Constantine described himself as 'a bishop of those outside' (*τῶν ἐκτὸς . . . ἐπίσκοπος*) the church, together with a similar comment by Eusebius that Constantine was like 'a shared bishop' (*τις κοινὸς ἐπίσκοπος*),[134] has long been the subject of scholarly debate.[135] This debate, however, has tended to focus on what these comments might reveal about either Eusebius' or Constantine's attitude towards the relationship between the church and the empire as separate and even opposed organizations,[136] rather than on what they can show about Eusebius' understanding of the duties of bishops and the emperor in their own right. For Johnson, Constantine's remark, at least in Eusebius' interpretation, if not in Constantine's original intention, is 'an expression of the doctrine of the separation of Church and State'.[137] However Eusebius' designation of the emperor by the same term, *ἐπίσκοπος*, used to denote the bishops of the church surely suggests unity rather than separation. Of course, this parallel

[133] *VC* 3.57.1. See also: *LC* 8.8.

[134] *VC* 1.44.1.

[135] See, for example: C. Rapp, 'Imperial Ideology in the Making: Eusebius of Caesarea on Constantine as "Bishop"', *JTS* 49 (1998), 685–95; Seston, 'Constantine as a "Bishop"', 127–31; D. DeDecker and G. Dupuis-Masay, 'L'"Épiscopat" de l'Empereur Constantin', *Byzantion* 50 (1980), 118–57; J. A. Straub, 'Constantine as *ΚΟΙΝΟΣ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΣ*: Tradition and Innovation in the Representation of the First Christian Emperor's Majesty', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 21 (1967), 37–55.

[136] For example: Straub, '*ΚΟΙΝΟΣ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΣ*', 52; G. Dagron, *Emperor and Priest: The Imperial Office in Byzantium*, trans. J. Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 [originally published in French, 1993]),135; Seston, 'Constantine as "Bishop"'; P. G. Caron, 'Constantin le Grand *ἐπίσκοπος τῶν ἐκτὸς* de l'église romaine', *Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité* 22 (1975), 179–88.

[137] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 195.

enhances the position of the bishops by suggesting that they are, in their own way, equivalent to the emperor, but it also further strengthens the position of both bishops and emperor by highlighting their privileged relationship with the divine. In particular, it suggests that Eusebius saw these earthly leaders as imitating the instructive, supervisory role of the Christ-Logos.

In a parallel which has not previously been explored by scholars, Eusebius often uses various forms of the word ἐπισκοπέω (oversee), from which ἐπίσκοπος is derived, to describe divine activity on earth, particularly that of the Christ-Logos.[138] In the *VC*, for example, Eusebius suggests that it was only 'the supervision of God (θεοῦ τις ἐπισκοπὴ), and the fear of the emperor' that prevented rioting in Antioch.[139] While Rapp has demonstrated how Eusebius' presentation of Constantine as an ἐπίσκοπος was tied in part to his portrayal of the emperor as a 'type' of Moses in the *VC*, she gives little consideration to this further parallel with Christ.[140] Rapp pointed out that, since Moses was considered by many early Christian writers to be a 'prefiguration' of Christ, the parallel between Constantine and Moses could suggest a further parallel between Constantine and Christ;[141] however, this link was also made more directly through the use of the term ἐπίσκοπος. Moreover, since ἐπίσκοπος was also used to designate bishops of the church, they too could be drawn into this parallel. In Eusebius' works, the supervisory role of an ἐπίσκοπος is thus exercised in common by the Christ-Logos, by Constantine, and by the bishops of the church. It therefore seems that, for Eusebius, Christian leaders, whether bishops or the emperor, stood almost in the place of the Christ-Logos, performing a similar role of instruction and guidance to lead people to divine truth.

This sense that Christian leaders were acting almost as representatives of the divine on earth is reflected in the kind of language which Eusebius uses to describe them. Eusebius' presentation of Constantine as a mimetic image of Christ on earth in the *LC* and *VC*, and his claim that the emperor had taken the divine likeness into his soul, have often been noted by scholars,[142] who have at times suggested

[138] See, for example: *VC* 1.15.1, 3.59.2; *LC* 6.9; *DE* 4.10.15, 8.2.5, 8.2.112, 8.2.113, 10.4.17; *HE* 3.7.9, 8.1.7, 9.8.15, 9.10.3; *De eccl. theol.* 3.14.1.8.

[139] *VC* 3.59.2. [140] Rapp, 'Imperial Ideology'.

[141] Rapp, 'Imperial Ideology', 693. See also: Cameron, 'Form and Meaning', 85.

[142] For example: Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 152; Thielman, 'Another Look', 227; *C&E*, 254; Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 35.

that this represents the 'sanctification' of the imperial office by Eusebius.[143] However, Eusebius did not reserve such language exclusively for the emperor. There are clear parallels between the terms which Eusebius uses of Constantine in the *LC*, and his earlier description of Bishop Paulinus of Tyre in the panegyric which he delivered at the dedication of the new basilica at Tyre in around 315.[144] In this speech, Paulinus is said to 'carry in his own soul the impression of Christ in whole, the word, the wisdom, the light',[145] and to have created as far as possible earthly images of heavenly 'models' and 'patterns' through his actions.[146] Thus it seems that, for Eusebius, Christian ἐπίσκοποι, whether men of the church or the emperor, act at their best as representative images of the Christ-Logos on earth.

However, while Eusebius was evidently quite comfortable transferring the language of divine μίμησις that he had once used of bishops like Paulinus to the new figure of the Christian emperor, this should not be taken as an indication that the emperor had displaced the bishops in Eusebius' eyes. The fact that in the *VC*, one of his last works, Eusebius drew a deliberate parallel between Constantine and the bishops, through his description of Constantine as an ἐπίσκοπος, demonstrates that the importance of the bishops was not diminished for him by the existence of a Christian emperor. Rather, in the *VC*, Constantine is shown as adding himself to the number of the existing bishops. Hence, when Constantine is said to have claimed that he was also a bishop, we are told that this comment was made while the emperor was receiving other bishops at a banquet, reinforcing the sense that he is simply one bishop among equals.[147] Similarly, when Eusebius describes Constantine as being like a 'shared bishop', the emperor is said to have 'sat in the middle as though one of many'.[148] Eusebius allows for no distinction between bishops of the church and the emperor—in terms of their importance in God's salvific design, they are equal.

Thus, in dismissing the idea that Eusebius believed himself to be standing at the very end of historical time, we are led to reassess the view that he must have invested particular significance in either

[143] Trompf suggests that, in its descriptions of Constantine, the *VC* is 'virtually sanctifying but never divinising': *Early Christian Historiography*, 138.

[144] On the date of this speech, see: *C&E*, 162. This similarity of language was also noted by Drake, *In Praise of Constantine*, 43–4.

[145] *HE* 10.4.26. [146] *HE* 10.4.25. [147] *VC* 4.24.1. [148] *VC* 1.44.2.

the church or the empire. Instead, when we look anew at Eusebius' works, freed from misleading assumptions about his understanding of history, we can see that, for him, real significance lay in the kind of virtuous Christian leadership that might be displayed either by the bishops of the church at their best, like Paulinus of Tyre, or by an exemplary Christian emperor, like Constantine. This significance stemmed from the role of these leaders in God's plan for salvation. As teachers and models of virtue, they could provide the kind of instruction in piety that would enable their followers to resist the malign influence of the demons and turn instead towards the true Christian God. As such, what Eusebius celebrates in his later works is not the fulfilment of God's kingdom on earth in either the church or the empire, but rather the unification of political and religious leadership in Christian virtue and the role which that might play in furthering God's historical plan for salvation.

CONCLUSIONS

While Eusebius undoubtedly welcomed many of the events of his later life, particularly the new political and religious circumstances after the Council of Nicaea, it is important not to confuse this generally positive attitude with a sense of naïve triumphalism. For all his celebration of Constantine's patronage of the Christian church, Eusebius was by no means blind to the challenges that continued to confront the virtuous. In the *VC*, much as he sought to downplay internal disagreements within the church, like the Donatist schism in Africa or the dispute over the date of Easter, Eusebius could not completely avoid referring to them.[149] Moreover, his remarks make it clear that he held such disputes to be the work of demons.[150] Even in a work that was meant to be celebratory and triumphal, then, we find Eusebius still disturbed by the lingering demonic threat. Throughout

[149] *VC* 1.45.2, 2.61.1–5, 2.62.1, 2.73.1, 3.4.1, 3.5.1–3, 3.23.1, 3.59.1–2, 4.41.1–4.

[150] Some of these disputes are attributed directly to demonic activity (*VC* 1.45.2–3); others more obliquely to the work of 'envy' (*VC* 2.61.3, 3.1.1, 3.59.1, 4.41.1), which, as we saw in Chapter 2, was immediately identifiable as a characteristic of demons for Eusebius. Some are attributed to both at once: *VC* 2.73.1. At *VC* 3.5.3, the dispute is said to be the work of an 'unseen enemy' (*ἀφανοῦς ἐχθροῦ*) of the church, in what is surely another reference to demonic activity.

the *VC*, there is repeated emphasis on the importance of unity within the church.[151] Having seen that, for Eusebius, it was the unity and consistency of virtuous Christian leadership that was so important for encouraging salvation, we can recognize that such calls for unity had a particular urgency for him. Unless Christian leaders were able to maintain the high standards of behaviour necessary to imitate the divine, and the level of unity that would allow them to present a strong front in the fight against the demons, there remained the danger that the demons—always present and always active—might find a way to regain some of their influence.

There can be no doubt that Eusebius was alert to this possibility. Modern scholars view Eusebius' works with the benefit of hindsight, aware that after Constantine there would be a largely unbroken succession of Christian emperors. But Eusebius had no such knowledge. The example of Licinius, who had switched from toleration of Christians to outright persecution, was hardly promising. Indeed, the very existence of the *VC*, often read as a 'mirror for princes', designed to instruct Constantine's heirs in the requirements of virtuous Christian monarchy,[152] demonstrates both the importance, in Eusebius' eyes, of ensuring that future emperors maintained high standards of virtue, and his awareness that such continuity could not be guaranteed.

Nor was the unreliability of imperial Christian virtue the only potential problem for Eusebius. As we saw in the section 'The Role of Demons in History', Eusebius considered 'heresy' to be the work of demons and the last years of his life saw him actively involved in theological disputes. Even as he was preparing the *VC*, Eusebius was also composing polemical works directed against the teaching of Marcellus of Ancyra, the *Contra Marcellum* (*CM*) and *De ecclesiastica theologia* (*De eccl. theol.*).[153] Thus, even at the end of his life, Eusebius was troubled by and actively participating in the kind of dispute that he felt to be the work of demons. In attempting through his writings to ensure the widespread acceptance of 'correct' doctrine, Eusebius

[151] *VC* 1.45.1, 3.13.1–2, 3.21.1, 3.21.4, 3.66.3, 4.41.4.

[152] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 195; Ruhbach, 'Politische Theologie', 250; Cameron, 'Construction', 154; Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 12; Cameron, 'Form and Meaning', 73.

[153] On the dating of these works, see: Wallace-Hadrill, *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 37, 57; Quasten, *Patrology*, 341; Attridge and Hata, 'Introduction', 34; *C&E*, 278; DelCogliano, 'Eusebius of Caesarea on Asterius of Cappadocia', 267.

would surely have seen himself as actively resisting demonically inspired attacks. For Eusebius, the struggle against the demons was real and continuing. There was thus no room for complacency in his understanding of history and little space for triumphalism, which, from his perspective, would have been premature.

6

Demonic Tyranny and Virtuous Kingship

Eusebius' ideas about kingship represent one of the most heavily studied aspects of his thought. His presentation of Constantine and the understanding of sovereignty which underpins this portrait have long drawn the attention of scholars, who have identified in some of his later works, particularly the *Vita Constantini* (*VC*) and *De laudibus Constantini* (*LC*), the beginnings of Byzantine and Western medieval theories of kingship.[1] However, despite extensive study, the picture we have of Eusebius' ideas in this area remains both incomplete and in parts confused. For some scholars, Eusebius' understanding of sovereignty reflects little more than a superficial 'Christianization' of earlier Hellenistic theories of kingship in which he simply adopted and expressed in Christian terms several ideas which had long been current.[2] Such a picture undoubtedly owes much to a focus on the *LC* in particular[3]—a speech in which the absence of overtly Christian language has long been noted by scholars.[4] Yet for others, Eusebius' presentation of Constantine, particularly in

[1] See, for example: Dvornik, *Political Philosophy*, II.616; Baynes, 'Eusebius and the Christian Empire'; Farina, *L'impero*, 257; Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 133; Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 34; Lyman, 'Eusebius of Caesarea', 327; Eger, 'Kaiser und Kirche', 115; Young, *Nicaea to Chalcedon*, 14.

[2] For example: G. F. Chesnut, 'The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic and Late Stoic Political Philosophy', in H. Temporini and W. Haase, eds., *ANRW* 2.16.2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1978), 1330–2; Dvornik, *Political Philosophy*, II.619; Baynes, 'Eusebius and the Christian Empire'; A. Louth, 'Eusebius and the Birth of Church History', in F. Young, L. Ayres, and A. Louth, eds., *The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 273.

[3] Chesnut, for instance, claims that in the *LC* 'one sees the typical emphases of Romano-Hellenistic political theory': 'The Ruler and the Logos', 1331. Dvornik similarly suggests that parts of the *LC* 'sound like passages from some treatise on kingship by a Hellenistic writer': *Political Philosophy*, II.619.

[4] For example: Drake, *In Praise of Constantine*, 29, 46–60; Cameron, 'Rethinking', 79.

the *VC*, is striking for its use of Christian imagery and typology.[5] Eusebius' portrayal of Constantine as a 'type' of Moses, or even of Christ, has been highlighted by several scholars in recent years.[6]

As a result, we are presented on the one hand with a speech in which, we are told, Constantine is presented as a typical Hellenistic king, and, on the other, with a biography in which he appears as an unmistakably Christian sovereign. Moreover, Eusebius' ideas about sovereignty are not confined solely to those works which focus on the figure of Constantine. The later books of the *Historia ecclesiastica* (*HE*) also discuss the political affairs of Eusebius' own lifetime and mention a variety of different rulers, portrayed both positively and negatively.[7] Even in the *Demonstratio Evangelica* (*DE*), we find occasional, brief references to the role of the Roman Empire and its rulers in relation to the spread of Christianity.[8]

Crucially, the widespread idea that Eusebius viewed Constantine as a victorious eschatological figure fails to take account of the continuing presence of hostile demons in Eusebius' understanding of the universe.[9] It is hard to reconcile such a positive picture with the accounts in many of Eusebius' works of malevolent demons continuing to challenge and mislead humankind. As a result, we need to find a new way of understanding Constantine's place in Eusebius' thought and to reassess Eusebius' presentation of the role of a Christian sovereign in the light of his concerns about the continuing demonic threat.

To do so, this chapter will approach the question of Eusebius' ideas of kingship from an angle rather different from that usually adopted. Previous scholarship has tended to focus above all on Eusebius'

[5] For example: Williams, *Authorised Lives*, 25–57; Johnson, *Eusebius*, 155–66.

[6] For example: Rapp, 'Imperial Ideology', 685–95; M. J. Hollerich, 'The Comparison of Moses and Constantine in Eusebius of Caesarea's *Life of Constantine*', *Studia Patristica* 19 (1989), 80–5; Hollerich, 'Religion and Politics'; Williams, *Authorised Lives*, 36–46; Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 35–7; Cameron, 'Construction', 158–61; R. Flower, 'The Emperor's New Past: Re-enactment and Inversion in Christian Invectives against Constantius II', in Kelly, Flower, and Williams, eds., *Unclassical Traditions*, vol. 1, 29.

[7] Including, as negative figures: Maximinus (e.g. *HE* 8.13.15, 9.1.1) and Maxentius (e.g. *HE* 8.14.1–6); and as positive figures: Constantius (*HE* 8.13.12–13), Crispus (*HE* 10.9.6), and, of course, Constantine himself. Licinius appears as both positive and negative at different points in the narrative. On Licinius as positive, see e.g. *HE* 9.9.1, and as negative, see e.g. *HE* 10.8.1–19.

[8] For example: *DE* 3.7.30–9, 6.20.20–1, 7.2.22.

[9] For example: Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 160–1; Farina, *L'impero*, 162; Williams, *Authorised Lives*, 42.

presentation of Constantine as the paradigm of virtuous sovereignty.[10] Yet there is just as much to be learnt about Eusebius' understanding of the role of a good sovereign by considering his references to the opposite figure—the tyrant. This chapter will therefore devote at least as much attention to Eusebius' presentation of Constantine's opponents and predecessors, usually portrayed by Eusebius as vicious 'tyrants', as it will to his presentation of Constantine. In those works which deal most thoroughly with matters of earthly sovereignty—the *VC*, *LC*, and *HE*—we find bad rulers repeatedly linked with demons or the devil.[11] Eusebius presents tyrannical and vicious rulers as being under the influence of, indeed, enslaved to, demons.[12] He argues, as a result, that they are unfit to rule, and incapable of meeting the criteria required of a good monarch by traditional Hellenistic kingship theory. Consequently, he is able to present Constantine's actions against his former co-rulers as entirely justified and praiseworthy.

More than this, Eusebius' ideas about sovereignty are underpinned by his continuing concern over the ongoing demonic threat. He suggests that, by a process of μίμησις, or imitation, such tyrants pose a threat not only to their subjects' earthly well-being, but also to their spiritual health, and hence to their salvation. Tyrants would lead their subjects towards demons and hence, in order to combat the demonic threat, a virtuous Christian sovereign, free from the influence of demons, is essential. Thus, for Eusebius, Constantine was important, not as the triumphant eschatological figure envisaged in previous scholarship, but rather as a key figure in the ongoing battle to secure people from demonic influence.

'THINKING WITH' TYRANNY

Before progressing further in our examination of Eusebius' representation of the tyrannical in his works, it is important to give some consideration to the concept of tyranny in the ancient and late antique world more broadly. For several centuries before Eusebius was writing,

[10] See, however, the brief remarks at Johnson, *Eusebius*, 167–8, and the largely descriptive discussion of Farina, *L'impero*, 224–34.

[11] See, for example: *HE* 8.14.5, 8.14.8; *VC* 1.58.3; *LC* 5.2–3, 7.6–7.

[12] For example: *LC* 5.2–3; *VC* 1.13.3.

tyranny had ceased to be a neutral designation for a particular kind of political constitution.[13] Rather, from as early as the fifth century BCE, it had become a weapon of invective, laden with negative connotations.[14] In Aristotle's definition of various possible political constitutions in his *Politics*, tyranny had represented the negative, inverted form of monarchy.[15] Moreover, the figure of the tyrant had been a staple of classical Greek tragedy and in the process became associated with a further series of negative behaviours and characteristics.[16] By the time it passed from Greek to Roman political discourse, characteristics such as arrogance, lust, and cruelty were considered standard in the figure of a negative ruler,[17] as the traditional Greek tyrant became assimilated with the hated figure of the Roman *rex*.[18] Thus, to label someone a 'tyrant' was to condemn not only the quality of their rule, but also their character and lifestyle.[19] Polybius had even suggested that it was hard to find 'a greater or more pungent charge' to make against a person, on the grounds that the charge of tyranny 'encompasses a meaning of the greatest impiety and brings together every injustice and unlawfulness in man'.[20]

Among early Christian writers, the concept of tyranny developed still further, with the 'tyrant' acquiring yet another negative association—the persecution of Christians.[21] Justin Martyr and Tertullian do not go quite so far as to label current emperors as 'tyrants', but they come close. Both writers suggest that to persecute Christians is to act

[13] Dunkle suggests that, in its original meaning, the term *tyrannos* simply designated 'a ruler who had gained power by usurpation and did not necessarily signify that the ruler was oppressive': J. R. Dunkle, 'The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic', *TAPA* 98 (1967), 152.

[14] K. A. Raaflaub, 'Stick and Glue: The Function of Tyranny in Fifth-Century Athenian Democracy', in K. A. Morgan, ed., *Popular Tyranny* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003), 59; L. Mitchell, 'Tyrannical Oligarchs at Athens', in S. Lewis, ed., *Ancient Tyranny* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 179–80.

[15] Aristotle, *Politics*, 1279a32–b10, cited in S. Lewis, 'Introduction', in Lewis, ed., *Ancient Tyranny* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 4.

[16] I. Gildenhard, 'Reckoning with Tyranny: Greek Thoughts on Caesar in Cicero's *Letters to Atticus* in Early 49', in Lewis, ed., *Ancient Tyranny*, 199; Dunkle, 'The Greek Tyrant', 153; Mitchell, 'Tyrannical Oligarchs', 179–80.

[17] Dunkle, 'The Greek Tyrant', 151–2.

[18] Dunkle, 'The Greek Tyrant', 158.

[19] Dunkle, 'The Greek Tyrant', 156.

[20] Polybius, *Histories* 2.59.6.

[21] T. D. Barnes, 'Oppressor, Persecutor, Usurper: The Meaning of *Tyrannus* in the Fourth Century', in G. Bonamente and M. Mayer, eds., *Historiae Augustae Colloquia*, n.s. 4 *Colloquium Barcinonense MCMXCIII* (Bari: Edipuglia, 1996), 58; and A. E. Wardman, 'Usurpers and Internal Conflicts in the Fourth-Century AD', *Historia* 33 (1984), 223.

in a violent and tyrannical manner, while Tertullian argues that persecution fails to respect the law.[22] These writers thereby urge the emperors and their subordinates to refrain from prosecuting Christians. This connection between the persecution of Christians and tyranny is one that would later also appear in Eusebius.[23] Christian writers therefore not only preserved, but also extended the negative connotations that attached to the figure of the 'tyrant'.

Recognizing the power that the label 'tyrant' held in the ancient world, a number of scholars have stressed in recent years that the concept of tyranny could be 'good to think with', providing a means by which people could explore what was necessary in a good leader or political constitution through consideration of its opposite.[24] In consequence, there was a long literary and philosophical tradition, reaching back to the earliest Greek historians, of contrasting the vices of a tyrant with the equivalent virtues of a good sovereign.[25] This is a strategy which Eusebius also employs to considerable effect in the *VC* and *LC*.[26] Yet the vices associated with the figure of the tyrant were not fixed, but might be added to by different writers as they saw fit.[27] For instance, Christian writers' belief that persecuting Christians was characteristic of tyranny would not necessarily have been shared by non-Christian authors. Thus tyranny was, in Sian Lewis' assessment, 'a malleable construct', which could change according to circumstances.[28]

Previous work on the idea of tyranny in late antiquity, however, has tended to focus less on this idea of the tyrant as a concept to 'think with', and more on the question of legitimacy. It has been suggested that the meaning of the term '*τύραννος*/tyrannus' changed during the

[22] Justin. *1 Apol.* 3; Tertullian, *Apology*, 2.13–15.

[23] See, for example: *HE* 8.14.8–9, 9.2.1, 9.4.2; Mart. Pal. [SR] 4.8, 6.6, 8.5, 11.7; *VC* 1.12.2, 2.2.3. This is noted as a significant theme of the *VC* by Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 38, and Farina, *L'impero*, 231.

[24] S. Forsdyke, 'The Uses and Abuses of Tyranny', in R. K. Balot, ed., *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 231; Mitchell, 'Tyrannical Oligarchs', 179; Raaflaub, 'Stick and Glue', 83: 'To put it simply, tyranny was good to think with.'

[25] R. MacMullen, 'The Roman Concept Robber-Pretender', *Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité*, 3rd ser., 10 (1963), 221–2; J. G. Gammie, 'Herodotus on Kings and Tyrants: Objective Historiography or Conventional Portraiture?', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 45 (1986), 185.

[26] For example: *VC* 3.1.1–8; *LC* 5.1–4.

[27] Lewis, 'Introduction', 6.

[28] Lewis, 'Introduction', 6.

fourth century, coming to mean specifically 'usurper' and to say more about the legitimacy of a person's position than about the character of their rule.[29] Yet the question of what constituted 'legitimate' rule in this period is far from straightforward. As Alan Wardman has pointed out, with regard to the fourth century it 'is very difficult to issue a satisfying judgement on the way or ways in which emperors proper were lawfully made'.[30] This is a problem which Gilbert Dagron has argued continued into the later Byzantine period, when he suggests that the lack of a clearly established system for arranging the transfer of imperial authority led contenders for power to base their claims on the competing grounds of inheritance and merit.[31] Both of these claims can similarly be found in panegyrics from early in Constantine's reign,[32] while the same collection of panegyrics also contains several attempts to link the emperor in question to some form of divine patron or ancestor.[33] This suggests that, both in the fourth century and beyond, there were a range of ways in which rulers might attempt to justify and strengthen their position. Indeed, the development of the Tetrarchy under Diocletian can only have made this question of 'legitimacy' more complex. The creation of a hierarchy of multiple emperors ruling in east and west meant that the defeated imperial rivals branded as 'tyrants' could now include not only those who had never held imperial power, but also, as in the case of Licinius, someone whose rule had been recognized by his co-emperors for some time. This makes any attempt to associate the language of tyranny with a particular understanding of 'legitimacy' extremely problematic. Rather, since it appears that ideas of 'legitimacy' were constantly being negotiated, we need to look instead at how emperors, and those writing in their honour, sought to justify their actions and to persuade people that they were the best possible ruler.

Moreover, as Barnes sensibly recognized, the apparent proliferation in the use of the term 'tyrant' in the years following Constantine's defeat of Maxentius in 312 was surely a result of the fact that the word had not yet lost its negative connotations, rather than a sign that it had

[29] For a valuable summary of this debate, see Barnes, 'Oppressor, Persecutor, Usurper'.

[30] Wardman, 'Usurpers and Internal Conflicts', 225.

[31] Dagron, *Emperor and Priest*, 13–53, esp. 37. See also: Wardman, 'Usurpers and Internal Conflicts', 227.

[32] *Panegyrici Latini* VII (VI).5.3, VI (VII).3.1.

[33] For example: *Pan. Lat.* XI (III).2.4, XI (III).3.8, VI (VII).8.5, and X (II).2.1.

become a neutral designation for an illegitimate ruler.[34] For an imperial victor looking both to justify his past actions and to secure his future position, the figure of the tyrant could prove invaluable.[35] Labelling a defeated rival a 'tyrant' served simultaneously to undermine the reputation of the loser and to enhance that of the victor, by presenting him as the liberator of his subjects. Thus it appears that, at least in the early fourth century when Eusebius was writing, the idea of the 'tyrant' remained loaded with negative connotations. Since tyranny was not a fixed and neutral designation for a particular political constitution, but rather a constructed and negotiable idea, it is important to pay close attention to Eusebius' use of the term in order to determine what he understood by the concept.

Throughout those works in which Eusebius is most concerned with matters of earthly sovereignty—the *VC*, *LC*, and later books of the *HE*—he repeatedly describes Constantine's imperial predecessors and rivals using the vocabulary of tyranny.[36] In the *VC*, the Tetrarchs, with the exception of Constantine's father, Constantius, are labelled as 'tyrants',[37] and Eusebius is careful to emphasize that, despite being raised in the households of these men, Constantine did not share their moral character.[38] Thus, even before he is emperor, Constantine is depicted as antithetical to the tyrants—for Eusebius, it seems, it was not simply the manner of a person's rule that would determine whether or not they were to be called a tyrant, but their entire way of life. Similarly, in the *HE*, the label of 'tyrant' is once again applied to Constantine's predecessors and rivals as emperor,[39] while, in the *LC*, it is clear that Eusebius wishes to associate earlier emperors with a tyrannical style of government. In the *LC* we do not find any specific individuals accused of tyranny; rather, Eusebius refers obliquely to those 'thought at some time to rule with

[34] Barnes, 'Oppressor, Persecutor, Usurper', 55–6.

[35] Wardman, 'Usurpers and Internal Conflicts', 223.

[36] For example: *HE* 8.14.1, 8.14.7, 9.1.1, 9.9.3, 9.11.2, 10.9.2; *VC* 1.12.2, 1.26.1, 1.27.1, 1.49.2, 2.4.2, 2.18.1; *LC* 5.2.

[37] *VC* 1.12.2: 'The tyrants of our own time' (*τύραννοι . . . οἱ καθ'ἡμας*). On Constantius as different from the other Tetrarchs, see *VC* 1.13.1–4. See also: *HE* 8.13.12–13, 8.*App*.4.

[38] *VC* 1.12.2–3.

[39] Including Maxentius: *HE* 8.14.1–6, 9.9.3; Maximinus: *HE* 8.14.7–15, 9.1.1, 9.4.2; and Licinius: *HE* 10.9.2.

tyrannical force (*τυραννικῇ βίᾳ*)'.[40] This, however, is more likely a reflection of the conventions of late antique panegyric than of any uncertainty on Eusebius' part about who was to be labelled a tyrant, for it was usual in this period for speakers to avoid naming an emperor's defeated rivals in their orations.[41] It is also perfectly clear from the way in which Eusebius repeatedly contrasts Constantine's rule with that of his predecessors that Eusebius intended his listeners to identify earlier emperors as bad rulers or tyrants.[42] Moreover, in all three works the negative associations of tyranny are clearly in evidence.[43] There is no suggestion at any point of any positive connotation for the term. Even in places where the terms 'tyrant' or 'tyranny' are used without further elaboration, the degree to which they are elsewhere associated with negative characteristics and behaviours makes it impossible to read these words simply as neutral descriptions. It therefore seems clear that, in using these words, Eusebius was seeking to tarnish the reputation of Constantine's rivals.

This, then, is one way in which the concept of tyranny functions within these works—it allows Eusebius to undermine the authority of Constantine's competitors for imperial power. Constantine, by contrast, is presented as a liberator and any questions about his own—less than straightforward—route to sole rule are tactfully obscured by this comprehensive attack on the character of his enemies.[44] Yet this is not the only role which the idea of the tyrant played in these works, for, as we have seen, tyranny was a concept 'good to think with'. The vices attributed by Eusebius to his tyrants help to highlight key features of his virtuous sovereign as well. In this way, Eusebius' presentation of tyranny contributes to creating his picture of the good ruler. It is also a means of trying to exert some influence over the actions of future sovereigns by suggesting that anyone who acts in a vicious manner would become a tyrant rather than a king. Thus, by

[40] *LC* 5.2. [41] Wardman, 'Usurpers and Internal Conflicts', 222.
[42] *LC* 5.1–4, 7.12, 9.13–14.
[43] For example: *LC* 5.3; *VC* 1.33.1, 1.35.1–36.2, 2.2.3, 3.1.1–8; *HE* 8.14.1–18.
[44] On Constantine as a liberator, see, for example: *HE* 9.9.2; *VC* 1.26.1, 1.37.1, 1.39.2, 1.41.2. This also appears to have been a feature of Constantine's own self-presentation—Eusebius records an inscription of Constantine in which he described his liberation of the city of Rome: *VC* 1.40.1–2. Constantine's route to sole rule of the Roman Empire involved wars against several of those who had previously ruled as his colleagues—on these various conflicts, see: *C&E*, 28–43 and 62–77. According to Wardman, Constantine's route to power was such that 'however paradoxical it may seem, Constantine was certainly a usurper': 'Usurpers and Internal Conflicts', 232.

studying the negative associations of tyranny in these works, we can learn something of what Eusebius wanted from future rulers. In many cases, there is considerable overlap between Eusebius' tyrannical vices and those found in the works of earlier non-Christian writers, yet Eusebius also added to these another negative association that reflects the influence of his Christian beliefs. This was the idea of a link between human tyrants and wicked demons.

DEMONIC SLAVERY

In the section 'Further Polarities' of Chapter 3, we saw that Eusebius associated demons with an oppressive and tyrannical style of rule; it is clear from his descriptions of earthly tyranny that he likewise saw human tyrants as firmly linked to the demonic. Both kinds of tyrant—demonic and human—are said by Eusebius to govern in a manner that 'enslaves' their subjects.[45] Of course, this association between tyranny and slavery was not new to Eusebius; as far back as Aristotle, it had been suggested that a tyrant might be equated to a δεσπότης, or 'slave master'.[46] Similarly, Herodotus wrote of the Milesians that they 'were in no way eager to accept another tyrant in their territory, having experienced freedom',[47] showing that tyranny was held to be incompatible with liberty. Within Roman society, P. A. Brunt has suggested that, whilst there had been provision in the earliest, archaic Roman law for a citizen to be enslaved for debt, such a sale would, by law, have had to take place outside Roman territory, implying that it was considered to be incompatible with *romanitas*.[48]

Indeed, Aristotle had set out in his *Politics* a theory of slavery in which the condition of slaves was presented as almost less than

[45] For example, human tyrants: *VC* 1.13.3, 1.36.2; *HE* 8.14.6, 9.9.3; demons: *VC* 1.13.3; *LC* 5.3; *HE* 8.12.3 (τῇ τῶν δαιμόνων δουλείᾳ); *CI* 294.8–9; *GEI*, *PG* 22.1073, 22.1252; *CPs*, *PG* 23.1076.34–9. As Martin has also previously noted: *Inventing Superstition*, 220.

[46] Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 1160b28–9, cited in Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 118.

[47] Herodotus, *Histories* 6.5.1.

[48] P. A. Brunt, '*Libertas* in the Republic', in P. A. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 283.

human,[49] claiming that some people deserved to be slaves because they lacked the capacity for reasoning necessary for freedom.[50] Once again, this was connected to the idea that slavery was not to be imposed on Greek citizens, for Aristotle identified the characteristic of being 'irrational in nature' as one which would be found primarily among 'far-off barbarians'.[51] Both law and philosophy therefore presented slavery as a barbarous condition, which would be degrading for a Greek or Roman citizen. The idea that tyranny, in effectively enslaving a population, was a barbarous form of government is reflected in Eusebius' *LC*, where Eusebius suggests that rulers he elsewhere characterizes as tyrants are themselves barbarians. Demons, often presented by Eusebius as tyrannical, are described in the *LC* as 'rougher than all barbarians'.[52] Slightly later in the speech, Eusebius also suggests that Constantine has 'defeated that dual barbarian nation' of both demons and godless humans, suggesting that Eusebius also held human tyrants to be barbarous.[53]

However, for Eusebius, earthly tyrants were not simply slave masters in the manner envisaged by Aristotle, but also slaves themselves. We find this expressed most fully in the *LC*, where Eusebius makes it clear that he believed vicious sovereigns to be enslaved to demons. In this case, Eusebius is not discussing the example of a particular tyrant but, more generally, those figures who might be 'thought at some time to rule with tyrannical force',[54] showing that he considered this enslavement to demons to be characteristic of all human tyrants. Here, Eusebius poses his audience a question: 'How,' he asks,

> can a ruler and lord of the whole world be someone who has attached himself to numberless embittered masters, and who is a slave (δοῦλος) of dishonourable hedonism, a slave of intemperate madness for women,

[49] Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 113, citing Arist. *Pol.* 1256b20–5 and 1280a31–5. For full discussion of Aristotle's views on slavery, see Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 107–27. Although Aristotle's ideas of slavery are usually studied using both the *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Garnsey suggests that there are several differences between these two works, and argues that the theory of 'natural slavery' is in fact only found in the *Politics*: 107–8.

[50] Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 109, citing Arist. *Pol.* 1254b21–4.

[51] Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 1149a10–12. Garnsey cites this passage, but suggests that Aristotle was not in fact thinking of the 'natural slave' in this instance: *Ideas of Slavery*, 114. However, by combining Aristotle's suggestion that natural slaves are deficient in reason with his claim that 'barbarians' are also deficient in reason, his audience might have been led to consider slavery as a condition fit only for non-Greeks.

[52] *LC* 7.2. Compare: *LC* 6.21. [53] *LC* 7.13. [54] *LC* 5.2.

> a slave of unjustly acquired riches, a slave of anger and rage, a slave of fear and terrors, a slave of murderous demons, a slave of deadly spirits?[55]

The repetition of the word δοῦλος (slave), which appears seven times in this one sentence, demonstrates that Eusebius wishes to emphasize the enslaved condition of the figures he is describing.

Moreover, in parallel to this emphasis on slavery, Eusebius also finds room for many of the traditional tyrannical vices, familiar from earlier Greek literature.[56] Yet the construction of the sentence ensures that the greatest emphasis is placed, not on these vices, but on the tyrannical ruler's relationship with demons. Concluding the sentence with the emphatic pairing of wicked demons and spirits ensures that it is these malevolent spiritual forces which linger longest in the audience's minds. It is surely also significant that this list of traditional vices is framed here by opening and closing references to 'embittered masters', 'murderous demons', and 'deadly spirits'.[57] This implies that these traditional characteristics and behaviours of the tyrant are in fact a product of their enslavement to demons.

In developing this idea of spiritual enslavement, Eusebius drew on a long tradition of earlier thought. It was widely accepted in both Greek and Christian thought that it was possible for a person who was not legally a slave nevertheless to be enslaved in a moral sense. Most famous is the Stoic doctrine of moral slavery, elaborated at length in Philo of Alexandria's *Every Good Man Is Free*.[58] This formed only half of a longer two-part work, which originally included the

[55] *LC* 5.3. For further analysis of this passage, and discussion of how the *LC*'s references to demons reflect the speech's Christian perspective, see: H. A. Johannessen, 'Tyrants, Slaves and Demons: The Language of Demonic Slavery in Eusebius of Caesarea's *De Laudibus Constantini*', *Studia Patristica* 72 (2014), 111–22.

[56] Herodotus, for instance, claimed that envy, indiscriminate murder, rape, and a lack of respect for the law were characteristic of tyrants: Hdt. *Hist.* 3.80.4–5; Euripides associated tyrants with the illegal acquisition of wealth, hedonism and lust: Euripides, *Supplices* 444–55; Plato characterized the tyrannical character (in this case not restricted to those who occupied positions of leadership) as disposed to theft, murder, impiety, and corruption: *Rep.* 9.575b.

[57] It is clear that Eusebius is thinking of demons in his initial reference to 'numberless embittered masters', for in the sentence immediately before this, Eusebius had referred to the same person having similarly associated himself with 'numberless falsely drawn icons of demons' (*LC* 5.3).

[58] On Stoic ideas of moral slavery, see Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 131–3. Sources for early Stoic ideas of slavery, as for much of early Stoicism, are limited and it is only from the first and second centuries CE onwards that we have full discussions of the

counterpart *Every Bad Man Is a Slave*.[59] In the surviving part of this treatise, Philo explicitly distinguished two kinds of slavery, one which related to 'souls' and another to 'bodies'.[60] For Philo, who suggested that a soul might be enslaved to 'wickedness and passion',[61] it was slavery of the soul, rather than legal slavery, that was most important and hence most worthy of a philosopher's attention.[62] In the Stoic view, it was only by exercising a high level of self-control in order to defeat these passions that a person could be said to be truly free.[63]

Moreover, this idea had already found Christian expression in Paul's language of the slavery of sin. At Romans 6:12, Paul instructs his audience not to 'let sin exercise dominion in your mortal bodies, to make you obey their passions'.[64] Elsewhere, he describes how 'with my flesh I am a slave to the law of sin'.[65] As Peter Garnsey has observed, this Pauline language of enslavement bears considerable similarity to the earlier Stoic notion of moral slavery, with slavery to sin replacing slavery to the passions.[66] There can be no doubt that Eusebius would have been very familiar with Paul's letters—indeed, he quotes passages from the Epistle to the Romans on many occasions.[67] We also know that he was aware of Philo's discussions of slavery. Andrew Carriker has demonstrated that Eusebius would have had access to both parts of Philo's treatise on moral slavery through the library at Caesarea,[68] and Eusebius, in common with many other early Christian writers,[69] did not hesitate to express his admiration for Philo.[70] The lack of direct quotation from either writer in

subject from Stoic philosophers: Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 129–31. On Philo's ideas of moral slavery, see: Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 157–63.

[59] Philo of Alexandria, *Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit* 1.

[60] Philo, *Probus*, 17.

[61] Philo, *Probus*, 17.

[62] Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 158.

[63] Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 133.

[64] NRSV trans.

[65] Rom. 7:25, NRSV trans.

[66] Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 183.

[67] For example: *PE* 3.13.4, 6.6.37, 11.8.1, 12.27.6, 12.52.34, 13.7.5.

[68] Carriker, *Library*, 170, 174–5. Eusebius refers to both parts of Philo's treatise on slavery at *HE* 2.18.6.

[69] Philo's influence on early Christian writers has been demonstrated by D. T. Runia, *Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1993). See also: H. Chadwick, 'Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought', in A. H. Armstrong, ed., *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 168–92, who explores Philo's influence on Clement of Alexandria and Origen.

[70] *HE* 2.18.1.

Eusebius' discussions of the slavery makes it impossible to prove direct influence,[71] although it is highly probable that he developed his own ideas in the context of these earlier writings.

A further possible influence on Eusebius' ideas about the enslavement of tyrants to demons can be found in the work of earlier Christian apologists, particularly Justin Martyr. Several Christian apologists writing in times of persecution had suggested that bad rulers were acting under the influence of demons.[72] For instance, in his *Apology*, a work which Eusebius appears to have known,[73] Tertullian wrote to the Roman provincial governors that 'there might be a power hidden in concealment which directs you against the form and against the nature of judgement and also against the laws themselves'.[74] For Tertullian, attacks on the Christians were so perverse that they could only be attributed to the malign inspiration of wicked spiritual powers, although Tertullian does not specifically use the language of enslavement here. We do find the vocabulary of slavery in Justin's *Apology*, however.[75] Justin does not go as far as Eusebius in claiming that the emperors actually are already enslaved to demons; rather, he frames his suggestion of an association between bad rulers and demons in the form of a warning. He urges his addressees—including the emperor Antoninus Pius and his heir Marcus Aurelius[76]—to be on their guard against the deceitful attacks of the demons, who, he claims, seek to make the emperors their 'slaves and servants'.[77] Justin raises the idea that rulers might be

[71] Eusebius does quote from Philo's *Every Good Man Is Free* at *PE* 8.12.1–19. However, the passage which Eusebius quotes is a description of the community of the Essenes and the context of the quotation is not a discussion of slavery, but rather an attempt to prove the superiority of the 'Hebrew' lifestyle. Thus, while it proves that Eusebius had read at least some of Philo's treatise, we cannot use this quotation to determine how far Eusebius was influenced by Philo's understanding of moral slavery.

[72] For discussion of this theme in the works of the early Christian apologists, including Justin, Tertullian, Clement, and Athenagoras, see: Pagels, 'Christian Apologists', 301–25.

[73] Eusebius quotes from the *Apology* five times in the *HE* (*HE* 2.2.5–6, 2.25.4, 3.20.7, 3.33.3, 5.5.7) and Carriker suggests that this was probably the only work by Tertullian to which he had access, most likely in a Greek translation: Carriker, *Library*, 261–2.

[74] Tert. *Apol.* 2.14.

[75] It appears that Eusebius also had access to both parts of Justin's *Apology*, for he includes them in a list of Justin's works at *HE* 4.18.1–2. See Carriker, *Library*, 220–3.

[76] Just. *1 Apol.* 1.

[77] Just. *1 Apol.* 14. As Pagels notes, Justin concludes his two-part apology with the suggestion that he is actually acting in the emperors' own best interests by trying to

enslaved to demons as a dangerous possibility; Eusebius, in writing about previous emperors rather than the present ruler, was free to make the connection more explicitly.

Thus, in developing his ideas about the relationship between bad human rulers and demons, Eusebius had a range of different sources upon which he could draw. Eusebius appears to have combined well-established ideas of moral slavery with a long Christian tradition of associating bad rulers with demons to produce the idea that 'tyrants' were enslaved to demons. In searching for the cause of a soul's enslavement, either to sin or to the passions, and in identifying that cause as an initial enslavement to demons, Eusebius firmly grounds the notion of moral slavery in physical reality. In this, his understanding of moral slavery differs from that of both Philo and Paul. For these writers, the idea of slavery to the passions remains metaphorical—we are not led to envisage a physical master external to the moral slave. In Eusebius' thought, however, we find the moral slave placed firmly in the power of external beings—the demons. These, as we have seen, were as powerful and as physical for Eusebius as any external human master would have been.[78] Eusebius draws a distinction between the kind of slavery to vice and immorality discussed by Philo and Paul, and a prior slavery to demons. At *LC* 5.3, Eusebius implies that the vicious character of the bad rulers under discussion is at least partly a result of their enslavement to wicked demons.[79] Eusebius is therefore not only accusing these figures of being morally corrupt, he is actually denying their independence.

As a result, Eusebius is able to suggest that these figures are incapable of ruling. By framing his suggestion that bad rulers are the slaves of demons as a rhetorical question, Eusebius is encouraging his audience to note the striking paradox in the idea that a 'lord of the whole world' might also be a slave.[80] He implies that a person's enslavement to demons makes it impossible for him to rule. This is contrasted with Eusebius' suggestion that Constantine alone may be described as 'truly lord of himself'—clearly Constantine has the level

divert them from demonic influence: Pagels, 'Christian Apologists', 307, citing Just. *2 Apol.* 15.

[78] See above: Chapter 2, section 'Physical Demons'.

[79] This suggests a similar relationship between tyrants and demons to that found in Tertullian; he suggests that the actions of the persecutors are so wrong-headed that they can only be the result of demonic influence: Tert. *Apol.* 2.14.

[80] *LC* 5.3.

of independence necessary to make an effective leader.[81] Eusebius was certainly aware that there were other ways, beyond claims to virtue, by which a ruler might seek to justify his position, for he deploys some of them in support of Constantine.[82] However, by suggesting that vice is in fact evidence of a ruler's enslavement, Eusebius effectively overrides these other claims to authority. From Eusebius' perspective, a moral slave simply cannot be an emperor; consequently, it little matters whether such a person had gained his position through inheritance, or even whether he had been widely acknowledged as the ruler.

This sense that even someone who, despite being in all outward appearance the emperor, might not in fact be a true sovereign recurs throughout the *LC*. In this work, Eusebius sets up a contrast between the outer form and inner reality of a tyrant's position. Eusebius introduces this distinction to his discussion of sovereignty in the prologue to the *LC*, when he announces that what will concern him in this speech is the nature of the difference between 'the exemplar of kingship in our time and the fraudulent impression (*τὸ χάραγμα κεκιβδηλευμένου*)'.[83] The phrase which Eusebius chose to describe the opposite of his model king is worthy of note, since it is powerfully resonant of counterfeit coinage. The word '*χάραγμα*' could refer generally to official, stamped documents, but also, importantly, to stamped money or coinage,[84] while '*κίβδηλος*', from the verb '*κιβδηλεύω*' ('to adulterate'), was used of adulterated coinage.[85] With this phrase, Eusebius is thereby equating the opposite of the model sovereign to a counterfeit coin, with all its associated connotations of falseness. Such a ruler may thus be seen as just as worthless and, potentially, just as socially damaging as counterfeit coinage. Crucially, however, Eusebius is drawing attention to an important

[81] *LC* 5.4.

[82] In particular, Eusebius stresses that Constantine inherited his position from his father: *HE* 8.13.12–13, 9.9.1; *VC* 1.9.2, 1.22.1–2. Williams has noted that ideas of inheritance were particularly important to Constantine and his sons, arguing that Constantine's father Constantius appears in the *VC* 'above all to show that Constantine was a legitimate ruler': *Authorised Lives*, 52. See also: Farina, *L'impero*, 169. Although the terminology of 'legitimacy' is unhelpful, it is nonetheless evident that Eusebius wished to avoid giving the impression that Constantine owed his position *exclusively* to his virtue. I will demonstrate, however, that the question of virtue remained the most important requirement for sovereignty for Eusebius, even in the case of the Constantinian dynasty (see the section 'Conclusions').

[83] *LC Prol.*5. [84] *LSJ*, *s.v.* *χάραγμα*. [85] *LSJ*, *s.v.* *κιβδηλεία*.

distinction between appearance and reality: a counterfeit coin may 'look the part', just as a tyrant may dress, act, and even be treated like a sovereign. In reality, however, both are base and without worth.

Having established this important distinction at the very start of his oration, Eusebius is then able to pick up on this idea again later on. At *LC* 5.2, Eusebius makes his point explicit, saying that an emperor of this kind 'might be thought at some time to rule with tyrannical force, but he will at no point be called king in true speech'.[86] Finally, at *LC* 7.6, Eusebius describes the rulers of the past, those who were enslaved to demons, as 'those thought to rule'. Once again, Eusebius makes an important point about the reality of these men's sovereignty—it is deceptive, existing only in appearance but not in reality. As a result, Eusebius is able subtly to suggest that Constantine, as the true sovereign, did nothing wrong at all in attacking men such as Licinius, for, while they may have appeared to be his co-emperors, the reality was very different.

For Eusebius, a tyrant's vices thus become evidence of a deeper problem and are only the outer manifestation of his inner condition. Of course these vices are troubling in themselves—in many cases they are characteristics that would prove unpleasant or even dangerous for a ruler's subjects. Yet Eusebius is more concerned with the bad ruler's enslavement, which, far more than his propensity for vice, is what really disqualifies him from ruling. Eusebius' interest in the tyrants' vices as evidence of their relationship with demons reflects his understanding of how demons might draw people away from salvation. As we saw in the section 'Escaping Demonic Influence' in Chapter 4, Eusebius felt that the encouragement of vice was a key weapon in the demons' arsenal. However, this was not the only means by which Eusebius believed the demons could lead people to damnation; he also stresses their role in promoting false belief.[87] Thus, since Eusebius suggests that vice, as a manifestation of demonic enslavement, disqualifies a person from ruling, we might also expect a similar suggestion that 'incorrect' belief be seen as a distinguishing feature of the 'tyrant'.

Sure enough, in Eusebius' presentation of Constantine's predecessors, we find repeated emphasis on the error of their religious beliefs.[88]

[86] *LC* 5.2. [87] *DE* 7.1.103.
[88] As Farina noted: *L'impero*, 225–6, 231–2.

Their faith in the pagan demon-gods and particularly the folly of trusting in these lesser spiritual beings instead of the true Christian God is highlighted in Eusebius' descriptions of the various civil wars between the Tetrarchs. When describing both the war between Licinius—at this point still presented as a virtuous sovereign—and Maximinus in the *HE* and that between Constantine and his erstwhile ally Licinius in the *VC*, Eusebius reminds his audience that the 'tyrants' placed their faith in the wrong spiritual forces and were defeated accordingly.[89] Indeed, the war between Constantine and Licinius is reimagined in the *VC* almost as a 'battle of the gods', in which the Christian God is shown as victorious and therefore stronger.[90] For good measure, Eusebius further associates his tyrants not only with traditional civic worship, but also with other practices that would have been widely considered abhorrent, including by non-Christians. Maxentius, for example, is said to have cut open a pregnant woman as part of a magical ritual.[91] This is a practice which we also find condemned later in the fourth century by the pagan historian Ammianus Marcellinus.[92] Licinius is similarly condemned for having recourse to magical practices.[93] For Eusebius, tyrants are thus characterized both by vice and by religious error, both of which, in his eyes, are manifestations of their enslavement to demons and hence are evidence that they are unsuited to positions of leadership.

Moreover, the kind of 'false' belief encouraged by demons was not, for Eusebius, restricted to pagan practices, but also encompassed 'heterodox' Christian belief. This is less heavily emphasized as a feature of tyranny by Eusebius—unsurprisingly, given that Eusebius was mainly describing the 'historical' tyranny of Constantine's predecessors, who were, of course, pagans, rather than Christians of any persuasion. Yet, in Eusebius' presentation of Constantine we do find it clearly implied that, not just Christian belief but 'orthodox' Christian belief was essential in a true sovereign. When discussing Constantine's attitude towards God, Eusebius uses a range of

[89] *HE* 9.10.2–4; *VC* 2.4.1–12.2.

[90] Williams, *Authorised Lives*, 39. See also: Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 202–3 on the war between Constantine and Maxentius, and 231–4 on the war between Constantine and Licinius; Farina, *L'impero*, 232.

[91] *VC* 1.36.1; *HE* 8.14.5. [92] Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res Gestae* 29.2.17.

[93] *VC* 2.4.2, 2.11.2. See also on Maximinus: *HE* 9.3.1.

different words which might loosely be covered by the English term 'piety' or 'pious', including '*φιλόθεος*', '*θεοσέβεια*', and '*εὐσέβεια*'.[94] Of these, the ones that appear most frequently in connection with the emperor are '*θεοσέβεια*' and '*εὐσέβεια*'.[95] The meaning of these two words is very similar and they often appear to be used almost interchangeably by Eusebius.[96] Both words, with their basic meaning of 'piety' or 'belief in God', contrast favourably with the '*δυσσέβεια*' (impiety) of tyrants like Licinius and Maxentius.[97] However, they also have a secondary meaning which was surely significant, for they could both refer, not just to piety in general, but to 'correct belief' more specifically.[98] Religious devotion alone was not enough for someone to be described as '*θεοσεβής*' or '*εὐσεβής*'; rather, that piety had to be correctly directed. The likelihood that Eusebius wished to exclude from ruling those Christians whose views he regarded as heterodox cannot be ignored.

Early in the *VC*, when describing the kind of example which Constantine provides to his subjects, Eusebius repeatedly describes him as a model of '*θεοσέβεια*'.[99] Here, forms of the word appear three times in only eight lines of Winkelmann's edition of the text, and this rapid repetition helps to emphasize the importance of this particular virtue. Moreover, on its second appearance here, it is further described as '*απλάνος θεοσέβεια*', or 'undeceived piety'.[100] The use of this adjective, which, as discussed, appears frequently in Eusebius' presentation of the demonic,[101] was surely deliberate. Eusebius seems to be emphasizing the importance of Constantine's orthodoxy here: Constantine's view of God has not been led astray by the demons who

[94] For example, *φιλόθεος*: *VC* 1.22.2, 3.29.2, 4.64.2; *θεοσέβεια*: *VC* 1.3.4, 1.4.1, 1.8.2, 1.41.2, 4.52.1; *εὐσέβεια*: *VC* 1.5.2, 1.6.1, 1.8.4, 1.9.1, 1.12.3, 1.22.2, 1.39.3, 3.29.1, 3.54.6, 4.18.1, 4.24.1, 4.52.1.

[95] Eusebius uses forms of the word *θεοσέβεια* and *εὐσέβεια* over ten times each in the *VC* to describe either Constantine or the kind of attitude which the emperor sought to encourage in his subjects and his sons. By contrast, forms of *φιλόθεος* are applied to Constantine or the state of his soul only three times in the *VC*. My calculations discount references in quoted documents and in chapter headings, where the wording is not Eusebius' own. (On the fact that the chapter headings are not to be attributed to Eusebius, see Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 24.)

[96] Farina suggests, however, that *θεοσέβεια* is a more specific virtue that may be encompassed within the broader *εὐσέβεια*, which he rightly identifies as one of the most important virtues of the 'true emperor' ('del vero Imperatore'): *L'impero*, 211–12, 216.

[97] *VC* 1.33.1, 1.49.2.

[98] *PGL*, *s.v.* *εὐσέβεια*; *θεοσέβεια*.

[99] *VC* 1.4.1.

[100] *VC* 1.4.1.

[101] See Chapter 4, section 'Demonic Influence'.

inspire both 'heresy' and polytheism. By using these words '*θεοσέβεια*' and '*εὐσέβεια*' more often than '*φιλόθεος*' to describe Constantine, it therefore seems that Eusebius meant to deny the possibility of ruling to 'heterodox' Christians as well as pagans.

Eusebius also emphasizes *φιλανθρωπία* ('love of humanity') as a distinguishing characteristic of Constantine and other virtuous emperors, most notably Constantine's father Constantius.[102] Indeed, Constantine's *φιλανθρωπία* is said to be so great that on occasion he even carried it to excess.[103] In underscoring *φιλανθρωπία* as an imperial virtue, Eusebius was, in many respects, following a precedent set by earlier Greek kingship literature.[104] Plutarch, for example, identified *φιλανθρωπία* as one of the divine virtues that a good king should seek to emulate and argued that a ruler was *φιλάνθρωπος* if he feared to cause suffering to his subjects.[105] Similarly, Philo listed *τὸ φιλάνθρωπον* as the first of four cardinal virtues of his good ruler, along with *τὸ φιλοδίκαιον* ('love of justice'), *τὸ φιλάγαθον* ('love of goodness'), and *τὸ μισοπόνηρον* ('hatred of wickedness').[106] Philo's paradigmatic ruler, Moses, is said to combine love of God and love of humanity, being described as *θεοφιλὴς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος*.[107] For Eusebius, however, this virtue of *φιλανθρωπία* does more than simply mark Constantine as a virtuous ruler in the traditional manner, but serves once again to demonstrate his distance from the influence of wicked demons. In Eusebius' view, demons are to be characterized as *μισάνθρωπος* or *ἀπάνθρωπος*.[108] This demonic inhumanity stands in sharp contrast to the *φιλανθρωπία* that Eusebius gives as a characteristic of the divine.[109] By emphasizing *φιλανθρωπία* as a virtue of his paradigmatic ruler, Eusebius is thus focusing attention, not only on

[102] For *φιλανθρωπία* applied to Constantine, see, for example: *HE* 10.9.2, 10.9.3, 10.9.8; *VC* 1.25.1, 1.43.1, 1.46.1, 2.3.1, 2.11.2, 2.20.1, 4.31.1; for *φιλανθρωπία* applied to Constantius, see: *VC* 1.9.1, 1.14.5–6.

[103] For example: *VC* 4.54.1.

[104] On this and similar virtues in earlier Greek and Roman literature, see: M. Griffin, 'Seneca and Pliny', in C. Rowe and M. Schofield, eds., *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 532–58; and B. Centrone, 'Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the Early Empire', in Rowe and Schofield, eds., *Cambridge History*, 559–84.

[105] Plutarch, *Ad principem ineruditum* 781a, 781c.

[106] Philo of Alexandria, *De Vita Mosis* 2.9.

[107] Philo, *Mos.* 2.163.

[108] For example: *PE* 1.5.8, 4.10.4, 4.16.14, 4.16.23–4, 5.1.8.

[109] For example: *HE* 2.14.6, 3.7.8, 10.4.11, 10.4.12, 10.4.18, 10.4.59.

the proximity of that ruler to God, but, at the same time, on his rejection of demons and their vices.

For Eusebius, a tyrant cannot be a true sovereign because he is a slave of demons. A tyrant may be identified for Eusebius either by his vicious lifestyle or by his false belief. Thus, both virtue and 'orthodox' Christianity become the primary qualifications for sovereignty in Eusebius' view. Of course Eusebius was not the first Christian writer to imply—however obliquely—either that earlier, pagan emperors were tyrants or to suggest that they might be acting under the influence of demons. Elaine Pagels argues that scholars have frequently underestimated the subversive core of earlier Christian apologists' political message by disregarding their discussions of demons.[110] The same might be said of scholars' treatment of Eusebius' political thought.

Of course Eusebius celebrates Constantine as the model of a virtuous Christian king,[111] but in doing so he also establishes strict criteria for determining who should be considered capable and worthy of ruling.[112] At root, it was essential that a ruler should be free from the influence of demons. In view of the demons' role in encouraging both vice and 'false' belief, Eusebius has therefore found a straightforward way of identifying a tyrant, or potential tyrant. Any ruler who inclined either towards vicious behaviour, or towards religious beliefs with which Eusebius did not agree, would be demonstrating that they were closer to the demons than to God, thereby disqualifying themselves from government. This is a particularly striking message if we remember that Eusebius wrote at least one of his most 'political' works, the *VC*, not, for the most part, under Constantine, but under his sons.[113] Since these new emperors had already recalled one of Eusebius' theological enemies, Athanasius of Alexandria, from an exile imposed by, among others, Eusebius

[110] Pagels, 'Christian Apologists', 314, 323.

[111] As scholars have long recognized—for example: Farina, *L'impero*, 10; Sansterre, 'Eusèbe de Césarée', 137, 155.

[112] As Johnson has also previously noted: *Ethnicity and Argument*, 194. As Johnson has elsewhere pointed out, this was a key element of the 'mirror for princes' literature of which the *VC* at least is often said to be a part: *Eusebius*, 166–9.

[113] On the dating and composition of the *VC*, see: *C&E*, 263, 265, and Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 9–12, as well as the discussion in Chapter 1, section 'Questions of Dating and Composition', subsection '*Vita Constantini*'.

himself,[114] we may conclude that Eusebius was not entirely comfortable with the religious direction being taken by the new regime. It may have been couched in the language of praise for a Christian sovereign, but Eusebius' message that an unacceptable ruler was enslaved to demons was potentially no less subversive than Justin Martyr's earlier suggestion that the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Antoninus Pius were at risk of losing their independence to the power of demons.[115]

DIVINE AND DEMONIC *ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ*

For Eusebius, however, this idea that tyrants and demons were linked was not simply a useful means of exerting some degree of moral influence over the emperors; rather, the idea that a ruler could be serving the forces of evil had considerable cosmological significance. In Eusebius' view, a ruler's relationship with either the divine or the demonic would have a particularly profound impact on the progress of the ongoing struggle against the demons. Where earlier authors like Justin had urged the pagan emperors to turn to the Christian God for their own benefit,[116] Eusebius did not consider a ruler's religious beliefs to be a purely personal matter. Instead, he suggests that a sovereign's decision to follow either the divine or the demonic had the potential to affect not only his capacity to rule, but also the salvation and spiritual well-being of his subjects. This was because Eusebius believed that, by a process of μίμησις, or imitation, a ruler's religious beliefs were likely to be adopted by many of his subjects. Thus, a ruler's choices would affect not only his own salvation, but that of many others. As a result, while a Christian sovereign would lead his subjects away from demons, a non-Christian tyrant would encourage his subjects to turn towards the demonic, strengthening the position of the hostile forces in the continuing cosmic battle.

The concept of μίμησις was a long-standing and prominent element of Hellenistic kingship theory and its adoption by Eusebius has

[114] On the return of Athanasius, see: *C&E*, 263–4; on Athanasius' prior exile by the Council of Tyre, see: *C&E*, 235–40.

[115] Just. *1 Apol.* 14.

[116] Pagels, 'Christian Apologists', 307, citing Just. *2 Apol.* 15.

often been noted by scholars over the years.[117] However, in focusing on Eusebius' presentation of Constantine as the mimetic image of the Christ-Logos, this scholarship has overlooked the fact that, in a non-Christian ruler, this spiritual μίμησις might take a—from Eusebius' perspective—far more troubling form. The idea that a good sovereign was an image or imitation of the divine was well established in Hellenistic thought, to the extent that it has been described as 'simply part of the general intellectual atmosphere' of the period.[118] As far back as the second century BCE, writers had argued that a ruler's virtues came from the gods and were a reflection of divine virtues.[119] By the first century CE this idea was widespread: it can be found in the work of both Plutarch and Philo, among others.[120] Plutarch's statement that 'a ruler is an icon of god' in his treatise *To an Uneducated Ruler* neatly encapsulates this theory.[121] The crucial element of this idea, as Plutarch expressed it, was that it was chiefly through mirroring the virtues of the divine that a ruler would be able to become, in some measure, semi-divine himself. Plutarch asserts that 'through virtue he [the sovereign] establishes a resemblance to god'.[122] This appears to have been an extension of the earlier belief that self-control was essential for a good sovereign, since it would allow him to govern effectively and virtuously.[123]

Eusebius was clearly influenced by this tradition when developing his own understanding of virtuous sovereignty, as many scholars have recognized.[124] In the *VC*, for instance, Eusebius suggests that Constantine has been given 'the icon of his [God's] sole power'.[125] Indeed, throughout both the *VC* and the *LC*, the concept of μίμησις

[117] Chesnut, 'The Ruler and the Logos', 1329–31. See also: for example, Baynes, 'Eusebius and the Christian Empire', 168–72, Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 35, 187; Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 193–4; Farina, *L'impero*, 107–27.

[118] Chesnut, 'The Ruler and the Logos', 1329.

[119] D. E. Hahm, 'Kings and Constitutions: Hellenistic Theories', in Rowe and Schofield, eds., *Cambridge History*, 462.

[120] For discussion of these ideas, see: Chesnut, 'The Ruler and the Logos', 1310–32; and B. Centrone, 'Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the Early Empire', 559–84.

[121] Plut., *Ad princ.* 780e. [122] Plut., *Ad princ.* 780e.

[123] Hahm, 'Kings and Constitutions', 463.

[124] For example: Dvornik, *Political Philosophy*, II.614–22; F. Young, 'Christianity', in Rowe and Schofield, eds., *Cambridge History*, 651; Baynes, 'Eusebius and the Christian Empire', 168–72; Farina, *L'impero*, 107–27; most recently: P. Van Nuffelen, 'The Life of Constantine: The Image of an Image', in Johnson and Schott, eds., *Eusebius of Caesarea*, 137.

[125] *VC* 1.5.1.

occupies a prominent place in Eusebius' articulation of his ideal of sovereignty. Eusebius introduces the idea early in the *LC*:

> And this is the one who rules the whole of this universe, who is above everything and through everything and in everything, both seen and unseen, the penetrating Logos of God, by whom and through whom the king who is a friend of God, carrying the icon of the highest kingdom, as an imitation (*κατὰ μίμησιν*) of the best one [i.e. God], steering the ship, directs as a guide all things on earth.[126]

Here, Eusebius appears to have picked up on several of the essentials of this idea as expressed by earlier Greek writers, including the notion that the good sovereign carried the 'image' of the divine and that he ruled 'as an imitation' of God.[127] The idea is also expressed in terms with which even non-Christians in Eusebius' audience would have been familiar. It would, however, be a mistake to suggest that Eusebius was therefore simply using the concept in order to appeal to an audience whose sympathies lay more with Hellenistic philosophy than with Christianity, for similar ideas also run through the more overtly Christian *VC*. Here, in his description of Constantine's *vicennalia* celebrations, Eusebius writes that the occasion 'seemed as if it were an imagined icon of Christ's kingdom'.[128] In this case, the idea of *μίμησις* is expressed in unmistakably Christian terms. As a result, it is clear that this idea of the ruler as an image of the divine formed an important part of Eusebius' understanding of virtuous sovereignty.

However, despite these similarities, it is misleading to suggest that Eusebius 'simply took over' earlier Hellenistic ideas on the topic of divine *μίμησις*,[129] for such an assessment overlooks an important difference between these earlier views and those of Eusebius. Crucially, in Eusebius' version of the theory, it was not only *μίμησις* of the divine, but also *μίμησις* of the demonic, that was possible. In earlier kingship theory, a failure on the part of the sovereign to mirror effectively the virtues of the divine would undoubtedly mean that he would not

[126] *LC* 1.6.

[127] For similar ideas, see: Plut. *Ad princ.* 780e–f; Ecphantus, *On Kingship*, 245.5, 272.13–14, 274.14–16; Diotogenes, *On Kingship*, 265.8–12; Sthenidias, *On Kingship*, 270.14–17. The treatises of Ecphantus, Diotogenes, and Sthedias, preserved by Stobaeus, are cited here by their Hense page and line numbers. Baynes, in particular, highlighted the similarities between these three treatises and the *LC* of Eusebius: Baynes, 'Eusebius and the Christian Empire', 168–72.

[128] *VC* 3.15.2.

[129] Chesnut, 'The Ruler and the Logos', 1332.

be a good ruler, but it did not mean that he would imitate instead an alternative, evil spiritual power. For Eusebius, by contrast, it appears that a ruler must be imitating some sort of spiritual power, and if that was not the true Christian God, then it could only be the wicked demons who tried so often to usurp the true place of God.[130] As a result, for Eusebius, the failure of divine μίμησις became not simply a regrettable lapse but a dangerous error of choice, in which the ruler came to side with the forces of evil against goodness, virtue, and piety.

That Eusebius held μίμησις of the demonic to be a worrying possibility is made clear in the *LC*, in a passage which contrasts the soul of the virtuous sovereign with the souls of his tyrannical enemies. Eusebius begins his discussion with what appears to be a fairly standard expression of the theory of divine μίμησις—Constantine is praised for 'having admitted into his soul the outpourings from there [i.e. from God]', and is therefore said to share in God's wisdom, goodness, justice, and courage.[131] Eusebius then rapidly switches his attention to the unnamed tyrannical ruler, who is said to have 'taken the disfigured and dishonourable into his soul'.[132] This, Eusebius makes clear, is because this tyrant 'has stamped (τετυπωμένος) on his soul numberless falsely drawn icons of demons'.[133] The contrast with the good sovereign, who has the image of God in his soul, is obvious. It is equally clear from Eusebius' juxtaposition of these two figures that he considered the relationship between the tyrannical ruler and the demons to be an inverted form of the mimetic relationship between the virtuous king and the truly divine Christian God. This is made still clearer by Eusebius' suggestion that the bad ruler 'has taken the rage of a savage wild-beast in exchange for kingly gentleness'.[134] Unrestrained rage may have been a traditional feature of a bad ruler,[135] but the reference to a 'savage wild-beast' immediately brings to mind the demons which Eusebius elsewhere describes

[130] On the demons' desire to usurp God's position and honours, see: *PE* 7.16.10.
[131] *LC* 5.1. [132] *LC* 5.2.
[133] *LC* 5.3. We have already seen (Chapter 4, section 'Demonic Influence') that the tyrant may be held to account for his association with demons, since he submits to them through his own free choice.
[134] *LC* 5.2.
[135] See for example: Hdt. *Hist.* 1.73; Philo of Alexandria, *Legatio ad Gaium*, 366. For further examples, and a discussion of this theme in Greek and Roman literature, see: W. V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 229–63.

in similar terms.[136] It seems that, for Eusebius, the bad ruler, in forming the image of demons in his soul, has also adopted some of their other characteristics.

Of course, Eusebius was not the first writer to express an interest in the contents of a tyrant's soul—Plato had suggested that a human tyrant might have an inner tyrant residing in his own soul.[137] Yet for Plato it was ὁ ἔρως (passion/desire) that tyrannized the tyrant's soul.[138] In making the force dominating a tyrant's soul an external, spiritual power, Eusebius opens up the possibility that the tyrant may also be engaged in a negative process of μίμησις in a way that Plato had not. Thus, while scholars generally focus on the idea of Constantine's μίμησις of the divine in Eusebius' works, there can be no doubt that he also allowed for the more dangerous possibility of μίμησις of the demonic.

Moreover, Eusebius' use of the verb τυπόω (to stamp) to describe how the tyrant acquires the images of demons in his soul is a reminder once again that a bad ruler was not a passive victim of the demons, but rather an active participant in their wickedness. This word is found in earlier Stoic psychology,[139] appearing in Diogenes Laertius' account of Zeno to describe the way in which an external impression (φαντασία) makes a mark on the human soul:

> A *phantasia* is a moulding (τύπωσιν) on the soul, fittingly taking its name from the impressions (τύπων) which are brought about by a signet ring in sealing-wax.[140]

For the Stoics, receiving such an impression in the soul was not an entirely passive process; rather, it also involved actively accepting the impression.[141] Thus people also had a role to play in forming

[136] See, for example: *PE* 4.17.9, *VC* 1.49.1; *HE* 10.4.14; *DE* 10.8.73; *Theoph.* 3.13, 3.55. See also: *LC* 2.3 on 'the rebellious powers'.

[137] Plat. *Rep.* 9.575c–d. On Plato's idea of the 'tyrannical soul', see the discussion in M. Schofield, *Plato: Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 265–70. D. J. O'Meara suggests that the *Republic*, particularly its portrait of a tyrant, was 'an obvious and major source of inspiration': *Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 147–8.

[138] Plat. *Rep.* 9.574e–575a.

[139] For a straightforward account of Stoic φαντασίαι, see: M. Frede, 'Stoic Epistemology', in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield, eds., *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 300–13.

[140] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 7.45.

[141] Frede, 'Stoic Epistemology', 306–7.

impressions in their souls. This is best illustrated by Philo, who wrote in his *Legum allegoriae*:

> And so *phantasia* is composed from the approach of an external thing moulding the mind through sensation, while impulse, the brother of *phantasia*, is composed from the stretching power of the mind, which, stretching out through sensation, fastens on to the thing before it and travels towards it, longing to attain and come together with it.[142]

Although Philo's philosophy was by no means exclusively Stoic,[143] A. A. Long suggests that, in this particular case, Philo's discussion largely reflects Stoic ideas.[144] This passage shows that, in the Stoic view, forming an impression on the soul or on the mind was an active process, in which the human being had to participate. Of course, in this case Eusebius is discussing images of demons, rather than φαντασίαι in general, but it is hard to believe that he would not have had this Stoic idea of active participation in mind when selecting the verb τυπόω. We know that Eusebius was familiar with Philo's *Legum allegoriae*, for he mentions it in his catalogue of Philo's works in the *HE*.[145] Once again, Eusebius subtly conveys the idea that these bad rulers have chosen to collaborate with the demons by allowing these false images to be stamped on their souls.

This idea that bad rulers might be engaged in active μίμησις of the demonic has further implications for Eusebius' understanding of the capacity of a non-Christian to rule. No one enslaved to demonically inspired religious error, be that polytheism or 'heresy', could hope to be a virtuous sovereign, for as far as Eusebius was concerned they have chosen the wrong model to imitate. As long as they do not recognize the 'correct' divinity, they cannot meet the requirement of Hellenistic kingship theory that the good sovereign should imitate the divine, for they are modelling themselves and their behaviour on the wrong exemplar. By contrast with the tyrants, whose enslavement to demons is so heavily emphasized, Eusebius in the *VC* describes Constantine as a 'slave' (δοῦλος) and a 'servant' (θεράπων) of God.[146]

[142] Philo, *Leg.* 1.30.

[143] On the variety of different influences on Philo's thought, see, most recently: L. Kerns, 'Soul and Passions in Philo of Alexandria', *Studia Patristica* 63 (2013), 141–54.

[144] A. A. Long, 'Stoic Psychology', in Algra et al., eds., *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, 573.

[145] *HE* 2.18.1; Carriker, *Library*, 165.

[146] *VC* 1.6.1, 1.46.1.

Moreover, Eusebius makes it clear in the same passage that Constantine is happy to describe himself in these terms.[147] If tyrants, by enslaving themselves to wicked masters, have made a fundamental error of judgement by choosing the wrong spiritual model to copy, Constantine, as a slave of the true God, has selected the correct model to follow and might therefore be able to achieve the level of virtue necessary to govern in the divine image. Eusebius is thus able, in the *VC*, to set up a contrast between the 'good' slavery of Constantine and the 'bad' slavery of the tyrants, thereby helping to emphasize the wide gulf that separates them.

At first sight, it might appear somewhat contradictory that Eusebius is able in one work, the *VC*, to describe Constantine as a 'slave',[148] and in another, the *LC*, to refer to him as 'truly self-ruling'.[149] Yet this does not in fact represent any inconsistency in Eusebius' thought; rather, it demonstrates the variety of different traditions which influenced his manner of expression. In the Greek and Roman tradition, particularly from the third century onwards, a ruler would often be presented as a friend or companion of the divine.[150] It is this metaphor of friendship that Eusebius employs extensively in the *LC*, although he also describes Constantine in these terms in the *VC* and other works.[151] At the same time, however, there was also a tradition in Jewish literature of describing the pious, particularly prophets and kings, as 'slaves of God'.[152] Philo, combining Greek and Jewish influences in his thought, had shown himself, like Eusebius, to be familiar with both possible metaphors for describing this relationship with God.[153] Although Philo appears to have preferred the metaphor of friendship to that of slavery, arguing that someone who was wise should be described as a friend of God rather than a slave,[154] he was nevertheless prepared to use the verb δουλεύω (to be a slave) to describe a pious person's relationship to God.[155] For Eusebius'

[147] *VC* 1.6.1. [148] *VC* 1.6.1. [149] *LC* 5.4.

[150] Drake, *In Praise of Constantine*, 58. See also: A. D. Nock, 'The Emperor's Divine *Comes*', *JRS* 37 (1947), 102–16.

[151] For example: *LC* 1.6, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 5.1, 5.4; *VC* 1.3.4, 1.52.1; *HE* 10.8.6, 10.9.2. Cameron regards this as 'a translation of [the motif] of the emperor as divine *comes*': 'Construction', 157–8.

[152] C. Hezser, *Jewish Slavery in Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 327, citing Mal. 3:22; 2 Sam. 3:18; Ps. 18:1; 1 Kgs 11:13; Ezek. 34:23–4.

[153] Hezser, *Jewish Slavery*, 330.

[154] Philo of Alexandria, *De sobrietate*, 55, cited in Heszer, *Jewish Slavery*, 330.

[155] Philo of Alexandria, *De cherubim*, 107, cited in Heszer, *Jewish Slavery*, 330.

understanding of 'good' slavery, however, it was more likely the epistles of Paul that proved most influential. This notion of slavery to God as a positive condition, even a source of pride, is extremely prominent in Paul's letters.[156] Paul regularly describes himself either as δοῦλος θεοῦ or δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ.[157] Moreover, these are terms that he also applies to the recipients of his letters.[158] Thus, within Christian thought, it was perfectly possible to be enslaved in a positive sense, provided that enslavement was to God or Christ,[159] rather than to the devil and his demons.

For Eusebius, then, these separate ideas of tyrannical enslavement to demons and of μίμησις combined to suggest that anyone who was not an 'orthodox' Christian was incapable of ruling as a virtuous sovereign, according to the requirements set out by long-standing theories of kingship. Yet Eusebius also envisaged a second level of μίμησις, which led him to see the tyrant's enslavement to demons as a problem of cosmological significance. This was because, in Eusebius' view, demonic error might spread through the figure of the ruler to infect the entire state. Eusebius' statement in the *VC* that Constantine's 'tyrannical' predecessors had 'first enslaved themselves and afterwards all of their subjects to the errors of wicked demons' makes this process clear.[160] As a result of the ruler's mistaken faith in demons, his subjects have also been drawn into the power of the demonic. In this, Eusebius was once again drawing on earlier ideas. According to earlier Greek philosophy, the good ruler, by imitating the divine, could lead his subjects towards the divine, encouraging them to imitate a lifestyle of godly virtue and rationality.[161] Philo had written that 'the obscure are the emulators of those who are esteemed and, that which they [the esteemed] seem especially to reach out for, towards such things do they [the obscure] extend their own impulses'.[162] In the context of a tyrannical ruler, this meant that

[156] Paul develops a distinction between 'slavery to sin' and 'slavery to God' in his letters, the former being a bad condition, while the latter is good: Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 183–6.

[157] See, for example: Rom. 1:1; Phil. 1:1; Titus 1:1.

[158] For example: Col. 3:24.

[159] The idea of slavery to Christ also appears in some of Eusebius' exegetical works. See, for example: *CI* 261.18–21, 294.22–5, 375.28–30; *GEI PG* 22.1069, 22.1097, 22.1229.

[160] *VC* 1.13.3.

[161] Chesnut, 'The Ruler and the Logos', 1312.

[162] Philo, *Mos.* 1.160.

'whenever a leader starts to revel in luxury and to decline towards a luxurious life, practically all his subjects also fan up the desires of the stomach and others besides those of the stomach, over and above what is necessary'.[163] In other words, Philo argued that the majority of a ruler's subjects would seek to imitate their leader's behaviour, for better or worse. For Eusebius, however, it was not simply the tyrants' behaviour that people would imitate, but—far more worryingly—their devotion to the demons.

This would have deep implications not only for the salvation of those concerned, but for the progress of salvation history more broadly. Non-Christian rulers could slow, if not reverse, the decline of demonic power by ensuring that the majority of people continued to turn to the demons in imitation of their emperors. Indeed, in the *DE* Eusebius is explicit about the fact that, for much of its history, the Roman Empire had done little to assist the spread of Christianity.[164] Eusebius suggests that the anti-Christian measures put forward by earlier emperors were permitted by God in order to demonstrate the power of the Christian message. It is important, he argues, that Christian worship should 'not be thought to have endured because of the acquiescence of the rulers'.[165]

The significance of this idea that subjects would imitate a ruler's religious beliefs and practices to Eusebius' thinking on kingship is further reflected in his presentation of Constantine. In contrast to the tyrants, Constantine in the *VC* is 'a clear model of a pious life to all men',[166] while, in the *LC*, he 'calls up (*ἀνακαλεῖται*) the entire human nation to the knowledge of the best one [i.e. God]'.[167] The crucial point is that, in the figure of Constantine, God has provided people with the correct model of virtue to imitate. Eusebius' use of the verb *ἀνακαλέω* (to call upwards), with the prefix *ἀνα-* indicating a positive movement upwards, contrasts strikingly with the kind of language that he uses about tyrants and demons. For these rulers, Eusebius prefers to apply the prefix *κατα-* to verbs describing their style of government, suggesting a negative, downwards movement.[168] Where Constantine leads people into a better condition, a non-Christian

[163] Philo, *Mos.* 1.160.
[164] *DE* 3.7.36–8. As Johnson similarly noted: *Ethnicity and Argument*, 179.
[165] *DE* 3.7.36. [166] *VC* 1.3.4. [167] *LC* 2.4.
[168] See, for example: *HE* 10.2.1, 10.9.3; *VC* 1.12.2, and discussion in Chapter 3, section 'Further Polarities'.

ruler would encourage people to fall to a lesser state. A ruler like Constantine, with 'correct' religious beliefs, is able to guide his subjects towards God, while a ruler enslaved to demons would lead them down and away, thereby endangering not just his own salvation, but that of his subjects.

CONCLUSIONS

Eusebius has often been presented as a pillar of the political establishment, an imperial sycophant who 'placed himself and his pen unconditionally at the service of the Emperor'.[169] Yet our examination of the role which Eusebius believed demons could play in the political system suggests that he was not unreservedly supportive of the political establishment. On the contrary, Eusebius had strict requirements of those wishing to be considered 'true sovereigns', in which both virtue and faith featured heavily. Of course, Eusebius was not quite as subversive as those earlier thinkers studied by Pagels. Pagels suggests that writers like Athenagoras had adopted a radically egalitarian approach, in which all people, or at least all Christians, were to be considered equal.[170] Eusebius does not go nearly so far. Indeed, we know from the *DE* that he believed that different Christians would exercise different levels of virtue, to the extent that he envisaged two different paths towards God for these different groups.[171]

Eusebius is certainly a long way from suggesting that just any Christian would be capable of ruling. His works consequently offer some other possible justifications for imperial rule, alongside those of virtue and religious belief.[172] Of these, the most prominent is the idea of inheritance. In both the *LC* and the *VC*, Eusebius stresses the continuity between Constantine and his sons as rulers of the empire. In the *LC*, this consists of a brief reference to Constantine sharing the

[169] Quasten, *Patrology*, 319. For a similar sentiment, see: Brown, *World of Late Antiquity*, 86.

[170] Pagels, 'Christian Apologists', 319–20, citing Athenagoras, *Legatio* 25.

[171] *DE* 1.8.1–4.

[172] Farina suggests that Eusebius combines 'the principle of the divine origin of power' ('dell'origine divina del potere'), with that of the 'elective' ('elettivo') and 'hereditary' ('ereditario') origins: *L'impero*, 169.

rule of the empire with his sons as Caesars.[173] However, it is stressed much more strongly in the *VC*, where the idea of the imperial throne descending from father to son appears both towards the beginning and the end of the work.[174] This serves to frame Constantine's reign with the idea of a smooth transition of imperial power. At *VC* 1.9.2, Eusebius describes how 'the throne of the empire' passed from Constantius to Constantine and then on to the latter's sons, stressing the idea of continuity. Here, Eusebius likens the empire to 'an inheritance' (τις πατρῷος). This word is used again towards the end of the work, when Eusebius discusses how Constantine divided the empire among his three sons 'as if allocating something in the nature of an inheritance to those most dear to him'.[175] This is a striking word to use, as if to suggest that the empire belongs by right to Constantine's family.

Even so, there remains a sense that this inheritance is a gift of God: in the *LC* it is God who appoints Constantine's sons as Caesars. Moreover, this is said to be just one of an increasing number of rewards which God gives to Constantine, 'in exchange for his holy acts towards him [God]'.[176] Indeed, while the word πατρῷος traditionally referred to something which was inherited from one's father,[177] among Christian writers the word could also refer to something which belonged to God, as the Father.[178] As such, Eusebius' language here also hints that the empire in fact continues to belong to God, and remains God's to give away or to entrust to a chosen ruler. Therefore, while the importance of inheritance is undoubtedly stressed, this remains at root a reward for Constantine's piety towards God—further evidence of the fact that his religious beliefs are the 'correct' ones. In consequence, it is also an inheritance that might be removed in the case of a failure of piety on the part of one of Constantine's successors.

Eusebius' first loyalty therefore lies with God in the battle against the demons, rather than with the emperor and the imperial family. Any failure, either of virtue or of faith, would, according to Eusebius' understanding of sovereignty, see a figure disqualified from government. If Constantine's actions against Licinius, who had at one point been presented by Eusebius as a sovereign appointed by God and rewarded for his faith, were valid and justifiable on the grounds of

[173] *LC* 3.1.
[174] Cameron and Hall, *Life of Constantine*, 334.
[175] *VC* 4.51.1.
[176] *LC* 3.1.
[177] *LSJ*, *s.v.* πατρῷος.
[178] *PGL*, *s.v.* πατρῷος.

Licinius' later turn towards the demons, then future action against other emperors who similarly failed to remain true to the Christian God might be similarly justifiable.

As a result of the foregoing analysis of Eusebius' understanding of the broader cosmological significance of the ruler, we are also able to locate the figure of Constantine more precisely within Eusebius' historical and cosmological vision. It has been suggested in the past that Eusebius identified the *pax Romana* with the final, eschatological 'Kingdom of Peace' and envisaged a brief future of not more than a few centuries, during which the Constantinian dynasty would rule as eschatological saviour-figures.[179] This seems implausible in view of the fact that Eusebius ended his life theologically on the defensive, eying a future in which it was by no means certain that Constantine's descendants would share Eusebius' precise understanding of Christian truth, and hence in his view remain free from demonic influence. Eusebius certainly considered Constantine to have a role to play in bringing people to salvation and driving forward the defeat of the demons as a result of a process of μίμησις. This role was significant, however, not because Constantine represented the concluding figure of human history, but rather because he was operating as part of a finely poised and closely fought battle against the demons. Constantine's importance for Eusebius is best understood in the context of the continuing struggle against demonic influence.

[179] Chesnut, *First Christian Histories*, 160–1.

Conclusions

The aim of this book has been to explore the ways in which Eusebius' ideas about the demonic influenced and interacted with his thinking on a range of other subjects that comprised his political ideas. It began with a survey of Eusebius' *oeuvre* that sought to situate the key texts for understanding his views on demons in the context of the political and religious upheavals of the era. This was followed by an essential examination of Eusebius' understanding of the demonic, filling a gap in previous scholarship. This showed that Eusebius believed firmly in the existence of demonic power, regarding demons as a hostile, active presence in the universe. Chapter 3 demonstrated how Eusebius' belief in malevolent demonic forces helped to structure his thought, resulting in a cosmology of starkly divided, warring opposites.

With the role of demons in Eusebius' cosmology clearly established, the fourth chapter began to examine how these ideas helped to shape other areas of Eusebius' thought. This chapter looked at the interplay between demonic influence and human free choice in Eusebius' descriptions of wicked activity. It revealed the importance of the concept of προαίρεσις in Eusebius' understanding of moral responsibility and showed that Eusebius regarded the maintenance of high standards of virtue as essential to securing salvation. Chapter 5 examined the role of demons in Eusebius' understanding of history, challenging the widespread scholarly view that Eusebius believed all demonic power to have ceased with the incarnation. This showed that Eusebius considered virtuous, exemplary Christian leadership—of both church and empire—to be essential in an ongoing struggle to resist demonic influence. Finally, Chapter 6 turned to examine Eusebius' presentation of imperial sovereignty and the figure of Constantine. It revealed that Eusebius was by no means unconditional in his support for the Roman emperor; rather, he demanded a particularly

high standard of 'orthodox' piety from those wishing to be seen as the true ruler. Only in this way would the emperor be able to perform the essential role of leading his subjects on the journey towards salvation.

Taken together, the conclusions of this study are striking, compelling us to reassess the common conclusion of scholars that Eusebius was complacently triumphalist in his vision of history and his understanding of the position of the Christian church. At each stage Eusebius has been revealed as far more cautious than his usual characterization suggests and deeply concerned about a continuing threat to human salvation from malevolent demonic forces. This concern led him to lay great weight on the importance of a virtuous Christian lifestyle in order to avoid the deceits of the demons and remain on the path to salvation. For Eusebius, complete Christian triumph still lay in the future and was dependent upon the maintenance of virtue by all Christian souls.

Of course, this work is not the first to reassess the traditional caricature of Eusebius as a servile imperial sycophant, who 'placed . . . his pen unconditionally at the service of the Emperor'.[1] Aaron Johnson has already presented us with a far more independent Eusebius, whose ambivalence about the role of the Roman Empire persisted even after Constantine's unification of east and west.[2] Michael Hollerich has likewise suggested that the importance of high political concerns in shaping Eusebius' thought has been overemphasized in the scholarship, highlighting instead the importance of Eusebius' thinking on the role of the church.[3] In addition, F. S. Thielman has questioned the notion of Eusebius' 'realized eschatology'.[4]

In questioning this further, long-standing assumption about Eusebius—that he should be characterized as a triumphal optimist—this study therefore has strong foundations in recent scholarship. Nevertheless, it leaves us with a picture of Eusebius that is strikingly different even from that found in the most up-to-date work on Eusebius.[5] It is a more nuanced picture, in which Eusebius' outlook

[1] Quasten, *Patrology*, 319. For a similar sentiment, see also: Brown, *World of Late Antiquity*, 86.

[2] Johnson, *Ethnicity and Argument*, 153–97.

[3] Hollerich, 'Religion and Politics'; Hollerich, *Eusebius'* Commentary on Isaiah.

[4] Thielman, 'Another Look'.

[5] Johnson, for instance, continues to stress the 'triumphalism' of Eusebius' views: 'The Ends of Transfiguration', 196. See also: Simmons, 'Universalism in Eusebius', 132–3. The exception is my recent article: Johannessen, '*Genos* of Demons'.

might be better described as cautiously positive than complacently triumphalist. By focusing on Eusebius' ideas about demons, this study has revealed a new side to him. It has also highlighted several possible avenues for future research.

It has not been possible in the space available to examine fully the sources of and possible influences on Eusebius' ideas about demons. We have observed a range of possible influences, from the works of Plato and Porphyry, to Jewish apocalyptic writings such as 1 Enoch, but further work on this might reveal more both about Eusebius' own intellectual background, and about trends in Christian demonology in the late third and early fourth centuries. Eusebius' profound intellectual debt to Origen has often been highlighted by scholars;[6] recently, however, some have started to question the extent of Eusebius' dependence on Origen and to focus instead on areas of difference between the two writers.[7] Origen's works contain a rich and intriguing demonology,[8] and a further, more detailed comparison between the views of Origen and Eusebius on demons might therefore offer a valuable new perspective on this debate.

Work on the reception of the Enochic story of the Watcher angels suggests that, by the late third and early fourth centuries, this interpretation of Genesis 6:1–4 was falling out of favour among Christian writers,[9] to be replaced by an interpretation in which the references to 'angels' were reinterpreted to describe pious humans, who had strayed from their virtuous lifestyle.[10] Lactantius is cited in this scholarship as the last significant writer to adopt the angelic interpretation of Genesis 6,[11] yet, as we have seen,[12] hints of this story can also be found in some of Eusebius' works. Examining the traces of this

[6] See, most recently: Penland, 'The History of the Caesarean Present', esp. 93; Ramelli, 'Origen, Eusebius, *Apokatastasis*, and Christology'.

[7] For example: Corke-Webster, 'Mothers and Martyrdom', 55; Hollerich, 'Eusebius' *Commentary on the Psalms*', 164; Zamagni, 'New Perspectives', 243; Johnson, 'The Ends of Transfiguration', 201–2.

[8] For example: Orig. *Cels*. 1.6, 1.67, 2.51, 3.2, 3.29, 3.37, 4.32, 4.92–3, 7.6, 7.35, 7.67–70, 8.30; *de Princ*. 3.2.1–7. On Origen's demonology, see: Marx-Wolf, 'Third Century Daimonologies'; T. Mikoda, 'A Comparison of the Demonologies of Origen and Plutarch', in R. J. Daly, ed., *Origeniana Quinta* (Leuven: Peeters, 1992), 326–32; on his angelology, see also: Blanc, 'L'angélologie'; Muehlberger, *Angels*, 33–4 and 98–9.

[9] VanderKam, 'Enochic Motifs', 84; Reed, *Fallen Angels*, 206, 218–21.

[10] VanderKam, 'Enochic Motifs', 80.

[11] VanderKam, 'Enochic Motifs', 84, citing Lact. *Div. Inst.* 2.14–17.

[12] See Chapter 2, section 'Demons and the Devil'.

account in Eusebius' writings could therefore prove instructive for those wishing to trace the decline of this interpretation among Christian authors.

From a broader perspective, this study has also demonstrated the importance of analysing ideas about demons in the works of urban, intellectual Christians of this period—a need previously highlighted by the work of Dayna Kalleres.[13] As bishop of a leading city and centre of learning,[14] few writers could be seen as closer to the heart of urban Christian culture at this time than Eusebius, and demons, as we have observed, occupied a prominent place in his writings. Overlooking these references to demons has led scholars in the past to form a distorted picture of Eusebius' ideas, overemphasizing the optimistic elements of his thought to the neglect of his concerns about the maintenance of high moral standards. Recognizing the significance of Eusebius' views on the demonic has led us to revise our picture of Eusebius' overall outlook, illustrating the value of studying references to demons where they have previously been ignored. This book thereby complements the recent work of Kalleres and Morwenna Ludlow,[15] while also highlighting the gap that still remains in our understanding of fourth-century Christian demonology. Further research on ideas about demons in the works of other urban Christian intellectuals of the period is still needed. Despite the efforts of Kalleres and Ludlow, there remains scope for much further work on Cappadocian demonology, for instance.

Finally, the exploration of Eusebius' ideas about agency and moral responsibility in Chapter 4 has not only helped to clarify his thought on this subject, but has also revealed a wider problem in scholarship on early Christian ideas about agency. It is not only scholarship on Eusebius that persists in using the terms 'will' and 'free will' without adequate definition. Rather, it is possible to find scholars from various backgrounds—historical as well as theological—referring to an early Christian author's ideas about 'free will' without fully acknowledging that ancient views on agency were expressed in a different vocabulary.

[13] Kalleres, 'Demons and Divine Illumination'; Kalleres, *City of Demons*.

[14] On Caesarea Maritima in this period, see: J. Patrich, 'Caesarea in the Time of Eusebius', in Inowlocki and Zamagni, eds., *Reconsidering Eusebius*, 1–24; on the city and its library, see: Carriker, *Library*, 1–36.

[15] Kalleres, 'Demons and Divine Illumination'; Kalleres, *City of Demons*; Ludlow, 'Demons, Evil and Liminality'.

In order to improve our understanding of early Christian debates about agency, freedom, and responsibility, examinations of the vocabulary and grammar of agency similar to that in Chapter 4 will be needed for other authors of this era. The significance of this book therefore lies in its contribution not only to our understanding of Eusebius' thought, but also to scholarship on early Christian demonology and discussions of agency.

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